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THE PUC AND SERVICE IN THE 90'S --
REGULATION, DEREGULATION, OR REREGULATION? 
The Public's 
In 1910, after years of 
people California 
tion., laying the groundwork 
(PUC) free of utility 
to determine its role in 
future into the next decade, 
The issue 
beyond. 
From all appearances. 
telephone service 
any 
Telecommunications Re ulation 
utilities and their customers, the 
of the California Constitu-
Public Utilities Commission 
at the heart of a struggle 
of California's telecommunications 
it be regulated in the 1990's 
pleased with the quality of 
telephone companies indicate a 
there are more Califor-
business and leisure activities than 
are ready to be implemented 
by the telephone companies as soon as they receive PUC authorization; some are 
already being offered on an interim basis, pending resolution of jurisdictional 
disputes between the PUC and the FCC. And telephone company profits have hit 
record heights, exceeding 14 percent return on equity in recent years. (For 
example, Pacific Bell, in 1988, earned approximately $1.2 billion on revenues of 
$11 billion.) 
One might ask, in these circumstances, what substantial societal gains can 
be attained by relaxing regulation of the telephone companies? 
On the other hand, to hold with the opponents of regulatory change that the 
telephone companies should not be permitted in any way to advance the coming 
"information society" may be short-sighted and deny the appropriate use of 
billions of dollars of ratepayer investments represented by telephone company 
assets and labor. 
Unfortunately, these larger issues of accountability and responsible plan-
ning for Californians' collective future may be lost in the welter of self-serving 
claims and counterclaims being put forward by the telephone companies and their 
opponents in several pending regulatory proceedings. 
This hearing is intended to examine the role of regulation in the evolution 
of California's telecommunications infrastructure and how pending regulatory 
proceedings, and future legislation, may shape this role. 
A Complex Telecommunications Industry 
Challenges California's Regulators 
Five years ago, the Bell System monopoly was dismembered at the hands of 
the U.S. Justice Department and AT&T's own executives. Today, different firms 
provide long-distance and local telephone service, under supervision by a federal 
court and the Federal Communications Commission; still other firms offer other 
information services. The success of this policy .is still hotly debated.* 
*Today, after three decades,the Federal Communications Commission's policy of inducing com-
petition in the telecommunications industry is facing serious criticism. International competition 
What not debatable is that the American telecommunications industry is 
considerably more complex than it was before 1984. 
case California, where telephone company revenues 
exceed $15 annually. California, probably the most lucrative and fastest-
growing telecommunications market in North America (and possibly the world), 
is a region exceedingly dependent on the appropriate provision and regulation of 
telecommunications services. All public telecommunications providers in Cali-
fornia, to a greater or degree, are regulated by the Public Utilities 
Commission 
• AT&T, MCI, US Sprint, AHnet, and a host of smaller "resellers" provide 
long-distance voice and data service in California. (The Los Angeles-San 
Francisco "hop" is the "hottest" --most frequently used-- transmission link 
in the world. 
• California's two largest telephone companies, Pacific Bell (a subsidiary of 
Pacific Telesis, a holding company), and GTE California (a subsidiary of 
GTE Corp.), provide local voice and data telephone service to approxi-
mately 11 million and 2.5 million telephone customers, respectively. 
• Twenty-two telephone companies provide local voice and data 
service to an additional half-million Californians. 
These long-distance carriers and the local telephone companies provide the 
public telecommunications network, the infrastructure on which California's 
future information economy can grow. These telecommunications firms thus 
have a responsibility and an incentive to support the development of an 
information economy; but they may also be tempted to exploit this development 
to their own advantage. 
and Canada, where integrated national telecommunications 
plat:tonm technological is one reason for this reassess-
:UH._, ........... telecommunications policy, which is encouraging 
but industry concentration in the "core," invites skepticism. 




The faced with a very complex situation, is today asking, "How shall 
we manage change?" One solution proposed to the Commission is that it permit 
the private interests greater leeway to make long-
range proposal is sometimes labeled "regulatory 
flexibility" or "marketplace-driven regulation." Two proceedings taking place 
right now will the PUC's will to hew to its historical regulatory 
responsibilities: "Alternative Regulatory Framework" Investigation (I. 87-
11-033), which September 1987; and the "Enhanced Services" 
proceeding (A. 88-08-031) . 
purposes 
The Traditional Goals of Regulation 
"alternatives," utility regulation and its traditional 
appreciated. 
The goals utility regulation include: (a) assuring just and 
reasonable rates, (b) preserving the ability of the utility enterprise to attract 
capital on reasonable terms, (c) preventing abuse of monopoly power and undue 
discrimination among customers, and (d) assuring adequate service·. In Califor-
nia, "adequate service" has been meant "high quality." 
regulation ideally links rates to costs (including 
regulation meets the reciprocal interests of 
utilities and the utilities, capital attraction on reasonable 
terms; and (b) for just and reasonable prices (rates) for service. 
The PUC, in the past, has used the general rate case as the principal proceeding 
for determining appropriate rates for the utilities. During a general rate case, 
which may last several years, public hearings afford both formal and informal 
opportunities by anyone with an interest in the utility's operation. 
The PUC the duty of rate design: deciding who pays what for 
which service. 
responsibility for telephone 
company new technology. These investments must be sufficient 
but not In the 1970's, when subscribers complained about General 
Telephone's poor service, the PUC permitted GTE's rates to rise, to cover the 
company's investments in new state-of-the-art switching equipment. This year, 
after Pacific Bell's technology investments revealed 
that some were not necessary, the PUC directed Pacific Bell 
to reduce its rates by more than $120 over the next three years. In the future, as 
telephone company planners call for additional investments, the PUC's vigilance 
in this area may even more important. 
can intervene on the ratepayers' behalf when the 
telephone or who use their facilities employ unfair business or 
marketing 1985, the PUC fmed Pacific Bell $17 million for abusive 
marketing practices that resulted in customers (especially non-English-speaking 
customers) signing for services they did not understand or want. Refunds to 
those customer by the PUC totalled another several million dollars. This 
year, the PUC investigating the marketing practices of pay-phone operators and 
cellular telephone companies. 
Nevertheless, despite its successes, traditional rate regulation has its 
detractors. The Communications Commission (FCC) under Presidents 
Carter, Reagan, Bush sought to reduce its regulatory involvement in 
dramatic fashion. At the state level, local telephone companies have staged 
intensive to do with traditional utility regulation;. 
a modified form of regulation in 1985, shortly 
the long duration of general rate cases imperiled 
technological change and threatened its financial 
called for a moratorium on the general rate case. 
The Alternative Regulatory 
Framework Investigation (I 87-11-033) 
but in 1 it nur•uuo. 
of telephone 
Pacific Bell's uCalifomia Plan for Rate Stability," 
own investigation into potential new methods 







...... v.u..u. rate-of-return regulation might be 
nni'h.nl:>f" sufficient incentives for the provision 
The PUC had already begun the 
the long-distance carriers, a process 
and was inclined to consider how it 
verneru with the local telephone companies. 
Regulatory Framework" Investigation 
rate case was quickly concluded and 
on hold. Also put on hold were attrition 
that would normally occur on an 
into three "phases." Phase One, 
issues of pricing flexibility in clearly 
is examining the issues of 
Phase Three will consider the issue 
after a new regulatory structure for 
the Investigation, allowing for 
high-speed data services in the local 
flexibility for Pacific Bell's and GTE 
scrutiny for special contracts negoti-
largest customers. 
expected to be completed by August of 
its decision. (A proposed decision 
judge presiding over the Investigation 
.... u •• ,..,. different proposals to the PUC in 
more "flexible regulation" (a 












made by Pacific Bell, GTE California, 
T,...,....,,,,,, ..... Advocates (DRA). 
hiatus on general rate cases and the 
'''"'''""1: .. £,"'.,' ... '",,.., without close PUC scrutiny. GTE 
on general rate cases and a 
companies would like greater 
and to price services closer to cost (which 
that this will permit them to install new 
otherwise would be uneconomical, and to 
the local telephone market. 
proposals. Some are opposed because these 
own telecommunications business. Among these are 
Sprint, and MCI Communications. 
Alarm. Bay Area Teleport, Dun & 
publishes Yellow Pages and runs an 
a telecommunications management firm serving 
are concerned that the issue of 
they believe should precede any lightening 
......... ,__,,..,,.,. companies, has been put on the back burner 
parties fear unequal competition with 
markets. (Amvox, Extension 
and the newspaper industry, 
taken similar positions in related 
venues.) The California Cable 
telephone company proposals will 
omnarnes and allow them to cross-subsidize 
captive ratepayers. 
consumers of telephone services are also 
but for different reasons. The 
Association, the Tete-
Center for Public Interest 
at this hearing by the City of 
A 
I 
rate-of-return regulation is adequate to 
the PUC when it began the Investigation. 
of proof is on those who want change; the 
.... '"'._ ...... "" ..... they argue. They advise the PUC 
.. ..,o.4& ........... might ask to be made 
the current mode of regulation is inap-
market environment and only serves 
companies (represented at this hearing by the 
are not directly critical of the Pacific 
they contend that any new regulatory 
situation as small companies with few 
a less dramatic overhauling of the current 
has not stirred a great deal of controversy 
a narrow line between maintaining traditional 
vUJ.vU.L•!.U. regulatory modifications. Though 
the sweeping scope of the telephone 
The Enhanced Services Proceeding (A. 88-08-031) 
Commission (FCC) authorized the 
"enhanced services" in addition to basic 
March 1988, federal Judge Harold E. 
permitted the local telephone companies 
electronic meeting points (one or 
a customer can dial to reach a variety of 
Bell applied for 
the "Enhanced Services" 
Pacific Bell, information service 
providers can get started more cheaply using Pacific Bell's gateway technology, 
rather than having in technology of their own. 
collection, program monitoring and 
censorship, and alternative gateway options are currently 
being contested by this proceeding. VISA, Inc., wants 
assurances and other billing and collection 
options (other billing through the telephone company) will be available to 
information vendors customers. Dun & Bradstreet is concerned 
about a that Pacific Bell Directory might be 
settlement prohibits the local telephone 
companies this type of information service.) The Information 
Providers Association (IP A), is engaged with Pacific Bell in negotia-
tions regarding information has in the past raised important questions 
regarding the a common carrier-- the telephone company-- exer-
cising over the content communications. The IP A and the American 
Newspaper Publishers Association were involved in last year's successful 
legislative effort to limit the accessibility of objectionable 976 services under 
state, not telephone company, guidance. Telenet (not represented at this hear-
ing) questions the efficacy of Pacific Bell's gateway plans. 
Via the PUC has granted Pacific Bell interim 
authority videotex (computer-message) services. 
Pacific voice-mail services on an interim basis. 
These information regarding consumers' 
willingness they also afford Pacific Bell an 
outstanding to gain familiarity these new services, including 
operational and expenence. The grant of interim authority afforded 
Pacific Bell by the to provide new services, is not limited by any 
apparent other the notice that it may, in the future, alter the 
grant of authorization. has discouraged Pacific Bell from setting forth 





and the Bi er Picture 
of the iceberg of a much 
Investigation is taking place, let alone 
regulatory change and what is at stake for 
as evidenced by turnout at 
has been pauce. Except for the 
and the Center for Public 
in this decisive proceeding that 
no public consens11;s supporting radical 
1 
the political consequences of 
-----·---= organ of state government, 
the New York Public Service 
initiated an ambitious, long-
I.UU . ...., ......... v ...... .., requirements. Its intent 
telecommunications policy could affect 
adopting possibly irreversible 
direct the PUC to craft a similar 
excellent thinkers and do-er's in 
a public alerted to the need for a 
What do Californians expect from their technological future? The 
question begs to be answered, as the public interest deserves to be served. 
Robert Jacobson 
Principal Consultant 





regulation include: (a) assuring 
the ability of the utility enterprise 
abuse of monopoly 
and (d) assuring high-
Are these goals inappropriate for 
in the 1990's? 
ideally links rates to costs 
method to achieve the 
terms and (b) just and 
regulation recommended --
still serve the public interest? 
before the Public Utilities 
("Alternative Regulatory Frame-
adequate to identify and con-
of issues that should be of 




of Californians at large? 
so, how? 
and the PUC of 
telecommunications policy? 
1. National Regulatory Research Institute. Telecommunications Modernization: 
Who Pays? September, 1988. (The NRRI, the research arm of the National Association 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, or NARUC, explains the care that must be taken 
dealing with investments new telecommunications technology.) 
2. International Communications Association. Adapting State Regulation of 
Telephone Companies to Industzy Change. 1989. (The ICA, a national organization of 
large telecommunications customers, argues for continuing traditional rate-of-return 
regulation.) 
3. Sam Ginn. "A Regulatory Busy Signal Blocks Phone Progress," Los Angeles 
Times, May 12, 1989. (Ginn, chairman of Pacific Telesis, the parent company of Pacific 
Bell, argues for less regulation.) 
4. Julie Amparano Lopez. "New Telephone Services Fail to Connect," Wall 
Street Journal, May 24, 1989. (Discusses marketing acumen of the telephone 
companies.) 
5. Bruce L. Egan. "Capital Budgeting for Fiber," Telecommunications, May 
1989. (Egan, a telecommunications economist at Columbia Unbiversity, explains the lure 
of fiber optic cable for telephone companies.) 
6. Johnnie L. Roberts. "AT&T Asks End Of Electronic Publishing Ban," Wall 
Street Journal, April24, 1989. (AT&T was prohibited from entering the electronic 
publishing business, until 1989, by the divestiture settlement. Time's up.) 
7. Joe Sharkey. "Newspaper Publishers Debate Pros, Cons of Allying With 
Phone Firms," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1989. (The newspapers and their 
association, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, have long been opposed to 
telephone company entry into electronic publishing.) 
8. Janet Guyon. "As Telephone Information-Service Firms Proliferate, Concern 
Mounts Over Abuses, Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1989. (New services provided 
over the telephone network, but not by the telephone company, pose an uncharted terrain 
for the PUC.) 
9. Brock "Free Speech Where You Find It," Microtimes, May 15, 
1989. (Meeks, a veteran reporter on telecommunications and computers, reports on an 
emerging issue: Are publicly accessible computer networks like shopping malls? Are 
their "visitors" protected by First Amendment rights of speech and assembly?) 
10. Robert Britt Horwitz. "Telecommunications and Their Deregulation: An 
Introduction," The Irony of Regulatory Reform. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988. (Horwitz is one of many young researchers reevaluating the wisdom of the FCC's 
and states' deregulatory policies. His findings are not salutory.) 
11. Mireya Navarro. "Powerful groups weigh in against Pac Bell," San 
Francisco Examiner, 4, 1989. fair summary of the positions of various parties in 
the PUC's current investigation of regulation.) 
1 
NRRI 88-11 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MODERNIZATION: WHO PAYS? 
NATIONAL 
prepared for the 
LATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
by 
Nancy J. Wheatley 
Dr. Lee Selwyn 
Patricia D. Kravtin 
Economics and Technology, Inc. 
101 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 
September, 1988 
This report was and Technology, Inc. under contract from the 
National Regulatory (NRRI) with funding provided by participating member 
commissions of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). The 
views and opinions of the authors do not necessarily state or reflect the views, opinions, or 
policies of the NRRI, or member commissions. 
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that telephone utilities are spending increasing 
telecommunications network infrastructure that is 
services. The modernization of embedded 
regulators with significant policy challenges, 
placexnel:lt of plant rarely coincides with the cost recovery of the 
new facilities. Moreover. changes in the industry that have led 
activities using common (rate base) plant have also led to 
mu;ma,tcn between parties who pay for the new plant and those who enjoy the 
vu. ............ by- and profits derived from- that new plant.. Finally, a policy of 
mcldermzat1on leads to increased retirements of plant prior to the date at which 
,-----" expected based upon normal mortality curves for the 
cost in the new plant, increases the effective capital 
term. The increased capital costs must be weighed 
~il•\A.Jl<u,.,u with the more modern facilities: decreased maintenance 
responding to the pressures for modernization of facilities is 
theory is clear and easily understood, an assessment of 
straightforward. The introduction of new technologies often 
new along with cost efficiencies in the provision of 
.,.., ..... v •. u agreement among all parties as to the relative merits of the 
customers or as to the benefits of the operating efficiencies 
services. As the telecommunications industry evolves, it is 
both to furnish existing services more efficiently and to 
be furnished on an unregulated basis. Regulatory 
costs attributable to new facilities should be 
and new and/or "below-the-line" 
rate base, and hence the rates, that customers pay for 
that a telecommunications utility can justify for a 
affects the economic viability of the modernization 
...... ._,...,..., ----·---, many options becomes a policy decision of 
competitors of the regulated telecommuni-
resoo1nse to the "who pays?" question exist Some would 
..... ~ ... ,,.,.,.1r features should be assigned responsibility for the 
as it is defined today, would bear none of the costs· of 
"'"""""' ... '""' the concept of basic service would never expand to include 
"" ......... ""~"' available through the more modern facilities. At the 
f'lPf"Wn1•1r enhancementS WOUld be 00rne by the general body Of 
1 
access to a state-of-the-an infrastructure . 
............ u.vu of basic service as the network evolves, it 
Telecommunications Modernization: Who Pays? 
also requires state to coc:>rdmate 
that neither ratepayers nor COlDOietitors 
e2\lt1atE~a and unregulated costs to ensure 
whatever cost allocation policy is 
adopted. 
State regulatory commissions have long taken the position that modernization activities 
must be justified based upon demonstrable improvements in operating efficiency, either in the 
shon run or over the longer term. Modernization for its own sake has not been allowed. The 
cost/benefit analysis typically relies on a "discounted cash flow" study, such as the Bell 
companies' CUCRIT, that compares costs maintaining embedded resources with the costs 
of replacing the older plant with more modern facilities. Among the factors that can be included 
in the analyses are the savings in operating expenses anticipated with the newer facilities and the 
additional revenues generated through sales of new services that becomes possible only with the 
newer equipment and systems place. 
Questions of attributing benefits of more modern plant between basic regulated services 
and competitive or potentially competitive services had not arisen until until very recently. In a 
proceeding before the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia (DC PSC), 
regulators confronted the issue of how to allow the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone 
Company (C&P) to compete for business customers with a digital Centrex offering. The DC 
PSC fashioned a plan that would allow C&P· to develop "Individual Case Basis" rates for 
Centrex service for specific customers in exchange for assurances that the risk of recovering the 
investments made to satisfy those customers' needs would be borne by the shareholders and not 
by the general body of ratepayers. Thus. the DC PSC has established a principle that. when the 
utility gains flexibility in pricing and marketing new services in competition with other firms, the 
risks and responsiblity for recovery of the investment needed to furnish that service should be 
shared in proportion to the risk between the general body of ratepayers and the shareholders. 
The California Public Utilities Commission (California PUC) has also recently reviewed 
modernization activities of Pacific Bell. The California PUC Staff has recommended a penalty 
in the form of a rate reduction against Pacific Bell because it found its modernization projects to 
be unreasonably risky. Pacific Bell responded to the Staff recommendation by suggesting that 
the Staff had not adequately considered the benefits of modernization such as maintenance 
savings. productivity improv~nts, and additional revenues. These factors could have and 
should have been included in discounted cash flow analysis used by Pacific to analyze its 
modernization program. Thus th California PUC may question whether there are benefits 
associated with Pacific Bell's modernization program that cannot be translated into quantifiable 
factors, and if so, how policy issues associated with thse intangibles can be adequately 
addressed. · 
Regulatory commissions will. be required to assess modernization projects involving 
facilities that are used to furnish both regulated and unregulated services. A mismatch of costs 
and benefits from these projects can occur if costs and revenues are not consistently allocated 
between the ratepayers and the shareholders. A mismatch can also occur if there is a change in 
the regulatory status one of the furnished using upgraded plant subsequent to its 
acquisition. Finally, the cost of capital of a regulated fmn may change as the fmn takes on 
increasingly risky activities. Each of these potential cost/benefit mismatches arises because the 
telecommunications utility is no longer providing only regulated services. Since it is neither 
possible nor given state the inr'.lstry, to return to an environment where 
regulated challenge is to devise a method to 





Teleco:mm:unications Modernization: Who 
risks and responsibility between ratepayers and 
investment between "above-the-line" and 
""'A'""'""u"''" is one with which regulators are 
taken the position that economic benefits to 
mc>demizatlOn if the modernization project is to be 
.................... operating expenses and increased sales of new 
................... should be maintained. 
required to fund a portion of plant that is 
activities, even if they would benefit from 
mo~aeJrnt.zat.£on standing alone. Thus, a cost allocation should 
is used for regulated services and resources that 
is not overallocated to regulated services, the utility should 
................ ~.., that had originally been allocated to regulated 
without compensating the regulated services at a level that 
been faced by a competitive firm acquiring those same 
to determine the level of this compensation. One is 
date on which the facilities were installed, with all 
rh~IT'O'I'•.n to the unregulated activity. Because this may 
w<Li,AV\o,QU,VU occurs long after the initial investment, it 
for the reallocation. Alternatively, investment could 
with a payment made to the relevant regulated 
the unregulated activity would have paid 
on a stand-alone basis, 
allocation of the risks and responsibilities for 
telecommunications industry evolves. The question of 
become much more complex as the traditional 
expanded their opportunities for competitive activities using 
infrastructure. The report attempts to strike a balance 
tnt ......... .,t., ratepayers, more sophisticated consumers of 
the traditional telecommunications carriers, and the 
assure that the stakeholders who benefit from 
programs to provide a cost/benefit 
that clearly identifies the costs and the benefits 
that assigns the costs associated with 
distribution of the benefits. and also encourages 
to accurately assess the impact of the 
program and providing for 
of costs continues to track the 
Telecommunications Modernization: Wbo Pays? 
Successful implementation of this policy will mean that as a nation we will continue to 
enjoy high quality, low cost telecommunications services with the assurance that the costs and 
efficiencies associated with a modem integrated infrastructure will be equitably distributed 






This White Paper was prepared by the International Communications Association to 
express its views concerning the future regulation of telephone services at the state level. 
The ICA is the largest and broadest-based association of telecommunications users in the 
United States. As such, the ICA sees an urgent need to respond to increasing pressures 
from telephone companies and their advocates for fundamental changes to long-standing 
regulatory procedures and the public policy objectives they embody. 
These challenges prompt a reexamination of the past role and performance of 
traditional regulation. Since regulatory oversight has proven to be a flexible and effective 
tool in the past, regulators should continue to play a leading role in promoting the best use 
of the nation's telecommunications resources. 
• The U.S. public switched telephone system has made great strides forward 
under the traditional system of rate base/rate of return regulation. The 
quality. availability. and usage of telephone services has increased 
dramatically over the past century. and telecommunications has assumed an 
increasingly crucial role in the economic and social structure of the nation. 
• These benefits have not come at the expense of the nation's telephone 
companies. The dominant carriers have a history of steady growth and 
robust financial health, which has actually improved since the breakup of the 
Bell System 1984. 
• Most proposals to reduce regulation can be traced to the telephone companies 
themselves. So far, these proposals benefit the carriers far more than 
consumers. Vinually all of the plans submitted by telephone companies 
move in the direction of lessened public oversight of their business practices. 
Acceptance of these proposals would create increased opportunities for 
carriers to further their own goals at the expense of the public welfare. 
• While the proposals advanced by the telephone companies are not acceptable 
as such, they do raise issues that regulators need to confront in order to 
successfully adapt to changes occurring within the industry. These changes 
include: 
Major gains in transmission capacity, digitization, and network 
intelligence that are allowing carriers to offer many new capabilities. 
New technology. particularly fiber optics, that is pushing the costs of 
service downward and the efficient size of a provider upward. 
Development of alternative technologies for some telecommunications 
services and several "niche" markets for specialized communications 
needs. 
• Despite these developments - indeed, perhaps because of them - the 
monopoly nature of the local exchange is essentially unchanged. In fact, the 
monopoly power held by local telephone companies will actually (ncrease as 
interactive information services and other new offerings proliferate, since they 
all must pass through the local exchange "bottleneck." 
• Regulators need to find appropriate responses to these industty trends. 
Above all, telecommunications regulation should pennit the benefits of 
industty development to be shared equally by carriers and consumers. This 
will require that regulators establish balanced policies in the areas affected by 
industry change: 
Competition. Regulators need to employ objective standards to 
assess the competitiveness of any market proposed for altered 
regulatory treatment, on the basis of its potential for sustained, 
effective competition. Anecdotal evidence and speculative 
economic theories that invoke potential competition as a market 
force do not justify abandoning regulatory safeguards. 
Pricing. Inadequate pricing policies leave dominant carriers free 
to engage in monopolistic pricing. Tariffed prices should be tied 
to underlying costs of service or some other stable standard. The 
"just and reasonable" ratemaking principle should be the 
benchmark against which any trial of alternative regulation is 
evaluated. This requires that regulators continue to collect cost 
and earnings data to serve as a baseline for evaluating alternative 
regulatory methods. 
Cost Allocation. Reducing regulation for selected services gives a 
carrier the opportunity to subsidize those services by improperly 
allocating costs. Moreover, ratepayers have been fmancing 
network modernization programs that will steadily lower carriers' 
operating costs for years. A misallocation could work to deprive 
ratepayers of those gains for which they have already paid. 
Caniers should be required to detail how costs will be allocated 
before a service is considered for reduced regulation. 
New Services. To qualify for relaxed regulatory treatment, "new" 
service offerings need to demonstrate a substantially new feature, 
function, or benefit to customers; otherwise carriers could simply 
repackage existing offerings to circumvent tariff or pricing 
restrictions. Services expected to assume a key role in the public 
network or in the nation's economic infrastructure - new or 





Defining the Public Interest. Some telephone companies are 
attempting to impose their own doctrine of the public interest in 
telecommunications services. These companies would like to 
limit the public interest, and thereby regulatory oversight, to 
traditional switched voice service - leaving all other services, 
including many (such as data services) that are becoming 
increasingly important to the economy without regulatory 
protection. In reality, the public utility role of the local telephone 
company will be expanding over the coming decades, as the 
public telephone network evolves into a comprehensive 
information network . 
The regulatory process has proven to be an effective and resilient tool during 
the past century of progress in the telecommunications industry. As 
telecommunications services take on an even greater role in driving the nation's 
economic growth, regulators will have to become even more vigilant to ensure that 
this critical resource is managed wisely. To remain effective, regulators need to 
cooperate with both consumers and providers to develop appropriate policies to 
respond to today' s regulatory challenges. An uncritical acceptance of the regulatory 
"reforms" promulgated by special interests would not only jeopardize the universal, 
high-quality telecommunications infrastructure that regulation has helped to build, but 
could also threaten the future growth of America's increasingly infonnation-based 
economy . 
A Regulatory Busy Signal Blocks Phone Progress 
By SAM GINN 
Californians are justifiably proud of their 
state as the cradle of the electronic 
revolution. That revolution is ushering in 
t.he Information Age, an era of unlimited 
oommunication that will surpass the Indus· 
trial Age in its impact on global develop· 
ment. 
But five years after divestiture, Califor-
nia is hamstrung by a regulatory process 
t.hat doesn't account for burgeoning com-
petition and overlooks the time lag In-
volved in implementing new technologies. 
We are trapped by an arcane process that 
serves neither consumers nor businesses. 
California's crucial telecommunications 
infrastructure-the highways on which 
information travels-is woefully lagging in 
parts of our state. We trail some of our 
oommercial rivals such as Japan, which 
plans to spend $100 billion to modernize its 
infrastructure by the year 2000. We're 
losing ground to more than 36 states that 
have revised their regulatory framework 
and stepped up commitment to modernize 
their telecommunications networks. 
About 242 communities in California 
don't have enhanced 911 service. While 
some people can dial 911 and have their 
home address flash on the screen of an 
emergency operator who can direct police 
or other rescue services to the scene, 
others don't have this system. 
In Humboldt County, Bakersfield, Morro 
Bay, and even parts of Sacramento and the 
San Francisco Bay area, businesses don't 
have services such as "call forwarding" 
and "conferencing calling." New business-
es will not locate in communities hobbled 
by horse-and-buggy communications. 
What is at stake are jobs and the future 
economic health of our state. 
No one in these technologically impov-
1 
eriahed communities will have the oppor-
tunity to use any future services ·such as 
monitoring of the sick at home via tele-
phone connections, access to electronic 
libraries or special services for disabled 
people and those not fluent in English. 
Outmoded switching technology is the 
culprit. Simple enough to aolve, one might 
think. Yet. using traditional regulatory 
criteria. It will be a long time before we will 
be able to economically justify modernizing 
the network in those communities. 
Virtually every telecommunications ser-
vice, with the exception of dial-tone to the 
home, is competitive. But telephone com-
panies in California can't price their servic-
es accordingly. Instead, they must endure 
lengthy proceedings to obtain permission 
from the California Public Utilities Com· 
mission to raise or lower prices. 
Can we recover from this telecommuni-
cations deficit? The answer is emphatically 
yes. Our success will depend on our ability 
to introduce a forward-looking regulatory 
policy that provides an Incentive to tele-
phone companies to increase operating 
efficiencies and enables them to build a 
communications system second to none. 
The California Public Utilities Commis-
sion has an opportunity to approve soon a 
plan submitted by Pacific Bell that would 
go far toward providing Californians a 
feature-rich telecommunications network 
and more efficient regulatory process. The 
plan was attacked by the California Cable 
Television Assn. at recent hearings. 
Among the association's arguments is 
that Pacific Bell's hidden agenda is to enter 
the cable television business. Pacific Bell 
has no intention of providing cable pro-
gramming but would seek to provide 
distribution capability to cable operators. 
Pacific Bell's California Plan for Rate 
Stability does not propose deregulation, but 
a different form of regulation. It would lead 
to lower or stable charges for most users 
and improved service. If it is approved, 
Pacific Telesis stands ready to invest more 
than $200 million a year to bring the state's 
network up to standards within three 
years-an investment that we are not 
allowed to make under the current regula-
tory scheme. 
Under the plan, the Public Utilities 
Commission would still regulate all future 
rates. The plan would freeze residential 
rates through 1992 and expand the free 
calling area and make TouchTone service 
free. It would allow us to lower some rates 
to business customers to meet competition, 
while gradually raising other business 
rates that do not cover our costs. 
The plan would substitute a simpler 
process for the 78-year-old system of 
endless legal proceedings that minutely 
examine costs (the current rate case has 
dragged on four years). The commission 
would set a benchmark rate of return, or 
profit level. If the telephone company 
operated so efficiently that it exceeded that 
level, the extra profit would be shared 
equally by the public and its shareholders. 
If Pacific Telesis failed to earn the bench-
mark rate, it would absorb the shortfall and 
not ask for rate relief. 
Regulatory reform is a "win-win" situa-
tion. When the providers of telephone 
service have incentives to improve effi-
ciency and increase service, everyone 
gains. If the regulatory process isn't 
changed soon, many of us will continue to 
be denied the full range of services 
technology can offer, and California will be 
hard-pressed to preserve its place as a 
leader in the world economy. 
Sam Ginn is chairman and chief ezecutive 
officer of Pacific Telesis Group. 
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The regional Bell companies hope t11etr 
latest generation of custornlZed calltllg tea· 
tures will produce !lefty profits. But so far, 
th~y have generated more yawns aDd 
shrugs than l1ng1ng endorsements. 
Known as "class" services, the new tea· 
:ures can accomplish a host of tasks. Sllcll 
lS fo1'Wll!'dlng only "preferred" cans. dis· 
Jlaytng the pbone numbers of incoming 
:ails aDd gtvlng distinctive rings to calls 
'rom certain numbers. 
"We're gtvtng customers a personal 
;ecretary," says F. Duane Ackerman. a 
3el!Sooth Corp. VIce chairman. "We tl1ln.il: 
he services will be extremely Sllccessful." 
But slteptles abound. Many people say 
lie features-aimed mainly at residential 
:ustomers-aren't very useful and are 
1ard to master. Some services anger cal· 
ers. And marketers say the Bell compa· 
lies' cypicaJ marketing approaches may 
•ot be suited to the new products. 
HIR Penetration 
"The Bell companies feel this Is their 
echnologtcaJ gift to the world and that the 
1orld should be happy," says DaVId Sl· 
non, a telecommwllcatlons consultant In 
lew York. "Tile!!, they can't understand 
1l!y more people dOn't want the services." 
The Bell companies, faced With a ma· 
ure telephone market, see class services 
s one of tlletr best hopes of generating a 
ig new revenue stream. and they have 
een upgradlng their networks to make the 
ervlces avaJiable. But the early results 
ave been miXed at best. Bell Atlantic 
m"p.'s New Jersey Bell subsidiary has 
1ade class services available to more than 
. 3 million customers since It started roll· 
lll' out the features In early 1988, but only 
.4% have signed up. Sootbwestem Bell 
orp. began testing the services last July 
1 Musltogee, Okla. Despite an ad blitz and 
resentatlons In shopping malls and other 
~Cal spots, only 7% of customers have 
Jugllt any class services. 
The Bell companies will need to sign up 
JOUt 25o/o of their customers for the serv· 
es to be profitable. says Jack A. Grub-
.an, a Pa.lneWebber Inc. telecommunica· • 
:ms analyst. For the services to have "a 
taterlal Impact" 011 eamlngs. be adds. 
metratton would need to 111t about 50%. 
The Bell coucerns haven't approaclled 
tat level of penetratlou W1tll an earlier 
~neratlon of optional services, so-called 
.tStom-calltllg features. After more than a 
~e. only 28.8o/o of Bell customers have 
ill waJting, the leading custom.caJII.ng 
•rvlce. Only lOo/o have call forwarding, 
ld just T.4o/o have three-way calltllg. 
The Bell companies blame regulatlon: 
ate agencies have limited how much the 
'ncerns cali earn. and because most are 
or near their profit ceillngs. they 
tven't pushed those services hard. But 
'W Y orll: and Vennont have adopted reg· 
ltiOils easing the profit limits. and other 
New Services, Cool Response 
GIOIII&fY of the !WI companies' new 
llf!rvlcel 
Cllillllllrilllll'll: &~~tllmlltiealb- dials the number 
of the lut ineomifl#caiL A110 known u 
mum call ud ~ callblek. 
CIIIIIIIIIIIE: lliltmtll i~ calla from 
specified pllalle lllllllberl to I ~
rebuff. 
--~ flldiaJa the Jut lllllllbef I 
euatDmel' dialed. A!IO !mown Ill call queue. 
DlllltltMitlllil: letueatomerapeeify 
11Ulllben from whieil ineomil'l# calla will 
il&vw 11 diatilletivw rin4'. A!IO kiiOW'll u call 
llllieetcr l!lld priori!)' call. 
~ OllllfcoiNi_. leta 1 euat.omer 
forward calla from apeeified numbers. Allo 
kiiOW'll u &elect fOI'Im'd and Hieeti¥1! call 
forwarding. 
c..... ID: display~~ l!lllllbers of ineomil'l# 
calla before a euatomer IIIIPmS the pho11e. 
Cllilll ~ an-. euatomel'lllll t.I'IICk dow!! 
11umber of Jut incomiq eall. 
states are lili:ely to follow. As they dO, the 
pbone companies Will liave more Incentive 
to boost profits. 
Still, class features strike many people 
as being a hard sen. Fredric Sawller, a 
marketing commwllcations consultant and 
coutrlbuting editor for the trade magazine 
Telepbony. calls tile newest services 
"really notlllng that anybody needs." 
Joan Patsy, an accounting aide In Mun· 
de, Ind., agrees, She notes, for example. 
that the Bell eotnpanles pttch call return. 
wll1cll automatically dials tile number of 
the last lncontlng call. as the end of the 
mad d.asll to the phone. "But an answering 
maclline records the person who caJ1ed 
you." Ms. Patsy says. "And you can de-
ckle wlletber you want to talk to the per-
son. With call return, you can't dO that." 
Answering macll1nes also can be nsed to 
screen cans, serving mucll the same func· 
tlon as caller m-wll1ch shows the pbone 
number of each lncontlng call-aDd call 
block-wll1cl! routes calls from specified 
numbers to a reconllng that says. "Tile 
party you are calltllg Is not accepting calls 
at tills tlme." 
Bell offlclaJs say the class services are 
more effectlve than answering macll1nes at 
screening aDd catclllng calls-aDd can 
serve other uses bestdes. "If there's just 
oue or two people you dOn't want to bear 
from, call blocker would screen just those 
calls." says Joleen Meyer, a SOUtbwesteru 
Bell prodnct·management official. Also, 
she says, call return Is more reliable than 
an answering maclline because It doesn't 
depend on the caller leaving a message. 
Some eriUes questl.ou the Ben compa· 
Dies' marketl.n( tactics. So far. the compa· 
Dies have relied mainly 011 bW stUtters and 
dlrect·mall fliers, With less emphasis ou 
TV. radio and print ads. 
Tliat's the wroug way to sen these serv· 
Ices, marketers say, because they are 
suited to narrower markets than the Bell 
companies are used to targeting. Robert 
Morris, a telecommumcatiOils analyst With 
Goldman, Saclls & eo .• says bW stutters 
may be a couvenlent way for the compa· 
Illes to send a message. but they aren't ter· 
Percentqes of custcmen who have 
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rtbly effective because they aren't market· 
specific: "Usually, they get t11rown In the 
trasb Without even being read.·· Instead. 
be says. the Bell companies sbould Identify 
and make their pltclles to specific mar.' 
kets. such as people working at home who 
might want different rings for business 
ratber than personal cans. 
The message of the Bell companies' 
current ma.rll:etl.n( efforts-such as Amert· 
tecb ads focusing ou the "special powers" 
of the star aDd pound keys aDd New Jersey 
Bell's urging to "look at wbat your pbone 
can dO now" -also Is wroug, marketers 
say. Steven Pennut. a Yale University 
marketing professor and telecommunica· 
tlons consultant. crltlctzes such ads for 
overempl!aslzlng "tile 'gee-wb.lz' element" 
and not sl!owl.ng bow the features can 
make life euler. 
Tbe Bell companies. says Mr. Permut. 
sbould go beyond terse descrtptions of the 
services aDd portray more people using 
them. or In situations where they migllt 
benefit from them. So far, only BellSouth 
has nsed clear examples, be says. One 
BellSouth ad shows a woman-Without call 
return-coming home With two bags of gro-
ceries aDd daslllng to the phone so site 
doesn't mlss a call. "If you dOn't show 
clear benefits.'' Mr. Permut says. "people 
won't pay extra for It" 
Mr. Grubman ofPa.ll..'I!Webber questiOIIS 
the Bells' pricing strateo. Qenerally. they 
cllarge S3 to S5 a month for oue servicE 
some cllarge less for additional serVIce: 
Mr. Grubman says the companies "overe. 
timate bow much a cousumer will spend. 
He suggestS cllargl.ng low per·use fees 
win c:usaomers who see themselves usln 
tile servtces Infrequently . 
Tile services themselves liave cause 
problems. In some IDstances frustratl.n; 
customers trying to use them. Jamie Re! 
nick. a computer procranuner In EIW 
beth, N.J., says be gave up trying to figul"! 
out bow to procram his cousin's phones t• 
ctve tnearnln( calls from cena1n number 
different rings. "These days, no one hll: 
time to figure out all these commands." hi 
says. "It's too much frustration." 
Help on tbe Way 
. Some compardes are trying to make tll4 
reatures easter to use. BeiJSouth. for exam 
pie, proVIdes recorded Instructions as par 
of the services to take consumers througl 
the commandS. and many companies offe1 
toll·tree help lines. 
Caller m. meanwll1le, has angerec 
some callers who object to having theil 
telepl!one nwnbers clisplayed-wtthoo! 
their consent-to people they call who have 
the feature. "What happened to my right 
of privacy?" aslts Lee Alges, wllo owns a 
consulting business In New Y ark and has 
an unJl.sted number. "The only way to pre· 
serve my privacy now Is to use a public 
pbone." Consumer groups are challenging 
caller ID before regulators In New Jersey 
aDd New York, aDd the Pennsylvania at· 
tomey general's office has aslted regula· 
tors there not to approve the service until 
privacy Issues can be fully debated. 
Pacific TelesiS Group In San Francisco 
plans to offer a service that will allow ca.!· 
lers to block their number from appearing 
011 caller ID deVIces. But New Jersey Bell, 
wll1ch says caller m "enl!a.nces the pri· 
vacy of the called party," doesn't plan to 
offer a blocking service. Other eotnpanles 
say they will study the privacy Issues be-
fore deciding wbetber to offer caller m. 
Despite all the problems, tllere seems 
Dttle dOubt that the Bell companies Will 
keep puslllng their new services. Bruce s . 
GordOn, a Bell Atlantic marketing VIce 
president, says the companies can't fret 
over the older, custom-calling services, or 
else "we'd never go forward." Bell Atlan· 
tic, he says, Is applying the same principle 
to the class services that Procter & Gam· 
ble Co. uses to promote a new detergent. 
"Procter & Gamble has six different deter· 
cents." be says. "Each has a market seg· 
ment P&G doesn't wait to see how one 
Is doiDg before going after a new market.·· 
PUBLIC NETWORK SERVICES 
Capital Budgeting for Fiber 
Many observers see telcos and CATV squaring off in a 
fiber-to-the-home battle. However, as the author points out, 
there's more to this issue than meets the eye. 
• Bruce LEgan 
AJreview of the communica-tion industry's trade :press ndicates some confusion 
regarding telephone companies' in-
tentions to deploy fiber optics in the 
public network. The confusion is 
often couched in terms of a "battle" 
between cable television and telcos 
over the future provision of enter-
tainment video to the home. If the 
telcos "lose" the legal and regula-
tory "battle" and somehow direct 
provision of video services is de-
nied, then according to the tradi-
tional argument, telcos will not ag-
gressively deploy fiber to the home 
since it will not be financially pru-
dent to do so. 
This interpretation of the situation 
is erroneous. Telcos view fiber in the 
network as a primary means to re-
main competitive in the future, re-
gardless of the current regulatory 
and legal restrictions on the direct 
provision of video services. Being 
first with fiber is very important to 
them, as it represents a robust busi-
ness investment strategy vis a vis 
strategies of rival communication 
service providers. Although growth 
in the basic telephone business is 
slow, providing fiber should help po-
sition telcos to at least share in more 
high-growth service markets by 
having high-quality capacity in 
place to meet the future needs of 
large customers· and vendors 
whose services telcos may current-
ly not be allowed to provide directly. 
In addition, there appears to be 
money enough to do it Consider 
that the entire net capitalization of 
.-:!iv -19&9 
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telcos in 1987 was about $200 bil-
lion and total spending for new con-
struction was about $30 billion. The 
average accounting life of network 
plant is in the neighborhood of only 
10 years. (Not only is capital spend-
ing high, but almost all of the funds 
to support it are internally generated 
- no borrowing.) In fact, the recent 
rate of capital spending and depre-
ciation for telcos rivals that of the 
high-growth cable television indus-
try. Thus, fairly rapid modernization 
of telephone plant is already under-
way and most of the new plant will 
be fiber or at least fiber-compatible. 
Yet there are the nay-sayers. 
Many industry observers point to 
the massive amounts of money re-
quired to get telco fiber to the home. 
Cost estimates vary greatly, depend-
ing on the source, from between 
$1500 to $15,000 per subscriber. 
This means that the entire cost can 
be as low as $150 billion or as high 
as $1.5 trillion! However, the most 
oft-quoted numbers are in the range 
of $1700 to $2000. This would put 
the total bill at about $200 billion. 
But is it really that unthinkable? In 
the context of both revenue and 
cost, of course not Rome wasn't 
built in a day, and the same is true 
for fiber networks. On a net present 
value basis, $200 billion worth of 
construction is only $30 per month 
per subscriber over 10 years and 
only $40 per month per subscriber 
over 5 years. Furthermore, current 
expenditures per household for 
electronic communications serv-
ices, including telephone, cable, 
26A 
and over-the-air radio and rv. total 
about $100 per month and that fig-
ure is rising. If one were allowed the 
luxury of abstraction, then clearly if 
providing public fiber networks 
were a priority, there would be 
enough money to do it 
In reality, the story is a bit more 
complex. The telco capital budget-
ing process is a combination of 
many cost and demand factors. 
However, the flexibility of the proc-
ess reveals why it will get started 
and, in fact, will likely accelerate. 
Realizing the magnitude of costs 
to deploy fiber to the home, telcos 
recently have concentrated on hy-
brid fiber I copper deployment sce-
narios where the subscriber loop 
plant, dominated by aerial and bur-
ied cable, will be utilized via elec-
tronic/ optical conversion devices. 
Such hybrid scenarios should de-
velop sufficiently to lower the fiber 
deployment costs significantly by 
retaining and using the existing 
copper loop and cable television 
coax plant This is especially good 
for customer acceptance since ex-
isting customer-premises equip-
ment (CPE), CPE interfaces, and 
premises wiring may stay intact The 
new hybrid approaches will provide 
some flexibility in selecting deploy-
ment alternatives. There is similar 
flexibility on the financial side. 
Large-scale and capital-intensive 
projects like fiber deployment are 
long-lived and construction inter-
vals are extensive. This simple in-
vestment perspective is sometimes 
55 
Fiber Deployment Costs 
overlooked by those who wish to 
deal in sensationalism. The total 
cost of a fiber telco network is often 
quoted as if the project requires a 
huge lump sum financial commit-
ment This, of course, is not the case 
at all. 
Being. first with fiber 
is very important to the 
telcos ....... . 
By definition, the annual cost of a 
large total expenditure occurring 
over an extended period of time for 
projects with a long useful life is 
relatively small. In other words, total 
cost should not be confused with 
annual cost Investment for fiber is 
a project which has any number of 
acceptable deployment strategies. 
The timing and construction inter-
vals become strategic decision var-
iables and may be varied according 
to business conditions. No annual 
expenditure is sunk until it is com-
mitted. Along the way, construction 
may be postponed or stopped alto-
gether. The cost stream is flexible 
due to the spatial distribution of net-
work plant Strategic deployment in 
market niches is possible and de-
pending on business and regulatory 
conditions, certain subprojects may 
be completed and others may not 
Network investment cost streams 
are more flexible than many other 
expensive projects where, for ex-
ample, only one large plant is con-
templated. 
There are a number of possibili-
ties on the revenue side as well. 
Currently local telcos receive about 
$25 per month per subscriber, 
which is expected to grow over the 
next 10 years. With what limited ev-
idence there is to date, cable tele-
vision operators are willing to pay 
about $8 per month per subscriber 
for use of the telco loop plant Based 
on these cursory numbers alone 
there appears to be significant rev-
enue potential to support recover-
ing the cost of fiber deployment 
There is also significant revenue 
potential from new service vendors 
and broadcasters. Currently, televi-
sion advertising averages about $25 
per month per household (however, 
a large portion of this currently goes 
to program production costs). 
Broadcasters desiring to use the fib-
er distribution network would pre-
sumably have to pay for it and the 
same is true for advertiser-support-
ed cable television firms. In addition, 
many new market opportunities 
may be available to vendors of non-
telecommunications services over 
fiber, such as real estate and video 
shopping malls. In other words, the 
revenue potential of fiber networks 
is measured not only in terms of 
what customers are willing to pay for 
service, but also what vendors are 
willing to pay to get access to cus-
tomers. In sum, there appears to be 
significant increases in current sub-
scriber revenue available to telcos 
with fiber distribution networks. 
In conclusion, if it is true that net-
work integration is more cost effi-
cient than many distribution net-
works, and therefore the total per-
customer cost is less than the status 
quo, then clearly financing and cap-
ital recovery for fiber deployment is 
a reasonable proposition. The real 
issue is the time horizon of the cap-
ital expenditure stream, which may 
be altered to match the present 
value of revenue streams. In any 
event, telcos will aggressively 
pursue fiber as long as they are 
financially able to do so. For now, at 
least, cash flow available for con-
struction is at an all-time high. 0 
Bruce L Egan is an independent industry 
consultant and an Affiliated Research Fellow 
at the Center for telecommunications ·and 
Information Studies at Columbia University's 
Graduate School of Business. From 1983-
1988, he was District Manager-Economic 
Analysis at Bel/core, and from 1976-1983, he 
was an economist at Southwestern Bell. Mr. 
Egan received a BA in accounting and eco-
nomics in 1975 and an MA in economics in 
1976 from Southern Illinois University. He did 
post-graduate studies at Washington Univer-
sity and St. Louis University. 
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Analysts Expect Prohibition, 
Set to Expire in August, 
Will Be Allowed to Lapse 
By JOHNNJI L. Roans 
Stl4/f ~·~ of THZ WALL Snuttn J ovaNAL. 
NEW YORK-American Te.lepbone lc 
Telep'aph Co. asked a federal judge in 
Wasbtngton to clear It to enter the elec· 
trontc publishing bilstness. 
AT&T requested that a ban barring it 
from electronic publishing be allowed to 
lapse, as scheduled, In August. If the re-
quest Is granted, AT&T could provide a va· 
riety of information on·line, such as flnan· 
claJ and securities data, videotex and 
news. It would be a potential competitor 
against such major electronic publishers 
as Cticorp, Reuters, Dun &: Bradstreet 
Corp. and Dow Jones &: Co., publisher of 
this newspaper. 
Analysts predicted that the ban would 
be allowed to expire. Moreover, they spec· 
ulated. AT&T's subsequent entry would 
have the potential to help attract the long· 
elusive mass market to the industry. 
AT&T made the request Friday in a mo-
tion submitted to u.s. District Judge Har· 
old Greene, who continues to enforce the 
1982 decree that broke up the Bell System. 
The ban, imposed by the decree, prevents 
AT&T from using Its own network to en· 
gage in electronic publishing. 
The ban was an outgrowth of Judge 
Greene's concern that mammoth AT&T 
could quickly dominate the industry. An· 
other concern was whether electronic pub-
lishers would have alternative networks to 
AT&T's for distributing their information 
OD·Une. 
' 
But under the decree, the ban Is sched· 
uJed to expire after seven years-on Aug. 
24, 1989-uniess opponents of AT&T's entry 
into the Market can prove that competitive 
conditions warrant prolonging the prohibl· 
tion. AT&T's motion, made under a provi· 
slon of the decree, Is believed to be the 
first official move to eliminate the ban. 
In Its fiJing, the telecommunications 
concern saJd that there are many alterna· 
tlves to AT&T's transmission network. in· 
eluding hundreds of regional long-distance 
concerns and such national long-distance 
carriers as MCI Communications Corp. 
and US Sprint Communications, a joint 
venture of United Telecommunications Inc. 
and GTE Corp. "It Is beyond serious dis· 
pute that these carriers offer ample alter· 
natives to all of the AT&T Hong-distance) 
transmission services used by electronic 
publishers," AT&T saJd. 
AT&T also maintained in the motion 
that competition Is healthy. The leading 
electronic publishers, It saJd, are "large 
and financially strong corporations," in· 
eluding Citicorp, Dow Jones and Reuters. 
. In addition, Prodigy, a joint videotex ven· 
ture of International Business Mach1Des 
Corp. and Sears Roebuck & Co., Is expand· 
lng nationwide. AT&T cited a recent report 
enumerating some 500 U.S. vendors offer· 
lng more than 3,350 on·line databases com· 
piled by about 1,500 database publishers. 
An AT&T spokesman saJd the company 
doesn't have any specific products ready 
for introduction If the ban Is allowed to ex· 
pire. But the company has shown a keen 
interest in the field in the past. In 1987, it 
entered a joint venture with Telerate Inc. 
to offer a service that allows International 
money traders to execute trades electroni· 
cally. Telerate Is 67'7o-owned by Dow Jones 
& Co. In addition, AT&T was a potential 
bidder for Quotron, the stock-quotes con· 
cern eventually acquired by Cittcorp. 
The ban posed a problem for AT&T in 
. the joint venture with Telerate and in mak· 
28A 
! r inC a bid for Quotron. Reuters lnto·nnanon 
1 Service Inc., a unit of Reuters Jfoldlap 
PLC. challenged the venture on the 
grounds that It violated the ban: But the 
Justice Department rejected the challenge. 
Because of its concern about the ban, 
AT&T decided ap.1nst blddlnr for Quo-
tron. 
Some analysts expect that the nation's 
newspaper publishers, long opposed to 
AT&T's becoming an electronic publisher, 
are likely to challenge the cumnt efforts. 
"Maybe a compromise w1lJ be Yorked out 
as to what AT&T can do," Slid Robert 
Morris III, telecommunicatloas analyst 
with Goldman Sachs & Co. He and other 
analysts predicted Judge Green• will allow 
the ban to end. 
In any case, Mr. Morris ex.,ects AT&T 
to rely on internal developnent rather 
than major acquisitions as Its vehicle for 
entering the business. He &dad that the 
company bas been spending Sdlle S2.5 bU· 
non a year on research and ct.velopment, 
wtth an emphasis on developrr.nt of com· 
municatlons software. "I waul think that 
the way AT&T w1lJ go Is mre through 
joint ventures, where It woul. work with 
established databases and bng Its soft· 
ware enhancements," be sal~ 
Experts saJd that AT&T'S ommunica· 
ttons prowess could open Uo way to a 
mass market for electronic publishers. 
"One of the big challenges othe Industry 
has been that It has just bef hard to use 
the information," saJd Mr. !orris. "With 
the right mixture of softwarend informa· 
tion, that should open the d()' much more 
widely to the consumer." 
U AT&T finds wide and aracttve uses 
for information delivered ectronically, 
"you could very easily see at the indus· 
try could take off." saJd Bnell Wright, 
vice president. electronic csmunications 
practice, for the consuJtingirm Link Re-
sources. 
AT&T's motion doesn't rvolve the ban 
on electronic information srvtces, includ· 
ing on·line publishing, b}the seven re-
gional Bell phone eompaies that were 
born in the breakup. 
-•• 
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,Cons 
r Publishers ate Pros, 
g With Phone Firms 
I 
By JOE SHUKEY 
Sto!J R~port~r of Tta: W AU. Snutln' JOC.'RMAL 
CHICAGO-Only two decades after tbey 
decided television was their mortal enemy, 
n~wspaper publishers are suddenly looking 
suspiciously at an old ally, tbe telephone. 
The question many of the people who 
run the U.S. newspaper Industry are pon· 
dering here at the annual convention of the 
American Newspaper Publishers Associa· 
tion Is this: If Congress and the courts give 
telephone companies the green light to en· 
ter the information-services business, 
should newspapers welcome them and sup-
ply the basic Information product in a mu· 
tually rewarding partnership? 
"On the surface, a partnership Is ap-
pt>allng," said George W. Wilson. presidt:>nt 
of the Concord !N.H.! Monitor and a mem· 
ber of the ANPA's telecommunications 
task force. "Nt'wspapers have lnforma· 
tion; telephone companies have dlstribu· 
tion channels. We're both mature busi· 
nesses that could use new revenue 
streams. Why not work together?" 
While the questions of advantages and 
disadvantages are complex, he said, there 
is a basic worry for the publishers. "How 
secure can we ever feel in a business 
where we cannot exercise any real control 
over the technical and marketing systems 
on which it relies?" Mr. Wilson asked. 
Electronic publishing Isn't a big field 
yet, but newspapers see in It potential for 
new revenue in offering audio and on·line 
computer services ranging from direct-re-
sponse advertising to sports reports and 
capsule movie reviews. With traditional 
print advertising growth rates and 
readership declining, many see 
electronic publishing as a way to Increase 
market penetration while also establishing 
more direct contact with potential new 
readers for their newspapers. 
The ANP A said !t would 
lobby hard to block about to be 
introduced in Congress that would allow 
the seven regional Bell companies to enter 
the business of directly selling Information 
over phone lines. On another front. Amen· 
can Telephone & Telegraph Co. Is in fed· 
era! court asking that a ban barring lt 
from electronic pubUshlng be allowed to 
expire, as scheduled. In August. Newspa· 
~r groups oppose Ufting the ban. 
Both Initiatives are good chances 
of succeeding; and pubUshers 
are . beginning to complex 
problem of how to deal with an unprece-
dented phone company presence In the In· 
formation-generating business. 
"Watch the phone " Frank 
A. Bennack Jr.. execu· 
tive officer of warned his 
colleagues at a crowded session on tele-
communications. 
Not to worry, says one regional Bt>IJ 
company, Southwestern BeD Corp. The 
company has been aggressivt> In staking 
out a position In Information services since 
a federal court ruled last year that the Bt>ll 
companies could be(ln offering "gate· 
ways" -electronic and organizational con· 
duits for the tral!Sffiission (but not the or:.:-
lnatlon ) of Information. 
Early this month, Southwestern Bell be· 
gan a yearlong trial of a "gateway" sys-
tem In Houston that offers both audio and 
Videotex services supplied by others, in· 
eluding Hearst's Houston Chronicle. The 
company has "seeded tile market" with 30,· 
000 low-cost computer terminals for recep-
tion or the videotex services, said Stuart 
M. Katz, tile company's national sales 
manager for gateway services. 
Previous newspaper-Industry ventures 
In videotex have failed, Mr. Katz said, be· 
cause tile hardware was too expensive. 
"You cannot have a gateway where the en· 
try·lev~l terminal is a s:z.ooo PC," he said. 
Nor, he said, will customers pay a fee for 
the telephone call, adding that the call can 
be subsidized by advertising. He said 
Southwestern Bell estimated that the ter· 
mlnals used In Its trial can probably be 
sold in volume for Wider SlOO apiece. 
"A gateway Is an alternative c.ba.n· 
nel for your Information:· Mr. Katz as-
sured the publishers, adding these entice· 
ments: "You can get consumers to call in 
and find out what's happening on the soaps 
tomorrow. And then you add a tagline say-
Ing for further Information pick up tomor· 
row's Houston Chronicle." 
Whlle some publishers said they were 
favorably impressed by the opportunities 
Mr. Katz outlined, most expressed wan· 
ness and said they adamantly opposed lift· 
lng restrictions to allow tile phone compa· 
rues to go beyond gateways and generate 
Information services, whatever the entice-
ments. "That's a genie best left In the bot· 
tie," said one industry official. 
The phone companies have argued that 
restricting them from providing lnforma· 
tlon Is a violation of tile First Amendment. 
and that the information-services field is 
sufficiently competitive. Among the major 
electronic publishers are Ctticorp. Reuters, 
Dun & Bradstreet Corp. and Dow Jones & 
Co., publlsher of this newspaper, which has 
a 67% sta.lte In Telerate Inc. Also, 39 U.S. 
newspaper companies already have their 
own local telecommunications services. 
Most publishers concede phone-eom· 
pany entry into the Information business is 
Inevitable. "The flood of new electronic 
products and services that I the regionals I 
are creating will become nothing less than 
tomorrow's for distributing infor· 
mation to American home," said 
Mr. Wilson of Concord Monitor. 
,..,. •• CaJ1fonl1a'l PllbUc UtWUes 
. Olmm.llllon bas received steady com· 
. plalllts. ud Ill repladons bave been un· 
clef coaUaua1 NView, aysaii)Okeswoman. 
'1'1» &&'fftC)' recently liked Padtlc Telesl.s 
Group 10 Impale Dew rules that would, 
amonr otber tblnp. require cert&ln dJ.sclo-
IUI'el allout ctwaes. 
Burda of PoUciDc 
wwa little ICtioll rrom tbe state. tbe 
llurdesl of pollctDr tbe 11ervk.es In Callfor· 
lia baa fallell Cll dt)' attomey~ where tbe 
llervicel operate, U)'l Consumer Action, I 
Sill Frucllco-bued consumer rroup. om-
c:lals Ill SIJlta Monica, for example, bave 
f1Jed laWIUitl Ill ltlte court there ap.lnst 
two 11ervtces tbat chl.rre S'2 for job and 
rental-bousiJIC Ustinrs copied from local 
oewspapers, Tbe dty contends tbat tbe 
11ervices Deed licenses 10 operate. 
For tbelr part. tbe pbone companies say 
that. they, too, are cooc:emed about traud 
ud lbady tactics. But Uley clearly want 
the services 10 fXll&ll4. ATU ays that In 
tbe few weeu lts new 900 serviet lw been 
available, customers bave requested more 
tban 600 of tile numbers, Tbe telephone rt· 
ant Is countlnl on sudl services to Increase 
tts Jonc-dlsta..net pbone business. 
MeanwhiJe, most 1oeal pbone companies 
are deiMnf with c:oasumer complalnts by 
enabUnr customers to block calls to t.be 
~ervices. But such blockinr can also hurt 
tbe business of lerttimate services. 
"U's k1Dd of a flaky market these 
days," uys ·James Garvey, rn.ana,er ol 
tbe Information 11ervices of Newsday, a 
New York·area DewSpaper tbat sells a 
ttme and weather service. "Call bloc.kinf 
baa really affected call volume." 
• 
ISSUES • BY BROCK N. MEEKS ~ 
Speech Is Where You Find It 
Pakistani Airlines, Flight 1006-l'm en route to 
Afghanistan via Peshawar, Pakistan, to cover the 
war. strikes me as odd that as I am about to romp 
through the Hindu Kush with 18th century warriors 
who routinely shoulder 20th century weaponry, the 
spectre of free speech haunts me even here. 
As I write, the Afghan president. Nijibullah. has 
declared a state of emergency that has essentially 
stripped the citizens of Kabul of any and all basic 
human rights-foreign journalists notwithstand-
ing. 
The state of emergency suspends a series of con-
stitutional rights, including protection against con-
fiscation of property, freedom of expression, free-
dom of assembly and petition, freedom from com-
pulsory labor, privacy of correspondence and tele-
phone conversations, and foreign travel. 
"That's all very interesting, Brock. But get to the 
point." 
OK. OK. The point is. although you expect such 
drastic measures from a regime infamous for its 
human rights violations, you don't expect some of 
the same issues to play in the heartland of America. 
But they are. Welcome to the war. 
Battleground 1990 
The issues of free speech and search-and-seizure are 
under attack in the main streets of urban and subur-
ban life: the shopping maiL It is a quirky kind of 
guerrilla war that is taking a heavy toll on the First 
Amendment rights of ordinary citizens. 
Ana the connection with telecommunications is 
that bulletin boards and computer conferencing 
systems are the shopping malls and main streets of 
the 21st century. Such electronic systems are the 
digital metaphor to the analog world of validated 
parking and 103 stores under one roof. And free 
speech abounds, for now. But it might not later. 
For example, in case after case, activist groups 
seeking to gain signatures from shopping mall pa-
trons have been told that the activity is illegaL The 
shopping mall owners claim these groups are oper-
ating on private property and have no rights to carry 
out such activities without their approvaL 
"But surely these groups have taken legal action to 
protect their rights lo exercise freedom of speech?" 
you ask. 
Certainly they have. And with all the fervor such 
constitutional issues raise. But the courts have 
sided with the mall owners. 
In 13 states bringing these issues before the Su-
preme Court, nine have favored the mall owners, 
finding that, according to their state constitution's 
provisions for free speech and related activities, 
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such as petitioning and passing out leaflets. the 
guarantee of free speech doesn't apply to malls. 
Electronic Main Street 
It seems improbable that someone could be sued for 
simply passing out copies of the Bill of Rights to 
passers-by. But it's happened. Ask Keenen Peck. a 
Milwaukee lawyer-he's been sued twice for doing 
just this at two different shopping malls. His crime: 
disturbing a place of business. 
Wben Peck went to court, the courts sided with 
the shopping mall owners and basically told Peck, 
"Leave your constitutional rights in the car when 
you go shopping." 
It's not a great mental leap to imagine a BBS sysop 
pulling the same type of action on an especially 
provocative user, say one that uploads copies of the 
Bill of Rights or text files urging the overthrow of the 
American government or revisionist holocaust 
"history" written by some hair-brained anti-Semitic 
group. impossible, you say? No. And the similarities 
are scary. Tbe shopping mall of the '80s replaces the 
broad, casual main street of yesteryear. Also gone is 
the "village green" where people used to congregate 
for anything from a Sunday picnic to an ad hoc 
concert. Shopping malls now play host to a score of 
community activities. BBSs and computer confer-
encing systems (especially those such as Compu-
Serve and Prodigy) do the same. 
For example: informal socializing, "under one 
roar· shopping, contests, all take place in shopping 
malls and on hundreds of electronic systems. 
In shopping malls the owners exercise complete 
control of the "content" that gets presented to the 
patrons. The same applies to the electronic world: 
the sysop or system administrator .completely con-
trols content. 
The shopping mall that sued Peck for distributing 
the Bill of Rights also sued a dance troupe for 
distributing anti-nuclear leaflets, yet the mall own-
ers later allowed military recruiters to set up dis-
plays of military vehicles, such as armored person-
nel carriers. ("Look at the tanks, Daddy!") 
The same type of action occurs on various com-
puter conferencing systems. On CompuServe Infor-
mation Services (CIS) system your rights of free 
speech are terminated as soon as you start to men-
tion the benefits of a cvmpeting system. The system 
administrators of CIS see sucb activities as intru-
sions that they have a right to bar. After all, they say, 
CIS is private property. 
"We pay for system upkeep and provide secu-
rity," says a CIS spokesman. "If there's a problem or 
disturbance or disaster, we have to take care of it and 
pay for it. Certainly we have the right to decide what 
goes on our system and what does not." 
To sharpen his point. the CIS spokesman noted, 
"There are plenty of free BBSes that people can use 
if they aren't happy with CIS." 
But what if those sysops also decide to play the 
heavy hand? Is there any protection? (No.) Are we 
then destined to roam the ethernet looking for a 
sympathetic outlet for our discussions? (And 
thereby end up "preaching to the choir"? No 
thanks.) 
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In 1980, the U."l. Supreme Court deferred 
states on the issue of free speech in shopping 
Bottom line for the courts: First Amendment doesn · 
protect speech in shopping malls-largely 
its restrictions apply to the federal govemmellt 
not to the owners of private property. 
So, the big court cops out, but leaves this 
hole: a state has the power to offer free 
protection in a shopping mall (or electronic 
if it chooses. 
TheCalifomia legislature lost a big opportunity ! , 
assure these rights when it dumped ACA·36 
trash last year. 
Round Two 
California isn't the only state grappling with 
issues, although it is the only state to atlempt 
electronic free speech issues. 
In Washington the Supreme Court decided 
malls function by design and purpose as 
nity business centers, and that owners of 
open to the public should have reduced expecta· 
tions of privacy. (Recognize that last phrase? Memo· 
rize it-it's likely to become an anthem 
speech advocates.) 
That decision upheld the rights of citizens 
gather signatures in Washington shopping 
Small victory. However, the court went on to 
mall owner has the right to "reasonably regulate" 
free-speech activities. 
So, make sure you only exercise free speech 
shopping malls where you know the politicai 
ings of the owners. 
Right. 
In Wisconsin the high court likened sno)P1D!I1tl'! 
malls more to "old-fashioned department 
On CompuServe 
1 Information Services 
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rights of free speech 
are terminated as 
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system. The system 
administrators of CIS 
c' see such activities as 
intrusions that they 
! have a right to bar. 
After all, they say, CIS 
is private property. 
than municipalities. According to the Wisconsin 
court, a shopping mall "concerns itself with one 
facet of its patron's lives-how to spend money." 
The court added, "Many other areas are more public 
and therefore more appropriate for the exercise of 
free speech." 
If you didn't jump on that last sentence, you're not 
paying attention. 
But what is "public?" Just how public are BBSes? 
How public are computerconferencing systems that 
charge for their services? 
No one is exactly sure. Much hinges on the defi· 
nition of the word "private." There is no single 
acceptable definition, 
That means that a sysop or system can define the 
dos and don'ts in ad hoc fashion. One system says 
"No foul language here"; another system says, "No 
mention of other competing systems." 
1 The procedure is fairly straightforward: you doc't 
' like the rules, take your cursor elsewhere. That 
seems acceptable, but why should I not be able to 
pay my money and speak as I want? 
What happens when civic governments move 
more toward an online environment? What happens 
when electronic democracy becomes a reality in· 
stead of just grist for the columnist's mill? 
What happens to free speech issues in those 
environments? Do we have to wait until the fight 
comes to our doorstep before we wake up and do 
something? 
That's what's happening in shopping malls all 
over the country, People are fighting for free speech, 
trying to push through legislation, There isn't a lot 
of hope. 
But in the electronic arena we don't have to wait, 
We can address the issue before it actually becomes 
an issue, And while we still have the right to do so, 
'I' And that's a right the some 15 million people 
below me. in Afghanistan, will never lcnow. But 
they don't have a choice. You do. And the cursor's 
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Telecommunications and Their 
Deregulation: An Introduction 
@ 
The telecommunications revolution, we are told, bas arrived. Telecommunications 
used to mean the telephone, a mature, rather dull, and highly regulated industry 
dominated by the staid Bell System. For most of us, the technology of the telephone 
was so good and reliable, and its uses so set and inflexible, that it was functionaUy 
forgouen. for corporate users, telecommunications represented just another mun-
dane cost of doing business. Telecommunicarions also encompassed broadcasting, a 
more glitzy endeavor than telephone to be sure, but one primarily characterized by a 
remarkable stability of three commercial television networks that aired mostly im-
itative and inoffensive entertainment programs, along with one poorly funded pub-
lic network. 
Today the very term telecommunications may be too confining. The once sta-
ble, noncompetitive businesses of telephone service and equipment manufacturing 
have become dynamic and highly competitive. Telephone technology has merged 
with that of the computer to vastly enhance the capabilities of bodl. The resulting 
sometimes labeled "information technology," bas become a vit)rant, bur-
reconfiguring business practices and permitting corporations to 
slash operating costs and automate the wodcplace. Some government policy-makers 
have information technology the United States' most important indus-
try. broadcasting has been so transformed by satellites, the abundance of 
cable and videotape technology, that the tradilionally limited television 
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channel~;, movie channels, "aduh" channel~;, Christian channels, Spanish language 
channels, and so on. 
While many of these changes reflect a grand profusion of technological innova-
tion, perhaps the more interesting phenomenon is the Jess apparent transformation 
of the state-deregulation-which has accompanied and abetted this technological 
"revolution." 1lle changes in telecommunications have emerged as much from 
changes in their regulatory treatment as they have from technological innovation. 
This book. examines the framework within which the telecommunications industry 
has been scructured, and how chat framework. changed. It seek.s to answer the 
question: how and why were American telecommunications deregulated? 
1lle American telecommunications industry is being deregulated after more than 
fifty years of close government oversight. In broadcasting, some of the changes are 
fundamental. Comcnercial broadcasters, once subject to many "public interest" 
regulatory controls, such as a requirement for public information programming, an 
obligation to ascertain the broadcast needs of the community, and recommendations 
on the maximum amount of advertising, are no longer constrained by such rules. 
lbe famous "Fairness Doctrine," which obligated broadcasters to air issues of 
conttoversy and to be balanced in that coverage, is now officially moribund. 1be 
period of license tenure for a radio frequency has been extended from three years to 
seven; for a television frequency from three years to five. The ceiling on the number 
of broadcast stations a single corporate entity may own bas been r.tised from a total 
of seven AM, seven FM radio stations, and seven television outlets, to twelve of· 
each. By the mid-l980s talk. echoed in the Senate Commerce Committee and at the 
Federal Communications Commission about complete First Amendment protection 
for any and all "publishers," pril'!l or electronic. The aim of such proposals is to 
completely dismantle any remaining regulatory controls over broadcasting, particu-
larly the rules which require broadcasters to operate as "public trustees." 
Ancillary broadcast services, long restricted by regulations favoring conven-
tional broadcasting, have been given a green light. The most important of these was 
cable television. For years, regulations hindered the expansion of cable television 
and restricted the type of signals 'lnd programs cable operators could purvey. These 
restrictions began to be dismantled in the mid-1970s. Cable has grown quick.ly 
since. Historic restrictions on pay television were removed, and new programming 
sources have emerged. By the late 1970s the FCC went so far as to promote new 
broadcast services. 
Common carriers such as the telephone system have experienced even greater 
changes. Long considered a "natural monopoly," the telephone system was closely 
regulated under the watchful eye of the Federal Communications Commission and 
state public utilities commissions. Regulatory controls made competition impossi-
ble. In exchange for monopoly status, telephone companies were obliged to extend 
service to all. Tluough the control of telephone rates, regulatory policies facilitated 
internal cross-subsidies to expand telephone service and k.eep particular rates low. 
The telephone system was united by the giant, vertically integrated American Tele-
,phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), operator of the only long-distance nee-
work. and of local telephone service in most major metropolises. But, beginning as 
early as the late 1950s, the FCC allowed a certain amount of competition in spe-
"'' lmrvdu~·uun s 
cialized business services. liberalized entry extended to domestic communication 
satellites in the early 1970s, and, most importanl, to long-distance telephone service 
by the late 1970s. In 1982 the structure of regulated telecommunications was 
massively tr.msformed by the break-up of AT&T. A divestiture agreement between 
AT&T and the Justice Department severed AT&T of its local telephone service 
companies. AT&T, historically confined to the provision of regulated telecom-
municalions services, was now free lo compete with computer giants such as IBM 
in global information technology markers. 1lle break-up of AT&T bas become the 
single most important event in the deregulation of American industry. 
The Context of Deregulation 
Yea telecommunicalion is not alone in experiencing a fundamental change in its 
regulatory treatment. It joins the ranks of several other industries that have been 
wholly or partially deregulated since the late 1970s. These include commercial 
airlines, railroads, trucking, intercity busing, banking, and (to a far lesser degree) 
oil and natural gas. Given the widespn:ad growth of the regulatory state in the 
twentieth century, how are we to understand this phenomenon of deregulation? 
Deregulation I'UD$ against the traditional understanding of government regulation as 
a means of rationalizing the economy and/or of safeguarding the public interest. We 
commonly think. of government regulation as the modem means of coordinating 
highly complex social activities in ways that the marker cannot. One traditionally 
accepted argument is that capitalists. acting on their own, pursuing the logic of 
profil maximization, cannot adequately safeguard the conditions which allow their 
industry-when tak.en as a whole-to flourish. Some businesses are regulated 
because their inordinate market power enables them to abuse other businesses 
and/or the public. 1lle coercive, regulatory power of the state limits the choices of 
individual capitalists in the long-term interest of both the industry and the public. Is 
deregulation, then, a gross betrayal of the public interest, a strategy on the pan of 
capital to reappropriate the power it once lost to democratic reforms? 
Or is deregulalion a response to the dubious efficacy or even failure of govern-
ment action? Govemmem interference in the economy is claimed to irreparably 
disrupt the allocative benefccence of the self-regulating, self-equilibrating market. 
Indeed, regulatory agencies often are said to be "captured" by the regulated par-
ties, which then utilize the state apparatus for private ends. Regulatory agencies 
protect businesses from competition. Does deregulaaion represent the • 'coming to 
senses" of an increasingly bureaucraaized state apparatus, dismantling itself in 
favor of more workable mark.et controls? 
In another popular account, the deregulation of telecommunications is tak.en to 
be a consequence of the revolution in technology. In this view, new technologies 
such as cable television and satellite delivery overwhelmed the traditional formulae 
of broadcast regulation. 1lle advent of digital encoding (a method of breaking down 
information into a code of binary numbers) and the melding of the computer with 
telephone switching caused the dissolution of the legal boundary between the regu-
lated telecommunications industry and the unregulated computer industry. In other 
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is a variant of technological detenninism: it sees technology as self-generative and 
social change as technologically driven. 
In my view, all such theories of deregulation are decidedly incomplete. For 
deregulation can only be understood in larger contexts. Telecommunication is just 
one of several American industries to be deregulated since the mid-1970s. Hence its 
deregulation cannot be explained with reference to internal telecommunications 
issues or technological faccors alone. Deregulation went beyond telecommunica-
tions, but was confined co a specific type of industry under a specific type of 
regulatory control. This poincs to the need to look toward regulatory structures. 
Deregulation was a political process, whereby the economic and political prob-
lems enveloping certain industries (but not others) turned a surprisingly hetero-
geneous political coalition against continued regulation. Joined within that coalition 
were two political logics usually diametrically opposed to each other-conservative 
free market economic theory and a left-liberal theory of political pareicipation. Each 
"logi.::" attacked regulation from the standpoint of its own theoretical position. 
Liberals and public interest groups, seeing in traditional regulacory agencies evi-
dence of "capture" by the very fanns under regulation, came to advocate deregula-
tion as a solution to entrenched corporate power. Conservatives and free market 
economists, seeing in regulatory agencies vast bureaucracies whose arbitrariness 
engendered economic inefficiency and artificial protectionism, also came to advo-
cate deregulacion. In various of these industries, the empirical example of an unreg-
ulated service provided the ideologically diverse regulatory refonn coalition with a 
powerful model that legitimated competition as a practice which fulfilled the values 
of both efficiency and equity. The industries under regulation fought hard for 
continued regulation, but could not overcome the politics of refonn. 
It is only when the phenomenon is situated in this context that one can grasp one 
of the greac ironies of contemporary deregulation. The prevalent business-inspired 
rhetoric of "gelling government off the backs of the people" notwilhstanding, 
deregulation has most strongly affected those regulatory agencies whose actions 
historically have been least odious to business. The agencies long criticized as 
having been "captured" by their regulated clients and serving those clients' narrow 
interests are precisely the agencies which are deregulating. Deregulation has af-
fected primarily the industry-specific regulatory agencies created during the New 
Deal, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). Some induscries, like airlines and trucking, were deregulated 
over the hostile and vociferous objeccions of the major corporate players and power-
ful unions of those industries. In contrasl, the agencies universally reviled by 
business, such as the Occupational Safely and Health Administr.nion (OSHA), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administr.ttion (NHTSA), though cut back and to some degree subverted under a 
hostile Reagan Administr.ttion, have not deregulated. In short, the conditions were 
001 there for a heterogeneous political coalition to support the deregulation of the 
•so-called "social" regulatory agencies. But they were there for deregulation of 
~ce-and-entry regulated infrastructure industries. 
The industries that have undergone deregulalion-airlines, trucking, railroads, 
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telecommunications, banking, oil, and nacural gas-have something very important 
in common. They are "infrastructures," the basic services which underlie all 
economic activity. They are central to the circulation of capital and the flow of 
commerce. Historically, regulatory agencies have exercised administrative controls 
over infrastructure industries as pare of the state's effort to construct a national arena 
for commerce and to stabilize the essential services upon which commerce depends. 
The type of regulatory controls exercised over these industries are known as "price-
and-entry" controls. Agencies detennined how anany and which finns would com-
pete in a given market, and set the basic prices that ftrmS could charge. 1bey 
substituted administrative decisions for market controls. 
The deregulated industries share another characteristic. With the exception of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, which began regulating the nation's railroads 
in the late 1880s, all were brought under regulation around the time of &he Depres-
sion and New Deal. The agencies are industry-specific-each agency has jurisdic-
tion over a pareicular industry only. While the main goal of New Deal regulatory 
agencies was to safeguard commerce, they also secured basic social equity. The 
"obligation to serve," a principle rooted in the old common law, was an essential 
feature of the regulation of infrastruccure services. 
I argue that the regulation of telecommunications, like that of other infrastruc-
ture industries, did serve the "public interest." However, the notion of the public 
interest embodied in the policies of the key government player, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, was so conservative and narrow, and its range of available 
regulatory options so constrained, that these policies did indeed protect the principal 
parties of the telecommunications industry, as many critics have charged. Tradi-
tional regulation of telecommunicacions exhibited a typically New Deal cautious 
guardianship over industries and finns deemed central 10 commerce. 1be public 
interest character of the regulation of infrastructure industries for the most pare was 
exhibited in that facilitation of commerce. 
The regulation of infrastructure industries has been inherently conservative in 
other respects. The nature of price-and-entry regulatory structures is to construct 
operating boundaries and barriers 10 entry. In theory this pennits existing fanns to 
provide services essential to commerce wiUout experiencing the destabilizing ef-
fects of competition. In short, price-and-entry regulation creates cartels. In so 
doing, the regulatory structures also facilicate socially valued "cross-subsidy" ar-
rangements. For instance in telephony, long-distance rates supposedly were used to 
keep local rates low in order to encourage the universal expansion of the telephone 
network. Similar cross-subsidy arrangements were established in all infrastructure 
industries brought under regulation. However, because of these very arrangements, 
there always exist incentives for certain classes of consumers-primarily large 
corporate users-to drop out of or "bypass" the regulated system, and for would-
be entrepreneurial entrants to service those users. In periods of high, sustained 
inflation, regulation generally exacerbates bypass incentives. 1be agencies grant the 
regulated industries price hikes which, under traditional cross-subsidy arrange-
ments, hit large corporate users proportionately more. Technological innovations-
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incentives and with the means to drop out of the regulated system. Oissatistied 
corporate users and potential competitors may form an alliance that pressures the 
regulated industry in the regulatory arena. 
The regulatory agency generally responds to technological innovations and by-
pass demands as unwelcome challenges co the organizational "settledness," or 
even to the integrity of the agency itself. The agency often responds to such 
challenges conservatively, clinging to its tried and true formulae and policies and 
acting to safeguard the regulated system. The regulated parties also act to thwart 
challenge and to procectthe status quo. It was this conservative dynamic of protec-
tionism that aroused the ire of both left-liberals and conservative free market ide-
ologues in the period of the late 1970s, a period when the political agenda had 
shifted from regulatory activism to one that questioned the efficacy of regulation. 
Regulatio11: Elements of a Theory 
This book examines regulation and deregulation through the prism of American 
telecommunications. Most studies of American communications focus on either 
broadcasting or telephone, rarely on both. Conventional studies tend to be either 
economic or anecdocal histories of the respective industries, with an occasional bow 
to law and regulation. Or, they are policy analyses, steeped in the byzantine com-
plexities of agency decisions, but bereft of a larger theoretical context. Yet the 
intemlation between the telephone and broadcast industries is not only important 
for an understanding of the process of regulation, but central to how deregulation 
carne about in telecommunications. At another level, studies lhatlook only at the 
deregulation of telecommunications miss the links to other deregulated industries-
and hence miss the broad reasons for the deregulation phenomenon. This book 
examines both broadcast and telephone industries. It looks at regulation and de-
regulation in other industries. II situates the analysis of regulation and deregulation 
within the theoretical context of the relationship between the state and the economy 
in the American sening. 
Telecommunication is a particularly interesting infrastructure because it not 
only is crucial for commerce, but also constitutes the public realm of ideas and 
discussion, and hence implicates the range of issues surrounding freedom of speech. 
This leads to two important subthemes. The first relates to telephony, and involves 
the tensions surrounding the benefits and drawbacks of a regulated monopoly in-
frastructure in a capitalise economy. The second relates to broadcasting, and deals 
with tensions among private ownership of the means of communication, the notion 
of a free and diverse marketplace of ideas, and the First Amendment quandary of 
regulatory controls. 
As should be clear already, this book analyzes deregulation as the consequence 
of a mosaic of forces, of struclures in inleracaion over time. The key piece in that 
moving mosaic (if such a mixed metaphor is pennilted) is lhe nature of regulation 
itself, for it is through and in and against the traditional price-and-entry regulatory 
structures thai the inlerplay of economic, technological, legal, and ideological 
forces took shape. The interplay of those forces constituted the conditions upon 
which political choices carne to be made. 
An lntrud!K·tion 9 
The importance of regulatory structures might be appreciated by contelUualizing 
the role of technological innovation. An important factor in telecommunications 
deregulation, technological innovation was not an independent, abstract force, but a 
concrete dynamic situated within entrepreneurial opportunities, political discourse, 
and, most important, regulatory constraints. What is important about technology 
was how specific innovations reconfigured the internal balance of entrepreneurial 
interests-a balance created and maintained within regulatory policies and for-
mulae. This dynamic of technological change within regulatory constraints became 
crucial, for example, as the FCC attemp&cd to meet the demands of large telecom-
munications users for better service and freer options. The small policy changes 
initiated by these users' demands chipped away at the AT&T monopoly and the 
regulatory formulae which legitimized that monopoly. They inadvertently set in 
mocion additional forces which culminated in the break-up of AT&T. 
Hence I argue that an adequate understanding of deregulation must rest upon a 
historically rooced theory of regulation that accounts both for the genesis of agencies 
and for actual agency operations. Regulation emerged in the twentieth century as a 
political institution to address new, systemic economic and social problems. Reg-
ulation in many ways is the hallmark of the modem "interventionist" stale. It is 
part and parcel of the dynamic of national development by private enterprise bul 
directed in some fashion by the state. The long regime of regulatory oversight of 
infrastructures provided a rational foundation for economic growth and develop-
ment-within a capitalist economic framewott, of course. 
To begin to address the question of deregulation, one must understand why 
regulatory agencies arose, what they do, and why they traditionally regulate particu-
lar kinds of industries such as telecommunications. The key is the role of the state in 
a capitalist economy. And this role lies at the heart of the question of the meaning of 
thai ubiquitous, but maddeningly vague tenn of regulation, the "public interest." 
In all state action, of which regulation is one, the definition of the public interest is 
crucial; it is a sort of black box whose meaning or representation is the terrain of 
struggle. 
The emergence of regulatory agencies constituted the building of nationol ad· 
ministrative structures in a state which had been institutionally localistic and court-
centered. For much of the 19dl century, the dispersed structure of American state 
power pennitted an active judiciary to direct the course of economic development. 
Judicial activism facilitated the establishment of quasi-infrastructural services in the 
early part of the century, largely by means of eminent domain law and the granting 
of exclusive franchises to the builders of bridges, roads, or canals. Once the in-
frastructure was in place, judicial action favored business risk-taking (and conse-
quently capitalist economic growth). With the exception of land grants and certain 
ocher subsidies, the economy was established by mid-century as a sphere largely 
beyond political intervention. This pattern changed by the 1890s, because the 
triumph of laissez-faire had created a general crisis of social control. Regulatory 
agencies grew in response to the needs and great changes fostered by the rise of the 
large national corporation. 
But regulatory agencies are not of a piece. Central to my theory is the notion that 
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correspond to the historical conditions surrounding their creation. The particular 
nature of inter-business and wider political conllicts dictated the emergence of three 
dillerent types of regulatory bodies, generally corresponding to three historical 
periods of origin. 
Progressive Era (approximately from 1900 to World War I) legislation created 
regulatory bodies largely in response to popular political activism. These bodies 
were designed to relieve the economic and social instability caused by the large 
corporation and its tremendous transformation of social and economic life. These 
agencies were concerned mainly with the general character of economic activity. 
The antitrust division of the Department of Justice (formed in the aftermath of the 
Sherman Act) and the FederaJ Trade Commission (established along with the 
Clayton Act of 1914) dealt with broad matters of monopoly and competition. The 
Federal Reserve System sought to control the exchange and circulation of money. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission, although literally an exception to this cate-
gorization (because it regulated a single industry), upon closer examination fits 
rather well. This is due to the absolutely pivotal imponance of the railroad for the 
conduct of commerce in the late 19th and early 20th century. 
New Deal agencies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Feder.al Com-
munications Commission sought to create strong price and entry controls in specific 
markets, with the purpose of establishing stable cartels. This "industry-specific" 
type of regulation grew in response to the anarchy of the market during the Depres-
sion, and was vigorously sought after by various industries. The form of regulatory 
action introduced by the price-and-entry agencies is often labeled in the economics 
literature "producer protection." Both Progressive Era and New Deal regulation 
established federal political structures which functioned in two interrelated ways. 
First, by providing an extra-market policing function, regulatory agencies helped to 
rationalize corporate capitalism. Second, regulatory agencies provided an admin-
istrative fr.amework within which imponant interest groups, primarily large corpo-
rations, could bargain, settle conflicts, and legally collude under state imprimatur. 
The agencies o(the 1960s and early 1970s, established in large part in response 
to liberal reform movements during and just after the Great Society, dealt with the 
social impact of businesses, not with their economic behavior per se. These new 
agencies were to regulate all industries, not specific ones. In conlr'.asl to the pro-
ducer orientation of the Progressive Era and New Deal types of regulation, the Great 
Society agencies were oriented largely toward the values of consumers and the 
interests of those left out of producer-oriented interest representation. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration are 
the best known of the "social" regulatory agencies. 
However, the origin of an institution is dille rent from the set of reasons and 
structures by which that institution oper.ates or is maintained over time. I argue that 
there is a fundamental distinction between genesis and operationality. Although 
regulatory agencies should be differentiated according to the temporal political 
alignment of social and economic forces reflected in their creation, and according to 
their function, all regulatory agencies are situated within the same field of institu-
tional power, and all regulatory agencies are united under the rubric of admin-
' 
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istrative law. Similar forces of institutional constraint, bureaucratic organization, 
and procedure affect all agencies. 
Regulatory agencies constitute a new structure of federal political power in the 
American political system; they represent a mixture of legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions, able on the one hand to be flexible and informal and on the other 
hand to formulate hard and fast rules. In theory this flexibility permits regulatory 
oversight to be continuous and substantive. But regulatory agencies do not funda-
mentally alter the traditionally dispersed sysrcm of political power in the United 
States. The agency is generaJiy the weakest player situated in an already constituted 
terrain of political power-including the pragmatic fact of actual functioning of the 
industry brought under regulation. Precisely because regulatory agencies do not 
centralize political power-agencies cannot direct economic production and they 
must vie with the many other layers of institutionalized governmental power at 
local, stale, and federaJ levels-.. bureaucratism" is endemic to them. This bureau-
cratism is seen in numerous time delays, in wrangling over jurisdiction, and in the 
multiple hearings at various institutional levels which any proposed regulation 
undergoes. The forces which engender bureaucratism in regulatory agencies push 
agencies to regulate conservatively. 
Regulatory agencies may properly be seen as a mechanism of rationalization in 
advanced capitalism, but they are only occasionally successful at this. Their overaJl 
lack of power means they might serve as a forum to allow oligopolistic industries to 
police themselves, or, alternatively, they might punish some corporations for "ex-
ternalities" (indirect, or spillover effects of business activity, such as pollution), but 
they usually are unable to act as planning bodies. Institutional and organizational 
factors are of critical importance in Understanding how a regulatory agency actually 
operates. This relation between the originally conceived function of a specifac 
regulatory agency and the bureaucratic constraints that mold its actual operation 
must be considered in any analysis of regulation. 
Telecommunications as Infrastructure 
Why are some industries, like lelecommunications, regulated while others are not? 
Put a different way, why are some industries considered to be imbued with a public 
function or affected with a "public interest?" Notwithstanding the fact that some 
(perhaps much) regulation at farst glance seems to serve private, rather than public 
interests, this is not true of all forms of regulation. Cenain industries, and certain 
types of industries, appear historically always imbued with something larger, some-
thing more generaJ than private interest. This "something" is what we intuitively 
understand as the public interest. 
Telecommunication constitutes one of the four essential modes or channels thai 
permit trade and discourse among members of a society, the other three being 
transponation, energy utilities, and the system of currency exchange, or money. 
Transponation, energy, and telecommunication industries provide the services upon 
which all economic activity (beyond the level of self-sufficiency) depends. Money, 
lU bottom a representation of value and the means of exchange of value, also is 
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crucial for economic intercourse beyond the level of baraer. These services are 
"connective" institutions. They are lhe channels for trade and discourse which bind 
together a community, society, or nation. They are central to the circulation of 
capital and literally constitute both the foundation ami the limit for the overall 
economic functioning of a society. This is why transportation, energy, telecom-
munications, and currency systems are called infr.lstructures. They are the struc-
tures below or underneath. 
As I suggested earlier, the construction and maintenance of infrastructures usu-
ally have been the responsibility or governmenls. A central contention of this study 
is that infrastructure industries are always the focus of direct state intervention, 
whether by way of promotion, subsidy, or regulation. This has been true in the 
Anglo-American context since 13th-century English common law courts declared 
certain kinds of occupations to be possessed of a special status-the so-called 
"common callings." Even in the United Stales, where the liberal tradition has 
meant that energy, tr.msportation, communications, and even financial services-
like all other capitalist enterprises-are private commercial ventures, government 
has been closely involved in their creation, maintenance, and oversight. In the 19th 
century, the state's involvement rested in acts of promotion and subsidy, and the 
extensive use of eminent domain law in the effort to establish quasi-public in-
frastructur-.tl services. In the 20th century the state's involvement has been the 
imposition of regulation and the establishment of complex systems of administrative 
concrol over these services. 
\..N Both governmental assistance and the imposition of regulatory controls were 
g? central to the establishment and ongoing operation of the American telecommunica-
tions system. Stale actions helped private corporations establish telecommunication 
services. 'Throughout its early years, the telegr-.tph industry received critical infu-
sions of feder-.tl and state subsidies. Congress legitimized telephony as a "natural 
monopoly,'' and established regulatory oversight to facilitate both the expansion of 
the nationwide telephone network and the reduction of business risk. Federal inter-
vention facilitated the emergence of radio in the United States, first by constructing 
a patent pool among the major corporate patent holders of radio technology and later 
by engineering the formation of the Radio Corporation of American (RCA). The 
Federal Communications Commission, established in 1934, was given a wide man-
date to oversee wire and wireless communications. The FCC attended to the public 
interest in telecommunications largely by protecting the existing structures of tele-
phony and broadcasting (and the corporations which provided those services). 
federal regulation stabilized the chaotic use of the radio airwaves for commercial 
broadcasters and oversaw a system of guar-.mteed fair rate of return for wired 
common carriers. 
The legal principle upon whi .h state intervention in these industries has rested is 
the commerce clause of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power ... to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sever-.tl States .... " 1 
This is important. U there is a general concept of the public interest informing state 
intervention into infrasl.nllclure andustries, it is a commerce-based concept. State 
intervention in infrastructure industries generally has meant the creation of a na-
~ooal trading area where good!' and services can circulate freely. To facilitate the 
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aclual circulation of goods and services, government imposed common carrier 
regulatory controls on the means of circulation. 
As it emerged in transportation law in the late 19th century, the main pnllll,;lplc: 
of common carrier law was that a carrier must allow nondiscriminatory, that is, 
and equitable, access to its service at just and reasonable prices. Nondiscrimination 
would ensure that carriers would serve the needs of commerce rather than inhibit 
commerce. Part or the provision or nondiscriminatory access to their services meant 
that common carriers were mandated to interconnect their lines with other carriers. 
Most often, common carriers were characterized by economies of scale and were 
granted monopoly franchises. Among other things, such franchises granted the right 
to take private property for public use, through eminent domain. These legal tools 
facilitated the construction of an overall network. Regulatory oversight would en· 
sure nondiscriminatory service and "fair" ralcs. Regulation thus took advantage of 
certain efficiencies deriving from the monopolistic organization of capital while 
presumably protecting against the abuses that monopoly power could bring. The 
key ro common carrier law-and the regulation of infrastructure industries gener-
ally-rests in the fact that it satisfies the contradictory demand for a unified plan of 
national development within a system of private property. 
Telecommunications and the Public Interest 
But state support and regulatory oversight did not simply help establish and protect 
telecommunication corporations and their services. 1bcy also secured certain broad-
er public interest goals, goals linked to democratically based principles of fairness 
and equity. Telephone and telegraph companies were legally obliged 10 provide 
service to ali, at fair and reasonable rates-known as "universal service." In part 
because of such obligations, the American telephone network traditionally was 
universal and efficient, and the service was comparatively inexpensive for the 
customer. It is significant that telephony achieved these ends as a govemmenc-
regulated monopoly. 
Broader public inrerest or equity-based values were auacbed to broadcasting as 
well. Broadcasters, though given licenses to monopolize a given radio frequency, 
were not to view that license as a property right. The airwaves were deemed the 
property of aU the people of the United States, and the holders of broadcast licenses 
were required to operate as public l.nllstees. Ultimately, broadcast regulation was 
founded upon a public domain argument, that the airwaves were a natural resource 
held in common-much like waterways. The state acted to protect and safeguard 
that commonly held resource. The public domain rationale rested upon a (now 
debated) scientific judgment as to the limited nature of the electromagnetic re-
source. Because not everyone who wished to engage in broadcasting could do so, 
government bad to select individual licensees from a pool of prospective applicants. 
In a very real sense, the government endowed certain private parties with immense 
public benefits. Because of this, the broadcast licensee technically was deemed a 
"public trustee," and had to fulfill certain .. affirmative" obligations. 
The common carrier principle is really little more than a commerce-based notion 
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carrier law meant simply the guarameed a~.:cess 10 the means of transmission. Even 
when common carriage entailed, as it did in telephony, a policy which obliged 
carriers to extend service to all, this also can be considered lo some degree a 
commerce-based policy. It allowed and encouraged the expansion of communica-
tion necessary for the free flow of commerce. TI1e fact that people were given 
access to the telecommunications infrastruclure was essentially a logical extension 
of expanding the marketplace. 
Nonetheless, the fulfillmem of the commerce function was responsible for the 
wider public interesl accomplishment of making the telephone essentially a public 
utility, available (in principle) to all citizens. In this sense, even as il facilitates 
commerce, common carrier law embraces principles broader than commerce. The 
obligation to serve and not to discriminate among customers-rooted in the old 
common law-clearly embody principles of social equily. 
There is another way in which commerce is not the fundamental pnnc1p1e 
which underlies the regulation of telecommunicalions. Telecommunication is a 
peculiar infrastructure because it is a primary medium for the circulation of ideas 
and information, a realm where, in principle, political life can be discussed openly 
in accordance with the standards of critical reason. The regulation of telecom-
munications is more complicated and interesting than that of transportalion, for 
example, precisely because in principle it safeguards the democratic right of free-
dom of speech. 
There is a historical and logical-but uneasy-connection between the cap-
italist orientation to the market (thai is to say, comractual freedom, lumped under 
what I have called the commerce principle) and wider civil freedoms (for our 
purposes here, the principle of freedom of speech and the creation of a "free 
marketplace of ideas''). After all, classical liberalism soughllo carve out spheres of 
behavior free from control by the state. This primarily entailed the freedom to 
fashion comracts and engage in commercial activity. Contractual freedom rested 
upon the legal privilege granted an individual to autonomously regulate his/her 
relations with others by his/her own transactions. 2 This is why contracts are, in a 
sense, private law-making. The recognized aulonomy of the individual in contrac-
tual behavior logically extended to the individual in other spheres of conduct, 
including the sphere of speech and ideas. Indeed, for a time the bourgeoisie's 
historic struggle for contr.tctt:al 1ieedom went hand in hand with the struggle for 
individual rights of speech :md print. In Europe, the bourgeoisie promoted the 
development of a public sphere in opposilion to the traditionalist and hierocratic 
forms of feudal authority. The Bill of Rights to the United States Conslilution, cast 
within the natural law theory so inlimately connected 10 the bourgeois revolution, 
protected speech and press from governmemal intrusions. Both in Europe and 
America, the spread of private, partisan newspapers and journals in the late 18th 
and early 19th century constructed a sphere of public opinion which mediated 
between society and the state. 3 
· The abstract connection between early capitalism and free speech had a concrete 
torrn as well. The marketplace in early capitalism oflen was both the site for lhe 
circulation of commodilies un.d the site where discourse took place. Central 
to the theorv of freedom of soeech are lhe notions that onlv in a free and open 
• 
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"marketplace" of ideas can a citizenry exercise democratic prerogative, and in 
such an open marketplace can "truth" prevail. 4 The liberal separation ofthe state 
from the private realm of ideas was indeed essential to the creation of an indepen-
dent public sphere. But this separation facilitates a democratic public sphere ro 
a degree, a fact that underscores one of the great tensions between liberalism and 
democracy. Just as concrete factors affect competition in the economic marketplace, 
the marketplace of ideas is greatly affected, if not essentially determined, by the 
available means of communication. The public sphere constructed by assembly in 
marketplaces and by a profusion of partisan newspapers is far different from a 
public sphere constructed by and within great and often centralized institutions of 
mass communication. 
The liberal model of freedom of speech stops at the limit of commerce. The 
model assumes that a democratic public sphere will emerge consequent to the 
unimpeded, private actions of speech-entrepreneurs. But the results of the stale's 
noninterference in the public sphere is much less clear when the means of commu-
nication are complicated, consolidated, and not generally accessible. The 
sphere constituted by media of electronic communication greatly extend the 
sphere and vastly expand the amount of information available, but at the same time 
create difficult problems of power. Because access to the modem public sphere was 
(and is) restricted to those with the capital to own a newspaper or operate a broad-
cast station, this mode of communication is essentially one of expanded monologue, 
with only indirect feedback. mechanisms. While those with wealth can disseminate 
their views, the First Amendment .. right" of most citizens is merely to listen and 
read. Yet a free marketplace of ideas implies dialogue. In short, the nature of the 
media of communication and the terms of access to them greatly affect the actual 
marketplace of ideas. If we take the liberal theory of the nuutetplace of ideas 
seriously, the limited access to centralized media constitutes a limit on self-govern-
ment and substantive free speech. 
The dilemma of broadcast regulation was this: how to safeguard the use of an 
important, technologically scarce, medium of commerce while maintaining the 
separation of the state from the private realm of ideas, and at the same time also 
facilitate a democratic public sphere? The solution was for a regulatory body to 
license would-be broadcasters, and suggest (not impose) broad and vague (not 
specific or concrete) principles of public interest licensee behavior. 
The paradox of the liberal conception of the public interest in telecommunica-
tions, as embodied both in common carrier law and in broadcast regulation, is that it 
is inescapably bound to the commerce origin. The free speech function of commu-
nications media was assumed protected by safeguarding the commerce function of 
the telecommunications infrastructure. Because a free market in ideas is assumed to 
result from the absence of government interference, there has never been a viable 
ideology of positive governmenc action to facilitate the exchange of ideas. The FCC 
assumed that a diversity of owners of broadcast media would result in a diversity of 
ideas. And yet the commerce-rooted imposition of common carrier law in telecom-
munications did indirectly serve broader free speech interests. Because of the com-
merce function of the telegraph and the telephone, access to those services was to be 
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interests by establishing the separation of the control of !he means of communica-
tion (the "conduit") from the content of lhe traffic which went over those lines. 
Although less clear-cut and far less complete, the common carrier principle also 
applied to broadcasting. The broadcaster was legally obliged to air programs on 
controversial matters of public policy and to be balanced in that coverage. When a 
broadcaster pennilted a candidate for public office to use the airwaves, that broad-
caster had to open the frequency to all candidates. s These obligations might be 
considered quasi-common carrier in nature. 
Deregulation and the Public Interest 
I argue that it is largely a commerce-based concept of the public interest which 
underlay the traditional system of telecommunications regulation. But regulation 
had powerful equity-based ramifacations as well. Universalaclephone service came 
to embody a principle that access to information and to the means of communication 
is part of being a citizen. Universal telephone service allows individuals to be part 
of the fabric of national life, if only due ao a legally embedded principle of mandato-
ry access to the equipment at cheap rates. Likewise, the scarcity r~~tionale for the 
regulation of broadcasting created a public interest goal beyond the technical prob-
lem of allocating the electromagnetic spectrum, to wit, that the diversity of view-
points and speech opportunities is crucial to a good society and a democratic polity. 
The principle of keeping content distinct from conduit, embedded in antitrust and 
regulatory "separations" policies, is, in a sense, a technologically rooted protec-
tion of freedom of speech. Separations policies constructed institutional boundaries 
between communications services: broadcasters were kept distinct from common 
carriers, aclephone companies could not engage in telegraphy. AT&T could not 
enter the data processing industry. Notwithstanding the original commerce-based 
intentions underlying the sysacm. of telecommunications regulation, broader concep-
tions of the public interest~.:ame to be attached to that regulatory system post hoc. 
Yet, historically, the application of the conceptions of "universal and nondis-
criminatory service," the "marketplace of ideas," and "diversity of viewpoints" 
was always tremendously problematic in the traditional regime of telecommunica-
tions regulation. Indeed, as the ensuing chapters will show, regulation barely se-
cured these broader ends of eqa~ity and fairness. Sometimes, in attempting to secure 
such public interest ends, regulalion actually sabotaged them. The irony is that these 
broader noaions of the public interest were ''attached" to specific technologies and, 
further, to the regulatory protection of such technologies. As the technologies 
themselves change and the separation between them becomes more problematic, the 
broader notions of the public in&erest lose their material and legal moorings. This 
underscores the other great irony of deregulation. liberals and public interest 
groups backed deregulation in large part because they saw "regulation as usual" as 
a form of regulatory "capture." The dismlucion of regulatory protectionism and the 
forces unleashed therefrom served, however, to undercut the historic connections 
between particular telecommunications technologies and the broader notions of the 
public interest. The broader public interest goals became subsumed and redefined 
under the ideological rubrics of technological expansion and unbridled competition. 
An lmroJUL·tion 
The deregulation of various industries underscore:; an important contemporary 
transfonnation of the concept of the public interest which goes well the 
technological changes in telecommunications. I have noted that it is the New 
industry-specific, price-and-entry agencies which are deregulating. Traditional eco-
nomic regulation created, at one and the same time, a complex system of producer 
cartels and service-based entitlements. Congress established the price-and-entry 
regulatory agencies to bring order, or ''rationality,'' to various industries during the 
Depression. Such agencies were aiven authority over a single industry which was 
burdened by some destabilizing condition. Railroads, trucking, and airlines were 
beset by too much competition; telephony was burdened with problems of monopo-
ly; radio broadcasting suffered from an absence of general technical opcratina rules; 
speculative banking practices undermined financial institutions. Regu!aro.y agen-
cies established how many and which ftrms could enter into business, set aeneral 
pricing levels, and fonnulatcd rules spccifac to the operation of an industry, such as 
which routes a certain uuckina fann would service or which radio frequency a 
licensee would inhabit. 
In fulfilling the goal to stabilize these various industries, the price-and-entry 
regulatory agencies created structures of mutual benefit-or cartels-among the 
major interests (often including organized labor) in any particular industry. Indus-
tries and markets were .. saved" precisely by not permitting marketplace coa&rols to 
function freely. Regulation substituted administrative rationality and informal polit-
ical decision-making for market rationality. Price-and-entry regulation constituted a 
fonn of state intervention which not only stabilized certain key industries but, in the 
process, fulfilled certain broad New Deal social policies as well. Rcaulation 
brought order to these industries, faxing stable market shares and prices. In so 
doing, it facilitated the broad unionization of those industries (which could be seen 
also as fulfilling the Keynesian macrocconomic goal of stimulating aggreaate de-
mand). LastJy, such regulation constructed a sort of service-based entitlement sys-
lem. Regardless of profit potential, buses, trucks, and airlines had to serve out-of-
the-way areas; local telephone service was made cheap and universally available; 
broadcasters had to fulfill (however nominally) the obligations of a public trustee. 
Regulation compelled that rates be skewed to facilitate the expansion of service. 
This generally entailed internal cross-subsidies that favored poor and out-of-the-
way customers. In :;hort, regulation constructed a reasonably stable system of 
mutual compromises and benefits to major corporations, organized labor, and even 
consumers. Deregulation undermines this complex SCI of benefits. 
Deregulation serves to dismantle the easy functioning of regulation-enforced 
cartels. h pennits the resurgence of competition and the anarchistic play of market 
forces. How such a political phenomenon could come to pass is very surprising, 
because the regulatory comrol of competition brought business certainty and rela-
tively assured benefits to the parties of the various cartels. It is not generally in the 
interest of the major benefiCiaries of an arrangement to seek: alteration of the 
arrangement. Indeed, as if to underscore this point, the powerful interests of the 
deregulated industries generally opposed deregulation. Another facror favoring 
maintenance of the regulatory status quo is the bureaucratic nature of the reaularo.y 
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organizations, tend not to shrink or dismantle themselves. Indeed, a frequent crit-
icism aimed at regulators and agencies is that they try to expand !heir purviews and 
budgets. With deregulation, however, regulators surrender their expenise to the 
workings of the market. More shocking still, some agencies actually initiated the 
deregulatory process themselves. 
A key cause of deregulation is the divergence over time of administrative 
mtionality and economic rationality. Regulatory structures and formulae tend to 
rellect an internal balance of imerests within a regulated industry. This is largely 
because the basic business and functional instilUlional patterns are set before the 
advenl of regulatory controls. Regulation usually recapitulates these pauerns and 
applie.s the coercive authority of the state to make them work. Over time, changes in 
the larger economic environment and technological innovation may alter the bal-
ance of interests in and around a regulated industry, but the regulatory structures 
and formulae may not adapt to these changes. 
In theory, the informal, discretionary nature of regulation permits an agency to 
adapt to new circumstances. In practice, regulation tends 10 be conservative. In the 
case of the FCC, the Commission clung to familiar definitions and policies long 
after their applicability had become ambiguous. The agency, beset with many 
problems and conflicls, often clings to established rules and policies. Regulatory 
rules may make administrative, but not economic sense. Moreover, if the regulatory 
arena becomes too contentious, if the struggle between interests is too basic, the 
agency experiences additional p"-essures to become more formalistic. Regulatory 
delay and imtionality reach a point where business decisions are made uncenain. 
Regulated panies flee the regulatory arena for relief. New policy forums may then 
disrupt the senledness of regulatory conservatism. 
To describe this process in historical terms, the liberal-lefl regulatory activism 
of the Great Society period not only produced new regulatory agencies, but pushed 
the older agencies to become •aore open to democmtic (or at least non-industry) 
demands. The traditional regulatory arena, long protective of (if sometimes also 
bothersome lo) the major regulated interests, waxed inordinately contentious and 
politicized. This phenomenon pushed agencies to become more formalistic, more 
prone to time delays and dntwn-out judicial challenges. In a period of high inllation, 
regulatory activism helped modify rate increases such that large service users paid a 
higher proponional share of the "cross-subsidy." These pressures magnified the 
economic incentives for large users to bypass the regulated system and for new 
entrepreneurs to offer unregulated services that would sidestep the regulated indus-
try's delicate system of producer cartels and service entitlements. In response, the 
traditional regulatory agencies enacted new rules to thwan such bypass. 
Corporations, reeling under new obligations, costs, and time delays imposed by 
the new social regulatory agencies, counterauacked. They formed lobbying groups 
and foundations, and commissioned repons decrying the "overregulated" society. 
Corporations attempted 10 tie the decline of US economic productivity to excessive 
regulation. One effect of this corporate attempt lo alter the reigning political dis-
course was to open up a greater space for the analyses of academic economists of 
regulation, who had been writing about the inefficiencies of regulation for years. In 
I a strange sort of way, the corporate effort succeeded and failed. With the backdrop 
of a crisis in public institutions consequent lo Waier!Hi.le and the economic "stludla-
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lion" of the 1970s, corporations largely succeeded in transforming a generalized 
populist dissatisfaction with government (including regulation) to a critique of reg-
ulation. But the regulatory agencies most affectedwere not the new social regulato-
ry agencies so reviled by business. Rather, they were those agencies mosc criticized 
by academic economists-the New Deal price-and-entry agencies. 
Notwithstanding the usual conservatism of regulation, political dynamics and 
technological innovation and changes in political culture can alter the conservative 
tenor of "regulation as usual." By the mid-1970s an ideologically diverse political 
coalition-including free-market economists located in key positions in the Ford 
Administration, historically pro-regulation liberals such as Senators Edward Ken-
nedy and Philip Han, and consumer advocate Ralph Nader-had emerged co reform 
regulation. Early reform stinings coalesced around commercial airlines and the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. Despite vociferous opposition from the airline industry 
and nearly 40 years of CAB precedent, commercial air transport was deregulated. 
Early successes with airline deregulation (lower prices and reputedly higher effi-
ciency) created further political impetus ro deregulate other transportation carriers 
and other infrastructure services. 
Telecommunication was affected greatly by the general environment of de-
regulation, yet in some ways both broadcasting and common carriage had already 
experienced changes which made them ripe for the deregulation impulse. The 
regulation of broadcasting had long been characterized by the protection of the 
conventional services of AM radio and VHF television from competitive entry. 
Although the FCC formulated various structural and content controls on broad-
casters, their efficacy in securing "public interest" broadcasting was dubious. The 
broadcast reform movement set out to change this. 
The broadcast reform movement (the communications "wing" of the many 
liberal activist consumer groups of the Great Society period, consisting of a loose 
coalition of liberal, often minority-group organizations dedicated to altering the 
broadcast system) utilized three identifiable strategies in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The m.>st widespread of these was that of conducting challenges io the 
license renewals of existing broadcast stations. Petitions to deny license renewal 
were filed on the basis that such stations had not fulfilled their obligation to broad-
cast in the public interest. Reform groups were greatly assisted in this endeavor by 
the judicial expansion of legal ''standing.'' This expansion enabled parties without 
propeny interests to argue before regulatory agencies. The second strategy entailed 
a call for the right of limited, but mandatory citizen access to broadcast frequencies. 
This included demands for airtime ro respond to "controversial" advertisements, 
such as cigarette ads. Last, the reform movement initiated (or at least picked up and 
gave loud voice to) a new discourse on the potential of "new technologies" ro 
alleviate &he endemic problems of broadcasting. In particular, this discourse focused 
on cable television as a rechnology that could create a • 'wired democracy,'' able to 
transcend the limited and commercial system of conventional broadcasting. 
license renewal challenges and access demands caused shon-term but severe 
regulatory problems for broadcasters, and caused them to flee the regulatory arena 
toward Congress for relief. Congress took up broadcast industry demands for li-
cense renewal relief in hearings which by 1976 became bound to the broader 
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time, !he broadcasl refonn movement's "new ~ohs~.:ourse, n.:sommu!l 
wilh the material interests of non-broadcast emrepn.:neurs, slowly pushed the FCC 
away from its traditional policies of protection. Broadcast deregulation emerged 
from an unexpected combination of new technologies and mutually contradictory 
rules designed to protect conventional television broadcasting. lbe advent of satel-
lite-delivered programs to cable operators caused contradictions in the regulations 
designed to restrict cable television. The subsequent inadvertent relaxation of con-
flicting regulations provided the FCC with a reaL-world case for judging whether 
broadcasters were, in fact, being injured by cable. When broadcasters could not 
show that they were injure>4 by the relaxation of specific cable rules, the FCC, now 
taken with the general notion of regulatory refonn, relaxed more of the rules. In 
addition, a crucial court case in 1977 established that certain other FCC rules 
designed to protect broadcasters were unconstitutional. By the late 1970s, the FCC 
had moved from abe New Deal cautious guardian model of regulation, to one which 
woded actively to liberalize entry in abe broadcast business. 
The common carrier area had been dominated by a venically integrated AT&T 
monopoly which WlfS protected by the FCC. AT&T controlled long-distance tele-
phony, was the local service monopolist in most metropolises, and supplied all of its 
equipment needs through its own manufacturing subsidiary. By abe mid-1970s, 
however. the internal balance of interests in the industry had shifted-partly due to 
the entrepreneurial opportunities created by technological innovation and partly to 
economic incentives to bypass t~ regulated system. Again, technology is not an 
.J::- independent, abstr.tet force, but a dynamic situated wilhin contexts of en-
~ trepreneunal opponunities and regulatory constraints. Underlying this shift were 
two important factors: one, longstanding antitrust problems over AT&T's venical 
monopoly, and two, the needs of a powerful community of large telecommunica-
tions users which was inadequately served by AT&T and wanted freedom from 
AT&.T-amposed options. 
AT&T, so adept at providing universal telephone service, was always suspected 
of using its venical monopoly to internally manipulate its prices in order to raise 
profits. Such antitrust considerations resulted in the 1956 confinement of AT&T to 
the provision of regulated common carrier telecommunications only. The large, 
venical monopolistic structure also was responsible for abe company's inability to 
satisfy the more specific needs of large telecommunication consumers in the post-
World War II period of business expansion. In response to the demands of these 
large users, the fCC opened special small pans or the Bell monopoly's operating 
environment to competition. These small entry "liber.dizations" were penniued 
only because AT&T could not serve specialized users ade.fuately. They were not 
intended or envisioned to open up AT&T's monopoly. Nevenheless, the FCC could 
neither foresee nor control the consequences of its actions. Entry liberalization 
encouraged the emergence of new technologies and new players into telecom-
munications common carriage, notably in "private lines" (special lines dedicated 
between two points, used increasingly for data carriage) and "terminal equipment" 
(tdephone instruments and switching systems). Over the years, these new players 
(particularly the MCI Corporation) and large users would push continuously at the 
borders of the Bell System witb new technologies and new services. 
An llllroduL"Iion 
Such developments had two inadvertent but serious ramifications. 
raised serious issues of public policy regarding the appropriate boundary betweam 
regulated and unregulated activities. And second, they placed AT&T's rate struc-
ture in potential jeopardy. These antitrust and liberalized entry matten became 
inexorably intenwined in the mid- to late 1970s. In 1974 the Justice Department 
filed an antitrust suit against AT&T, charging that the company bad used its regu-
lated profits to practice predatory pricing in competitive markets. 
faced with new competitive players and unclear regulatory boundaries, AT&T 
found its external operating environment and ils policy arena, both for decades 
remarkably stable and certain, becoming increasingly unstable and uncertain. By 
1976, partly at AT&T's urging, and partly abe result of the deregulation environ-
ment, the policy-making arena opened to include Congress in an attempt to rewrite 
the 1934 Communications Act. Soon, however, all branches of government were 
engaged in effons to fonnulate new nalionalteleconununications policy-a process 
likened by AT&T's Chairman Charles L. Brown to .. nothing less than a tbree·ring 
circus." 
What began as a complex antitrust case in 1974 inadvenently became by 1981 a 
closed policy forum within whicb various economic and political concerns could be 
joined. In the context of Reagan Administration Justice Department negotiations, 
the need to solve pressing contradictions in domestic telecommunications common 
carriage could be reconciled witb large users' demands for telecommunications 
options, with AT&T's desire to be freed of regulatory barriers, witb national se-
curity considerations, and, finally. witb the growing concern to protect and enhance 
American glol»>l interest in information technology. 
The transfonnation of abe concept of abe public interest posed by abe deregulation of 
these industries involves a shift away from a concern witb stability and a kind of 
social equity to a concern witb market controls and economic effaciency. In this 
regard, the deregulation of telecommunications commands particular attention. For, 
again, it involves not only the usual issues of political economy in abe spheres of 
commerce and antitrust, but is characterized centrally by issues of public utility and 
free speech as well. 
The divestiture of AT&T, and abe relaxation of regulatory controls over broad-
casting in panicular, pose important questions about abe nature of abe modem public 
sphere. The foreseeable outcome of abe divestiture of AT&T is increasing telecom-
munications options for business and the decline of the principle of universal ser-
vice. The deregulation of broadcasting tbreatens to collapse the First Amendment's 
protection of messages to mean complete fn:cdom for media owners only. Diversity 
and a free marketplace of ideas are declared to be delivered by the unfettered 
market. Telecommunications deregulation tbus creates a distinctly modem political 
and philosophical paradox: how to guarantee meaningful freedom of speech in an 
age or infonnation abundance. There are also basic questions about deregulation's 
effect on commerce. Given tbat a planned and stable teleconununications infrastruc-
ture was crucial to economic development and the free: flow of commerce, will abe 
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Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce 
State Capitol, Room 437 
Sacramento, California 
Tuesday, June 6, 1989 
"Don't Hang Up!: The PUC and Telephone Service in the 90's 
Regulation, Deregulation, or Reregulation?" 
CHAIRWOMAN GWEN MOORE: In 1910, after years of 
strife between the utilities and their customers, the people of 
California, by initiative, create~ the California Public Utilities 
'• 
' Commission [PUC] to create order and protect their common interest. 
Now, the Public Utilities Commission is engaged in one of its most 
important assignments ever: Determining how to regulate 
California's telephone companies in the 1990's. 
In December, the PUC significantly lightened the 
regulation of AT&T, the largest long distance carrier, as it had done 
earlier for MCI, U. S. Sprint, and the other long distance carriers. 
Now, the local telephone companies are petitioning the PUC for their 
own lightened regulation. 
But there is a bigger issue. That issue is how 
telecommunications services will be provided in California m the last 
years of the 20th Century and the first years of the 21st. 
Our hearing today is convened to discuss what our state's 
telecommunications policies should be. Ever-changing federal 
policies and new techological possibilities require that we reassess 
our state's policies on a regular basis. For that reason, I'm asking the 
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witnesses, who represent almost every active player in 
telecommunications arena, to concentrate their testimony on the Big 
Picture: The policies that they recommend for the future. Among 
these IS the appropriate role of the Public Utilities Commission. I 
don't want to reiterate the proceedings now before the Public 
Utilities Commission except as they point the way to the future. 
As Californians, we all have a big stake in our 
telecommunications policies. They will determine, more than we can 
imagine today, how we will live our lives tomorrow. Can we build a 
social concensus for the 21st Century, for the "Information Age?" 
Can we afford not too? [Prepared Remarks, See Attachment A]. 
With this purpose in mind, I will call forward the first 
witnesses. 
I'd like first to come forward the representatives of 
Pacific Telesis and General Telephone. Their requests may shape 
what our "Information Age" looks like, depending upon what the PUC 
does. The Public Utilities Commission can come forward at this time, 
also. 
Terri Murray, Bruce Jamison, and Tim McCallion. 
I'd like for you to tell us what your vision is and what 
you see changing. Those of you who follow, I want you to tell me 
what's wrong with what they are proposing. 
MR. BRUCE JAMISON: Madam Chair and members of the 
Committee, my name is Bruce Jamison, executive director for State 
Regulatory representing Pacific Bell. I plan to discuss, within the 
context of the preliminary remarks that the Chair outlined, the well-
balanced nature of our proposal; second, the issue of deregulation 
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and the fact that Pacific is not seeking deregulation, and third, 
respond to concerns about our proposal, that business rate mcreases 
which are below cost should move towards cost over time, gradually 
and predictably, and that those increases will not result in increased 
revenues for Pacific. 
However, I'd first like to correct an error in the paper 
that was circulated by the Committee prior to these hearings. 
Included in that paper was a statement that the Commission has 
twice rejected Pacific's proposal. That's not true. I have addressed 
that subject more fully in my written remarks. [See Attachment B]. 
The first question in the list of questions that the 
Committee sent to the various parties today listed a set of goals for 
regulation: assuring just and reasonable rates, preserving the ability 
of the utility to attract capital and reasonable returns, preventing 
abuse of monopoly power and undue discrimination among 
customers, assuring high quality service and adequate facilities. 
Stated differently, these goals are very similar to the goals that the 
Commission outlined m the notice that convened the proceeding that 
is in progress today: The OII on changing regulation for local 
exchange companies . 
Pacific's filing responded to that order. Ours was one of 
the few proposals that covered all aspects of the issues outlined in 
the Commission's order rather than aiming only at the narrow self-
interest items one by one. My prepared remarks contain a summary 
of that proposal. 
Hearings m Phase II were extensive, covering some 61 
days of hearing room time, with 20 parties and 43 witnesses 
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providing testimony in those proceedings. Public participation 
hearings were held in San Diego, Santa Monica, Long Beach, Pasadena, 
San Francisco, San Jose, Fresno, Sacramento and Redding. Now, the 
parties have filed briefs in this proceeding, and we're waiting a 
decision by the Commission. 
In those briefs, parties identified some concerns about 
the Pacific's proposal. First, there was concern about our proposal to, 
in effect, lower the rate charged on residential service by including 
touchtone in that service and expanding the local calling area. Some 
of the other parties in this proceeding opposed that, saying it should 
go lower. "Those rates should be lower." Other parties opposed said, 
"Those rates should go higher." This very range of opinion, I think, is 
a good indicator that we have made a balanced proposal. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask you a question. 
Under your proposal, in the future,there will be no room for those 
kinds of hearings, for the next four years. If it was good for this 
process, then what's wrong with it for the future? 
MR. JAMISON: The Commission always has the option of 
convening an on order instituting investigation on any subject that it 
chooses. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Part of your proposal, as I 
understand it, is to freeze rates for four years. What reason would 
they have to issue an Oil? 
MR. JAMISON: I'm sure many subjects might cause the 
Commission to want to examine issues in the telecommunications 
industry. Some of those might have pricing implications. Those 
procedures are still well intact. 
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Second, there was a concern about the need for 
safeguards and about the adequacy of regulatory oversight. Let me 
reiterate Pacific is not seeking deregulation. We believe adequate 
safeguards are available. Under Pacific's proposal, any rate increase 
that would come about as a result of principals adopted in this 
proceeding would have to be approved by the Commssion. 
"Flexibility bands" that Pacific has proposed would have to be 
approved by the Commission on an individual basis. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Once the range of the bands are 
approved, is any further approval necessary by the Public Utilities 
Commission? 
MR. JAMISON: No. If the Commission approved a 
flexibility band for a particular service, within that range we could 
move the price. We are proposing, for existing services, that the 
highest price could be no higher than the current rates as they are 
today or as they're determined by the rate proceeding that has to 
follow this particular part of the on. 
With all of these PUC approvals required and integral to 
our plan, this is clearly not the plan for a business seeking 
deregulation. I would reiterate, Pacific is not seeking deregulation . 
We don't believe that's appropriate. 
Some parties, the cable industry in particular, have 
attempted to conduct hearings in the on and in the press, distorting 
and mischaracterizing Pacific's proposal. There have been expressed 
concerns about our proposal that business rates are below cost and 
should move towards cost over time. It is important to note, 
however, that those rates would not result in any new revenues for 
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Pacific. They will be offset by reductions to the long distance 
earners for the services that they receive from Pacific, to connect to 
our network. I believe that those long distance carriers probably 
will flow those reductions through to their customers, many of whom 
are the very same customers that would see increases in the below-
cost rates that Pacific currently provides. 
A major intent of our proposal -- and let me stress that 
the PUC still has to review those rates and the costs associated with 
those rate increases -- is that if any services are to continue to be 
priced below cost in this changing, more competitive communications 
environment, it should be reserved for residential services. 
That ts not everything that is contained in the proposal, 
but I have tried to hit highlights. I have attached a summary 
statement of the proposal to my prepared remarks. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What's good for the consumer in 
your proposal? 
MR. JAMISON: First, the inclusion of touchtone in basic 
serv1ce for the residential customers as we move into an era of more 
and more information services provided by many, many providers ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You know how I feel about that. 
It doesn't cost you any money to do it, so what's the big deal? 
MR. JAMISON: We're talking about the revenues. We 
recetve over $100 million a year from that, and we're proposing that 
be included ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We are talking about moving 
close to cost-of-service. If you are telling me that it doesn't cost any 
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more to cost that service than rotary, then we ought not to have 
been paymg that anyway. 
MR. JAMISON: Today, the way regulation is practiced, the 
Commission allocates the revenue requirement across a variety of 
services, expecting some to provide contribution to support others. 
Touchtone provides contribution, and it is one of those very services 
that keeps rates or basic services low today. We're proposing that 
the customer should no longer pay for that. I think that is a separate 
Issue. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay, but I don't consider that a 
gift. Go on, give me another one. 
MR. JAMISON: Extension of the local calling area is an 
important item. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I think that is important. 
MR. JAMISON: We're proposing that what is now Zone 2 
be included in the ZUM (Zone Usage Measurement) areas: Zone 2 toll, 
a second band of toll in the non-ZUM, be included as part of the local 
calling area for both residentials and business. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But isn't that something you took 
from the consumers when you went to ZUM in the first place? 
MR. JAMISON: No. In fact, I think quite the contrary the 
ZUM bands use to be multi-message-unit bands years ago. Those 
were created primarily because of the ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Multi-message units used to be 
spread over a much wider area. I remember the people went nuts 
when ZUM went into effect. 
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MR. JAMISON: That's correct, but the multi-message unit 
function was a replacement for toll, not the other way around. In 
fact, the ZUM rates are tied to the toll rates in that they are today 
currently pegged at 50 percent of the toll rate. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you're telling me that what's 
good for the consumer in that package is : First,f you're going to give 
them touchtone service, which doesn't cost you any more to provide 
than rotary; and second, you are going to give them a wider calling 
area which is similiar to what they had before you went to ZUM. 
MR. JAMISON: No. They didn't have it before we went to 
ZUM 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. 
MR. JAMISON: Regardless what touchtone costs Pacific to 
provide, the fact is that the customer will see a net reduction in their 
bill. If, for example, you have touchtone at home, we figure on 
average -- know averages are risky to deal with -- but in the case of 
touchtone, that is $1.20 a month that the customer will no longer be 
paymg. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you're saying that basic 
serv1ce now drops to $7 .20? 
MR. JAMISON: No. Basic service stays at $8.35, but it will 
include touchtone service as part of it instead of touchtone being an 
extra charge. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Instead of it being $9.45 or 
whatever, now your monthy bill will be $8.35? 
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MR. JAMISON: Yes, and on top of that, on a broad average 
basis, residential customers see about a $1.00 reduction because 
of the expansion of the local calling area. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What we're talking about is 
almost a 25 percent reduction for residential callers. Is that what 
you're telling me? 
MR. JAMISON: Right. When you roll that all up together. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, the package for residential 
customers represents about a 20 to 25 percent reduction in costs. 
That is what's in it for the consumer? 
MR. JAMISON: There are other things in it for residential 
customers, as well. For example, in the area of flexibility, Pacific has 
asked for services that are priced above costs. I am speaking 
primarily of toll services; we would like flexibility in that arena. We 
believe we are going to have to respond to competition in the future. 
It hasn't been authorized on a wide scale yet, but authorized on some 
incidental basis. By having flexibility there (and we're only talking 
about downward from current rates), I would expect that customers 
will see lower toll rates as a result. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Who picks up the slack as we go 
down? 
MR. JAMISON: That's part of this whole package: Should 
we reduce rates through the flexibility proposal? That's a risk to us. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Are you telling me your 
shareholders may eat your flexibility? 
MR. JAMISON: To the extent that we confront 
competition and that requires us to lower rates, or we lower rates 
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because ... In some cases you may be able to make your money 
depending on the price elasticities. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, there are other groups you 
can shift the cost to. Is that not true? 
MR. JAMISON: I don't see how, since we aren't proposing 
to raise rates except those business rates tied specifically to a 
program whereby the long distance companies are going to have the 
rates they pay to us reduced. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. General Telephone, is your 
program just like Pacific's? 
MR. TIM MCCALLION; No, it is different. Morning, 
Chairwoman Moore and members of the Committee. My name is Tim 
McCallion and I'm director of Revenue and Earnings Management for 
GTE California. Additionally, I was GTE California's policy witness in 
the Commission's Alternative Regulatory Framework proceeding. 
As you requested, I will limit my remarks to describing 
the features of our plan. Our plan is significantly different, from 
both the proposal presented by Pacific Bell and the proposal 
presented by the Division of Ratepayer Advocates [DRA]. 
GTE California is seeking a change in regulation. We are 
not seeking deregulation of any services that are currently regulated. 
There are several features of GTE's proposal which I will briefly 
described. I might want to add that we have given to the Sergeant of 
Arms a very short background paper which describes our plan in 
slightly more detail. [See Attachment C]. 
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First of all, under our proposal, we would divide the 
services that we offer today into two categories which I refer to as 
Category I and Category II. 
The first category would consist of the majority of the 
telephone services, the majority of the services which are required 
for customers to have what I refer to as "POTS," plain old telephone 
service. That would include the residential network connection, the 
single-line business connection, the multi-line business connection, 
intraLA T A toll calling and access services. 
Category I services would be subject to an index. In the 
future, prices for those services or the overall revenues we get from 
those services would only change based upon this index. This index 
would have two components. One component would recognize 
inflationary changes which occur and the other component would 
give recognition productivity improvements in the 
telecommunications industry. As we discussed at hearings before 
(and this has been discussed at the Public Utilities Commission). 
Productivity in the telecommunications industry has been improving 
in recent years. Therefore, there would be an adjustment to our 
Category I index to recognize the productivity improvement . 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Does that means you would go 
before the PUC for that recognition? 
MR. MCCALLION: We would hopefully have the PUC 
adopt a productivity factor in their Phase II order. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, it wouldn't be something that 
they would review. It would be a standard that they would 
establish. When you achieved that, then you would automatically be 
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able to increase your rates or get your bonus for your productivity. 
Is that the deal? 
MR. MCCALLION: We would be able to adjust rates either 
upwards or downwards only based upon that standard. Another 
aspect of our plan which you started getting into ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask this, if you had a 
minus productivity, then would you reduce your rates? 
MR. MCCALLION: Yes. If the inflation and productivity 
netted out negative, which certainly it could, we would have to 
reduce the rates for our Category I services. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How are we going to know you 
did that? Trust you? 
MR. MCCALLION: We would make a filing to the Public 
Utilities Commission at the beginning of each year to reflect the 
change based upon the index. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So they would see whether you 
were productive. This change can only occur once a year? 
MR. MCCALLION: Yes. It is an annual adjustment. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Bald? 
MR. JIM BALD: Under your plan, do you foresee the 
business community sharing in these productivity improvements and 
whatever lower rates might be available because of that? 
MR. MCCALLION: Under our plan, all of our customers for 
these Category I services would share in that productivity 
improvement. That is the productivity improvement that is built 
into the index. The adjustments would be made to those services in 
Category I. That doesn't capture all of our services -- in a minute I 
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will describe which ones it doesn't capture -- but it is the majority of 
the services. The single-line customer and the multi-line 
business customer the benefit of that productivity 
improvement. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Would that be a shared benefit, 
so to speak? You would share whatever the productivity 
improvement was? In other you would give so much to the 
customer and your shareholder would get so much? Is that what 
we're talking about? 
MR. MCCALLION: You anticipated the next step of our 
plan. The next step of our plan is a sharing mechanism. That is, if 
the company's earnings are above the benchmark rate-of-return 
established by the Public Utilities Commission, we would share the 
earnings above that benchmark on a 50/50 basis between the 
company and its customers. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That sounds familiar. Is that like 
yours? 
MR. JAMISON: Yes, it is. I did not try to include every 
item in our proposal. 
my prepared remarks. 
a key item in our plan. 
Those items are included in the attachment to 
The concept of sharing above a benchmark is 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask you to differentiate 
that kind of approach from rate-of-return, what we do today. How 
does that differ? 
MR. MCCALLION: First of all, in today's environment the 
staff of the Public Utilities Commission, the Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates, and other participants take a very close look at our 
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revenues, our expenses, our investments and go through an account-
by-account line item review. They review the wages that we're 
paying to our employees. They review how fast our operators are 
answering telephone calls, and therefore, how many operators they 
feel we need. They review our instruction program to see if it is 
beneficial to the ratepayers. 
Under our proposal, that account-by-account, detailed 
review would no longer be necessary, because utilizing the index will 
provide us with a bucket of dollars within which to operate. As long 
as we operate within that bucket of dollars, there is not the necessity 
to make any of these adjustments. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: No. My question was, when you 
earn over your rate-of-return, how is the money adjusted? I think 
the Division of Ratepayer Advocates better tell me that all of that 
goes back to the consumer as oppose to a 50/50 share. Is that 
correct? 
MR. MCCALLION: Not necessarily. During the rate case 
proceeding, we are adjusted down to our authorized rate of return. 
In the years between the rate case proceedings, the Commission has 
an "attrition mechanism" to where they impute some productivity to 
us today. Based upon our recent rate case order and the one that 
came out a few years ago for Pacific Bell, if the company achieves 
more than the amount of labor productivity, we are required to give 
50 percent of that additional savings back to the ratepayers, and we 
get to retain 50 percent of it. In the past, prior to this order, in the 
years between general rate cases, the companies were permitted to 




years. So, we now have actually a little bit less incentive than we 
had in the past to improve our productivity in those years betwen 
rate cases. 
MR. JAMISON: There is a key difference between the 
way ratemaking is practiced today and what is proposed by Pacific 
and somewhat similarly by General. Today, revenue figuring is only 
forward ooking. There is no backward reaching except for the 
productivity element that Mr. McCallion mentioned. So, if Pacific 
does well in a year, the Commission does not take it away nor can it. 
It can only base rates on forecasts of the future and set rates going 
forward. Those two items are important to understand relative to 
Pacific's proposal We are proposing now to put the company at risk. 
Based on forecast, but based on actual outcomes, whatever that 
benchmark is set to be, if it is exceeded, that outcome is shared 
50!50 -- in effect a reach-back provided to the customer. It also 
provides an incentive for Pacific to do better. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How does that differ from a bill 
that I seem to remember that called for an annual ratecase? 
MR. JAMISON: As I recall, it described a procedure very 
similar to which exists today. That can't be accomplished in a year or 
two years or three years. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's not true. It reduced the 
revtew of the day-to-day, micro-management kinds of things. It 
looked at the big ticket items. Very similar to the things you are 
describing here, fas I recall. 
MR. JAMISON: I don't recall it that way. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's hear from the Division of 
Ratepayer Advocates. What's wrong or what's good about what they 
are telling me? 
MS. TERRI MURRAY: First, let me introduce myself to the 
Committee. I'm Terri Murray, director of the Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates [DRA]. (Prepared Statement, see Attachment D). In terms 
of what you heard from Mr. Jamison and Mr. McCallion, I would 
agree they have both accurately described the differences between 
current rate-of-return regulation and the proposals. The Division of 
Ratepayer Advocates is perhaps a little more enthusiastic about what 
we have accomplished in the past, under traditional rate-of-return 
regulation, then either Pacific or General. But we, too, agree that the 
changes in the telecommunications industry, technology, federal 
policy and judicial action do call for some modification of our 
traditional framework. 
We are concerned, perhaps for somewhat different 
reasons than the two companies that are represented here today, 
that ratepayers may subsidize the entrepreneural adventures of the 
local exchange companies by paying development costs for projects 
intended for competitive ventures. An example is the $20 million --
plus that ratepayers explicitly picked up for Project Victoria. We are 
concerned about the risk of cross-subsidization of new and 
competitive services in a mixed marketplace where there are both 
monopolies ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: $20 million on Project Victoria? 
MR. JAMISON: In the evidentiary hearings, the DRA's 




have become profits to the business and not reduced rates to the 
ratepayer. That is a mischaracterization. In fact that is one of the 
ways regulation works today that demonstration that there is not 
this reach-back. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Was the research done with the 
subsidization from Pacific Telesis or in Pacific Bell? 
MR. JAMISON: It was done in Pacific Bell. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How do you get to the 
shareholders out of Pacific Bell? 
MR. JAMISON: Had the research taken place, that would 
have made more money available as dividends to our owner, which 
Is, of course, Pacific Telesis. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So it came out of the 
shareholder's pot and there is a clear paper trail to the shareholder's 
pot. 
MR. JAMISON: That's correct, because had it not been 
done, it would not have resulted in lower rates. It would have 
resulted m higher profits. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why are you so confused on that, 
DRA? 
MS. MURRAY: I think the confusion here (because I agree 
with Mr. Jamison) points to a problem, and that was my point. In the 
existing regulatory framework, between ratecases, there is no way to 
reach-back and pick up access earnings that might be there. They 
become available either as shareholder profits or to finance 
potentially competitive ventures. I certainly did not mean to suggest 
that Pacific Bell had done something that was impermissible under 
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our existing regulatory framework. I simply pointed out that there 
are problems with traditional rate-of-return in a mixed marketplace, 
this being one example. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you have some suggestions? 
MS. MURRAY: We do have some suggestions for that and 
for some of the other problems that we see in traditional rate-of-
return. DRA has put forth a proposal in the investigation that we 
think more fairly balances the needs of ratepayers and shareholders 
than the plans you have heard thus far. One key element of our 
proposal is to move competitive services into a separate profit center 
-- to isolate them, in terms of cost accounting, from the regulated 
monopoly side of the business. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Isn't that being done already? 
MS. MURRAY: We think that it could be done. We have 
not thoroughly gone through the kind of cost allocation procedures 
that would be necessary to totally separate those services from the 
monopoly side of the business. That is part of our goal to separate it 
out completely; to draw that line. That is not an easy thing to do, but 
we hope to do so through our proposal. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How do you regulate them if you 
can't tell? Not DRA in particular -- where's Pete Arth, the Public 
Utilities Commission? Is someone here from the Commission? 
Welcome to the table. You can help us to better understand this. 
Terri is representing the Division of Ratepayer Advocates. So, we 
need someone from the Commission. 
MR. PETE ARTH: Could we start over again? 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Give him a hint, Terri,to what I 
want to know. 
MS. MURRAY: Let me, while Pete is gathering his 
thoughts, just run down ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: He doesn't know what the 
question Is. 
MR. ARTH: I actually was listening to the testimony. It 
seems like you're looking for an assurance that was missing from 
Terri's tesitmony. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: First of all, I would assume 
the PUC has been watching to be sure there is no cross-subsidy. We 
kept being assured that that's the case. Now, we are being told that 
there's no way to really make that determination, and that is a 
problem. In the past, I have always been assured that it wasn't a 
problem, and it was being taken care of. So, is there a problem with 
cross-subsidy? 
MR. ARTH: I think that is one of the core questions in the 
proceeding, and you are going to hear from all of those who give the 
obvious answer "yes" that there is a problem. Will it be adequately 
addressed in either of the local exchange company proposals? Is it 
necessary to have the protection of the DRA or shall we do away with 
the hands-on, full regulation that has traditionally existed to detect 
these sorts of problems? The answer on behalf of the Commission is 
yes, there is a potential and yes, it is being addressed. The 
commitment is there, to do whatever comes out of this proceeding. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask you one of those 
"Are-you-still-beating-your-wife?" questions." I have always been 
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assured in the past that cross-subsidy wasn't a real problem. That 
was clear. We have talked about different accounting procedures 
over the years, and you always disagreed with Sylvia Siegal that 
cross-subsidy and the utilization of ratepayer funds is not a problem. 
MR. ARTH: I'm not going to preempt what Terry is going 
to tell you. Obviously, one of the problem is the resources available 
to the Ratepyer Advocates and the major customers to go after the 
paper trail, to be able to detect, prosecute and remedy what's going 
on. That is certainly one of the keys: whether it is or isn't a solvable 
problem. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. Go ahead, Terri. 
MS. MURRAY: A second element of our proposal would 
index rates on the monopoly side of the house to automatically 
assure that all cost decreases get passed on to the ratepayers without 
regulatory lag. In that sense, there are some similiarities between 
our proposal and that of General Telephone. We do look at inflation 
and productivity indices. The significant difference there is that we 
have proposed to look at those indices on a company-specific basis. 
We recognize the different starting points that each of the compames 
comes from and recognize the unique cost differences in a manner 
more similiar to the traditional regulatory framework. 
Their own customers are entitled to benefits if there are, indeed, 
very large productivity increases. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That more closely resembles the 
General proposal than it does Pacific's. Pacific, what's wrong with 
Terri's proposal? 
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MR. JAMISON: What Terri didn't describe in the DRA's 
proposal ts a mechanism which has yet to be laid out. It depends on 
building an index on factors within the business rather than on 
industry-wide or statewide factors. To the extent that you build an 
index that is ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, your proposal wouldn't allow 
for that, if I understand your residential proposal. Yours is a flat 
freezing of the rates. 
MR. JAMISON: That's true, except if the company were to 
exceed the benchmark rate-of-return, whatever that was set at, and 
there were monies to be returned to the customers, it would be up to 
the Commission to determine which customers those should be 
flowed to. We have said clearly that those customers are the 
residential customers. So in effect, you get the same return. I think 
you get a similiar outcome under each of those processes. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Only if you exceed your rate-of-
return. For years you have been telling me that you are barely 
making it. 
MR. JAMISON: That's true. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If you never get to your rate-of-
return, the likelihood of there being any benefits to the ratepayers is 
almost null. Right? 
MR. JAMISON: No, that's not true. On the other hand, 
under current regulatory process. if we don't meet the authorized 
rate-of-return, we have every right to come back in and ask for rate 
increases. Our proposal takes away that right. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. 
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MS. MURRAY: Let me just add a comment on that last 
remark. It is not ORA's perception that the Pacific proposal 
eliminates their right or option to return to the Commission if they 
are under-earning. It was my understanding that is an option kept 
open explicitly. There is nothing binding Pacific or any other 
company operating under such a plan to come back to the 
Commission 
Going on with the DRA proposal, I think one element of 
great interest to all customers is our proposal to decrease local 
exchange company rates, upfront, to reflect a fair return. In order to 
conduct this proceeding, as well as to handle the large volume of 
telecommunications related caseloads in the past few years, it has 
been some time since we formally reviewed Pacific Bell's rate-of-
return. As the briefing papers prepared by the Committee reflect, 
Pacific is now earning quite a healthy return. We believe that to get 
a plan like this started off in a way that would be fair to all parties 
concerned, we should get a start-up revenue requirement that 
reflects current reality before we start indexing or freezing rates. A 
rate freeze is no great benefit to residential customers, if a rate 
decrease is what they are entitled to. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Bald? 
MR. BALD: Can we have a clarification from somebody? 
Pete, can the PUC come back in under this proposal or are you 
prevented from doing so? 
MR. MCCALLION: Under GTE California's proposal, we 
could not come back in for a general rate case or rate case filing. We 
would be allotted a certain among of dollars in which to operate, and 
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we would have no floor on our rate-of-return by which we could 
automatically come m. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Under both these proposals, the 
traditional rate case, as currently know it, would be eliminated. 
But each does have a safety clause in case conditions change. 
MR. JAMISON: That's not correct. There are three 
exceptions included in Pacific's plan. One, major tax legislation 
changes. I would remind everybody that the last major tax 
legislation resulted in tax decreases which were immediately flowed 
through. Second, major accounting ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What did I just say? That there 
are provisions built in for when conditions change. 
MR. JAMISON: The implication of the question, m my 
v1ew, was not outside event such as tax law or accounting rule 
changes, but was a change in business conditions. A change in 
business conditions is not something ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: "Circumstances beyond your 
control" IS essentially what ... 
MR. JAMISON: Business conditions, in a sense, are 
circumstances beyond the control of the business, and they have to 
cope with them. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Not necessarily. 
MR. JAMISON: I want to make sure we're not mixing 
those things up. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Federal taxes or are things 
beyond your controL Business usually takes the responsibility for 
business conditionss, within its own purview. 
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MR. JAMISON: That is what we're proposing to do, take 
responsibility for that. In effect, shift regulatory risks to business 
risks. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Hill? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRANK HILL: Maybe I could comment on 
that last comment of Mr. Jamison, about taking that business risk. It 
seems to me there is no business risk when, for years, PacBell 
promised that if we put all this infrastructure into place, we will see 
a decrease in basic customer rates. Now, what we're hearing, "We 
will go ahead and take the risk, but to let us freeze rates. We won't 
pass that benefit onto the consumer. We will give you touchtone 
service which doesn't cost us anything. We will extend your ZUM 
area. We will go from an 8-mile to a 12-mile. Undo what we took 
back a few years, when we went to ZUM. 
It seems to me this is all about taking money that ought 
to be passed on to the consumers, coming up with less of a regulatory 
framework . "We will no longer be looking at how much we're 
paying people of the cost of service. Just give us some more 
flexibility so we can spend that money in a competitive marketplace, 
and have the advantage of using the monpoly subsidy against other 
private businesses." I don't see how else you can justify what you're 
trying to put together. 
MR. JAMISON: In fact since 1986, there have been $975 
million in rate reductions, in Pacific's rate, in large measure reflecting 
those very efficiencies that have already taken place. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: $975 million doesn't tell me 
anything if it ought to be $2 billion. We can argue about that, but 
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wasn't this whole proposal, this whole infrastructure sold on "We are 
going to see these continued decreasing costs;" and now, "We are 
walking away that?" 
MR. JAMISON: The question of whether or not there will 
be continued decreasing costs in the industry or specifically in Pacific 
Bell needs to be put in context. It is true that we have been able to 
had good productivity increases in the last several years. Whether 
or not that can be continued the future, I think, is a very open 
question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: AU right. Tell me why we should 
go ahead and find out for two, or three, or four years that cost is 
going to continue to decrease, and that cost should be passed on to 
the consumer? What is the downside? Let's find out. 
MR. JAMISON: I believe that is what our proposal does 
by saymg, "Let's share based on actual outcomes." We also included 
in our proposal a provision to review the whole, complex mechanism 
in 1992. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Why the proposal to freeze rates? 
Why don't we go ahead and drop rates and pass those on to the 
consumer, and see if those costs continue to drop? 
MR. JAMISON: In the first instance, residential rates are 
already below costs. If we are going to reduce rates, and there are 
rate reductions pending through the surchange accounts that exist 
today, I believe those rate reductions should come in toll rates, not 
residential rates. Beyond that, it's not clear where the future will go, 
either from a competitive sense or from the continued productivity 
that everybody likes to point to, that Pacific has achieved. 
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By basing outcomes on actuals, by basing the return or 
the sharing of benefits above a benchmark based on actuals, the 
Commission will have every opportunity to examine how well this 
proposal, which we believe puts more risk and more incentive on 
Pacific, and works over the years. We would never make a proposal 
like this without including in it some opportunity for the Commission 
to review how the process has been working. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Tell me why we shouldn't come at 
it from another standpoint. That is, if we are going to take -- I think 
the whole issue here is cross-subsidy -- if we are going to take those 
profits from the monopoly and use them in entrepreneural ventures. 
I am thinking, as an example, of an issue I am involved with, the 
Yellow Pages. Some of the profits from the Yellow Pages go to keep 
the rate base -- why don't we go ahead and say, let's take all those 
profits from the Yellow Pages and put them into ... ? It seems to me 
you are arguing both ways. Why don't we take all those profits from 
those entrepreneural ventures and use all of them to keep the rates 
low? After all, we're talking about a regulated monopoly. Although 
I guess you guys -- it seems to me that you want the benefits of a 
regulated monpoly. You want a guaranteed customer base, but you 
also want to take some of those profits and compete out there. 
MR. JAMISON: On the contrary Pacific is one of the few 
parties that has proposed that new, network-related services be 
included in the regulated accounts. To the extent that those are 
profitable, those services will, indeed, provide revenues to help keep 
other rates low. I would add that the DRA proposal is a mixed bag, in 
effect saying, "Pacific, you bear the risk, but if you do well, share the 
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reward of those new products." We object to that. We're saymg 
keep all of the new are related to the network in the 
regulated accounts. 
There is another here that transcends whether or 
not those new products a reasonable life or not. That is to the 
extent you put those things off, separate and unregulated, or as we 
call it in the industry, "below the line," you run the risk that services 
will not be integrated, not of the network. Had we had these 
kind of discussions back the 191O's, 1920's, people would have 
argued that dial tone was an enhanced service and ought to be 
regulated and put below the If we had this discussion in 1964, 
people would have argued that touchtone should have gone below 
the line. I would remind everybody that touchtone today provides 
about $200 million of contribution to keep other rates low. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: The reality is, we are not talking 
about getting involved in touchtone or dialtone service. We're 
talking about PacBell competing in cable television. 
MR. JAMISON: No, we're not talking about competing in 
cable television. PacBell has said repeatedly that it is not interested 
m competing in cable T.V. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Then, tell me what the benefit to 
the consumer in freezing rates and going to a fiber optic network. Its 
sole purpose has got to be to transmit video. 
MR. JAMISON: That is not the sole purpose of putting m 
fiber. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Tell me the sole purpose is. 
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MR. JAMISON: If we put in fiber, we will put it in for 
telecommunications purposes. In fact, fiber is becoming, more 
quickly than anybody anticipated, the economic choice for providing 
service to people's homes. It will become the medium of choice for 
providing telecommunications services to our customers in the 
future. That future is coming very quickly. Fber has unique 
property, almost unlimited bandwidth capacity, depending upon the 
electronics that you put on at each end. If a cable company came to 
us and said, "Would you carry our signal for us?" we would want to 
do that on a contractual basis. We would not be in the cable 
business. We would do what we do best, and that is transport for 
somebody else. I believe the real issue that the cable people have 
raised is that they today ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Don't keep dwelling on the cable 
people. 
MR. JAMESON: They keep dwelling on us. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We are looking at the Big Picture. 
Remember, Mr. Jameson? We are trying to get the "whole thing" on 
what telecommunications ts. Everybody will get their chance. I am 
going to let you stay up here with me and give you a chance to 
refute. 
Now, we are gomg to get through this first part of the 
proceedings. Terri, I think you pretty much said what the position of 
the DRA is. Does everybody want to have one little parting shot on 
what it is that you're asking for? Just a quick one sentence from 
each of you, and then we are going to have the people who think 
there is something wrong with what you're proposing or who like it. 
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MR. JAMISON: We're asking for regulation that is more 
suited the increasingly competitive environment while it recognizes 
that environment and which contains the safeguards necessary to 
ensure that all of our customers have access to the full range of 
services that a modern information-age network can provide. 
MS. MURRAY: I think what DRA is looking for much the 
same thing, but accomplished in different ways -- making sure that 
the starting point for the entire mechanism gives ratepayers a fair 
opportunity to share the benefits of the information age, and not 
avoiding the responsibility of effective regulatory oversight in our 
zeal to adopt a new framework. 
MR. MCCALLION: I would have to echo the remarks of 
both parties. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's safe. 
MR. MCCALLION: Just add that what we are looking for is 
a change in the way which local telephone companies are regulated, 
to streamline the process. We feel that the plan we have put forth 
does provide adequate safeguards against some of the concerns that 
Mr. Hill and other people have raised. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: In the next group, I'd like to hear 
from Sylvia Siegal, AT&T, MCI, Bay Area Teleport, Dun and 
Bradstreet. We will have a revolving mike kind of thing. Bruce, why 
don't you come closer to me? Don't be shy, come on up. 
Ms. Siegal, would you come up and take one of our 
"resident" seats? 
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MR. BALD: Mr. Jameson, is it part of Pacific's proposals to 
raise business rates? I can't find that in here in your prepared 
statement. 
MR. JAMISON: We are proposing that those business 
services that are currently priced below-cost should move towards 
their costs, over time. We have hewed to that very carefully in a 
revenue shift that the Commission has already ordered. That is they 
are requiring that we lower the rates to long-distance companies that 
they pay access to our network. That revenue is to be shifted to 
some other services, within the basket of services that we offer. 
That forms the basis of those rate increases to businesses. I would 
stress again that there would be no net revenue increase for Pacific 
Bell. 
MR. BALD: I may try and ask it again. How many 
business customers might be affected, and how soon, by what you 
just described? 
MR. JAMISON: If the Commission approves the principle 
I just described, there will be amptjer proceeding required, either 
the "Supplemental Rate Design Proceeding" or Phase III. My 
expectation is that it might last through the remainder of 1989 or 
into 1990. At that point, assuming that everything led to an order 
by the Commission, we would see gradual rate increases for basic 
business rates over the next several years. Our estimate, and agam, 
it is risky to deal in averages, but over time, this would result in, at 
most, a five percent per year increase to business customers. I 
hasten to add that this doesn't reflect the reductions they would see 
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because of the reduction to the long distance earners. They would 
probably see reductions in rates as welL 
MR. have been talking about how everybody 
IS going to share in the productivity savings from the techno1ogies. 
What I hear you saying is, everybody going to share but business. 
MR. JAMISON: that's not true. It is true we have 
proposed that business rates should move up. They are priced below 
costs today. They are not those costs. However, we have 
also said that if we hit some benchmark rate-of-return or above, 
then it is for the Commission to decide how that is shared. We have 
said, generally, that it should be spread across the customer base. To 
the extent that we hit that benchmark or above, we would share. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's move on. Tell General 
Telephone, the PUC, and Pacific Bell, everything you ever wanted to 
say, in one sentence or three. Identify yourself for the record, and 
then tell me what's wrong with what's being proposed or what's good 
about it. 
MR. ROBERT STECHERT: Thank you, Madam Chair and 
Members of the Committee. My name is Robert Stechert. I'm vice 
president of External Affairs for American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company. (Prepared Statement, see Attachment E). We appreciate 
the opportunity to be here today, and to address the question of 
alternate regulation for the local exchange companies. 
Let me say at the outset that we agree with the goals that 
were set forth in the statement that you distributed in advance of 
this hearing. Those goals of regulation should continue to be the 
same for the future as they are today. Let me also add that we 
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believe there may well be other mechanisms besides tradditional 
cost-of-service regulation that will better serve those goals for the 
local exchange companies. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you like their plan? 
MR. STECHERT: We don't like this plan, however. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Now, wait a minute. That's a 
little inconsistent. Bruce is trying to figure out what you're saying. 
MR. STECHERT: I think there are a number of aspects to 
both Pacific'sand General's plan that do make sense and which should 
be adopted. However, there are some frailities with those plans, 
about which we have considerable concern about. 
First of all, we think that any alternative form of 
regulation should insure that rates would be lower than they would 
be under continued cost-of-service regulation. We don't believe that 
will be the case under Pacific's plan. Indeed, for the access charges 
that we interexhange carriers pay to Pacific and General Telephone, 
we believe that our rates would likely be higher under the plan 
proposed by Pacific than under continued cost-of-service regulation. 
That means that the long-distance charges that we charge our 
customers would also likely be higher than they would otherwise be, 
because our customers would have to bear the cost of the access 
charges that we pay to the local exchange company. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Everything in their program is 
designed to be able to give you break. I think Ms. Siegal has a 
problem with that. Given that, I don't understand what your 
problem is. If there is anybody that they are being good to, it would 




MR. STECHERT: I don't think so. What they said is, they'll 
freeze existing rates at 
from there with 
downward flexibility 
to the access charges they charge us. That 
doesn't mean that those access charges wouldn't even be lower than 
that if we continue under cost-service-regulation. In fact, we believe 
the expansion of the local calling area and the free provision of 
touchtone service to local ratepayers, that the revenue that they are 
giving up in doing will be reflected in higher access charges to 
the interexchange companies. That means higher charges to our 
customers for long-distance service. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you think there won't be a 
reduction? There has to be some reduction in the long-distance 
service. 
MR. STECHERT: will be reductions, Madam 
Chairwoman, as as there would be if we continued under the 
current arrangement. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But you still take a risk. You 
don't know what those costs would be, because you only get what IS 
perceived. Even, if it were demonstrated in a regular rate case, they 
can still retain it in the same manner. So, there is no guarantee 
either way. 
MR. STECHERT: There's no guarantee, but we believe the 
risks are greater under the plan that Pacific proposes than under the 
current arrangement. 
Secondly, Pacific's plan would share access earnmgs with 
ratepayers. But they limit that sharing to local exchange customers, 
not the interexchange carriers who pay access charges. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You are already getting a 
discount. So, why do you want to get greedy? 
MR. STECHERT: We are not getting a discount. In fact, we 
are paying more for access charges than the cost of providing those 
services to us. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, you will. You have been 
getting a gradual reductions every year. I mean, don't give me that. 
MR. STECHERT: Only for part of the access charges that 
we pay. There are a whole series of access charges that we pay to 
the local exchange companies. Only some of them are coming down 
and they are not at costs or even close to costs at this point. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Just like your said, some of the 
services have to pay to subsidize other things. 
MR. STECHERT: We don't believe that is necessary. We 
believe the services could be cost based. Long distance ratepayers, 
people who make calls long-fdistance within the state, ought to pay 
cost based rates, as should local exchange customers. We don't think 
it is fair to limit the sharing to loca] customers and deny those same 
benefits to long-distance customers. 
Finally as far as Pacific's plan is concerned, we don't 
believe it contains requisite safeguards to ensure against cross-
subsidization of competitive ventures in which Pacific might engage, 
with revenues obtained from the provision of monopoly services. 
We think the plan should be revised to ensure that there is adequate 
safeguards to prevent that kind of inappropriate cross-subsidization. 
As far as General Telephone's plan is concerned, we 
believe it is better than Pacific's, that is moves rates more towards 
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there are frailities with General 
monopoly services that 
which are included under its so-called, 
services. 
In conclusion, DRA's plan comes closer to providing an 
alternate scheme of regulation that we could support. However, 
DRA's plan is unusually If we are going to investigate an 
alternate form of regulation, one of the principal factors of such a 
plan should be to regulation and get away from the 
regulatory inefficencies 
regulation today. 
delays that exist under cost-of-service 
think that DRA's plan will make much 
progress towards that kind of reform. We think it needs some 
considerable changes if it to be adopted. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Why don't we go to 
MCI? Don't repeat anything that AT&T has said. If there is 
something you want to then feel to do so. 
MR. STEPHEN P. BOWEN: Thank you, Madam Chair. My 
name ts Steve Bowen. I work for MCI in Washington. I am a senior 
attorney. (Prepared Statement, see Attachment F). 
Generally, we agree with the points that AT&T has made 
this mornmg. I would add a couple of things that were not 
addressed in AT &T's statement here or in their testimony in the case 
before the PUC. 
First of all, no one has mentioned that the purported 
benefits to interexhange carriers, reduced access charges realized 
through increases in business rates, are entirely independent of their 
plan as it stands. Those reductions m access charges were awarded 
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by the Commission before either Pacific or GTE filed their plans. 
There is really no reason for either local exchange company to claim 
credit for lowered access charges to interexchange carriers. 
Second, without going back over points Mr. Stechert just 
made, I would suggest to this Committee that every one of the goals 
that both Pacific and GTE has spouted in this case can be 
accomplished by a less radical means than proposed in their plans. 
What's missing in both Pacific's and GTE's plans is the recognition 
that we have to get back to basics in the regulation of local exchange 
companies. We have to get back to looking at where is the 
bottleneck? We all know it is there some place. Where is the 
bottleneck. What services use it, and how do you regulate a 
company with one foot in the monopoly world and one foot in a 
world which has become competitive? That's a very difficult task to 
undertake. 
I would suggest that the solution is not, as both Pacific 
and GTE propose; to simply walk away from regulation as it stood m 
the past. MCI believes there are aspects of that regulation which 
have not worked very well. We don't suggest that three or four year 
rate cases work very well. But there are ways to refine that process, 
far short of the walking-away proposed by Pacific and GTE. 
We also concur with the statements of Mr. Hill: Both 
Pacific and GTE face significantly declining costs. 
(INTERRUPTION: COMMITTEE ACTION ON AB 901) 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Go ahead. 
MR. BOWEN: I was addressing the question of whether 
the costs of local exchanges are declining or not, and if they will 
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continue to do so in the 
of how are 
likelihood that 
for trunking. not 
companies propose to 
think they will 
anybody would do, 
We believe, based on our knowledge 
to us 
a substantial 
both for switching and 
both local exchange 
regulation at a time when we 
costs. I think it something that 
so. 
Our that the Commission's order 
of things in this case "the before the horse." 
Local exchange for flexibility to price services 
when there is no The doing so would be to 
allow the local exchange companies to lock in, through pricing plans 
and price flexibility and so 
would most benefit 
it is very important for 
timing that is required 
the very same customers who 
introduced properly. We think 
Commission to recognize the proper 
and to not grant flexibility to local 
exchange companies for pricing services and in advance of opening 
up the LATA's to competition and the benefits it could bring. 
I was little bit disappointed during the case and during 
the briefs m the case to hear that there were "three plans out there." 
There are, in fact, more than three plans. MCI has a plan which, 
while we don't call it anything fancy like "CPRS," is an attempt to 
address the need change regulation. We believe that the important 
thing the Commission should do right now is to look at what people 
call "rate design" issues. How do you prevent local exchange 
companies from cross-subsidizing services, which they claim are 
competitive, with monopoly revenues? It is a great difficult task. 
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The kinds of tools that are available are cumbersome, and little used. 
Costing has been the chiefone. People hate costing. The 
Commission's eyes glaze over when you mention the word "costing," 
let alone the eyes of people who don't do this for a living. We have 
tried to come up with a solution which we believe is effective and 
simple. 
Our solution would require that you look behind the 
tariffs of local exchange compames. Look at the pieces that make up 
their network; that is, the building blocks. Those are far fewer in 
number than the actual tariff items: You've got a loop, you've got a 
switch, and so forth. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why do you want to dictate how 
the locals -- I mean, what's in it for you? 
MR. BOWEN: What's in it for us is a desire to compete on 
a fair basis. We have no problem at all with competiting head-to-
head against anyone under appropriate and fair rules. Right now, 
the rules will not likely be fair. The plan that we proposed is 
designed to address that unfairness. If you are a carrier like MCI 
that basically buys at wholesale, being asked to compete with the 
retailers, the local exchange companies, is not fair and should not be 
allowed. The retailers can pay less for the same service that we have 
to buy and they can charge us to buy that service. We're trying to 
make sure that everybody pays the same thing for the necessary 
bottleneck, monopoly input, which is switched access in the case of 
toll service. 
The way it works is that everybody pays the same 




situation does not now exist in California. Until it does, there is a 
serious potential as "price squeezes." It is very 
easy, when to the service from Pacific and GTE, for 
them to squeeze 
rates of access. 
between retail rates and our wholesale 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: AU right Why don't we hear 
from Bay Area Teleport? In a couple of sentences, give me your 
concerns. 
MR. LARRY KAMER: Thank you, Madam Chair and 
Members of the Committee. My name is Larry Kamer. I'm 
representing Bay Area Teleport. 
Bay Area Teleport a private provider of high-speed 
digital network services operating in 11 counties in Northern 
California. 
The concerns we have raised before the Commission have 
been echoed in part the DRA, AT&T and MCI with regard to the 
safeguards we believe must be imposed before any kind of rate 
flexibility is granted. We have been quite aggressive in pursmng 
those safeguards at the Commission. 
I'd like to look more to the future and see if I can lay out 
a couple of new thoughts. 
The existence of our firm suggests that the increasingly 
sophisticated needs of business and government have given rise to 
the large number of metropolitan area providers around the country, 
all privately funded, to meet these needs. We are quite concerned, 
obviously, that the flow of capital which is now available to those 
private networks will be reduced if the risks are judged to be too 
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great for investing in that area. We're hoping that the Legislature 
and the Commission do not propose or promote policies which gives 
undue, advantage to monopoly providers in those services. 
What do we think the Legislature ought to do? We 
believe that the concerns that have been raised by Assembly 
Members Hill, Wright and Nolan of this Committee, and many, many 
others in the Legislature on both sides of the aisle who have written 
to Commissioner Wilk about this case, are absolutely on target, 
raising legislative concerns about the possibilities of cross-subsidy 
and anti-competitive behavior as a result of this case. 
But beyond that, the Legislature needs to continue 
looking at the way the Commission handles cases. We're not faulting 
any individuals or any organizations for promoting their causes and 
views, under the rules, as aggressively as they can. We do think that 
in the long-run we need to have effective review, judicial review, of 
the CPUC decisions. That is why we support Assemblyman Floyd's 
Assembly Bill 338. We believe that, at some point, ex parte contacts 
have to go, which is why we support Senator Rosenthal's SB 1125. 
We believe that new legislation is called for to require the 
Commission to identify substantial evidence as the basis of its 
findings and facts of its decision. We proposed an amendment to AB 
338. It doesn't look like that is going to happen this year, but we do 
think that it is a legitimate interest for this Committee and other 
legislators. With that, I'll stop. I have provided you with a written 
summary of our remarks. (See Attachment G). 





MS. SYLVIA SIEGAL: Thank you, Madam Chair and 
Members of the 
[Toward Utility 
small business customers. 
executive director of TURN 
, on behalf of residential and 
As I here listening to all of the testimonies, there are 
common threats and common objections. I guess it is up to TURN to 
provide the proper solution, and I'm happy to do that. 
For your information, Committee members, TURN has 
been overly active. I never see our hard-working telephone 
attorney, sitting there in the audience. We have been overly active 
m our -- sometimes I want to put a "b" in front of it -- and COP, in 
the new enhanced program that is coming up. In the AT&T case, we 
have just appealed to the California Supreme Court, because we don't 
believe in that kind of flexibility that gives them carte blanche. In 
the special contract proceeding, workshops under the supervision of 
the PUC can go on interminably. We have been active m 
modernization settlement. We objected strenuously to DRA's 
settlement on this very important and costly issue. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I am not going to let DRA get 
away with that, and I will come back to that at some point. 
MS. SIEGAL: We don't let DRA get away with much, but 
sometimes they do. After all, there are more of them than there are 
of us. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. 
MS. SIEGAL: Basic to all the testimonies I have heard 
today, are pleadings for cost studies. In our testimony, we proposed 
that before we anything, there should be a stand-alone cost study 
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of the telephone system. Once and for all we can determine what, if 
any, subsidies flow from basic exchange customers to enhanced 
services, to long-distance -- to any of the other vertical services 
currently in effect and being proposed. Without this study, you're 
just shooting in the dark, and you are shooting away our money 
present and future. 
Mr. Hill is gone, but if you are listening on the squawk 
box, Frank Hill, you are absolutely right. It is still a decreasing-cost 
industry. Particularly in the economic environment of California, 
which assures continued growth of population and a fantastic growth 
in traffic, PacBell and a11 the other telcos [telephone companies] in 
the state can do nothing but make money. The question is, how 
much and how should they share? 
Frankly, I'm not willing to share with PacBell, or General, 
or any of the telcos their "excess profits." As has been mentioned 
since divestiture, PacBell and General have earned tremendous 
profits. Since divestiture they have had to give back around $800 
million because of excess earmngs. I see no reason for them to share 
in excess earnings when customers are entitled to have it all 
returned -- 100 percent, not 50 percent. You're earning it because 
the unlimited capacity the customers have paid for, the 
intrastructure, is allowing you to exploit new services and heavier 
traffic. 
The truth is, Members of the Committee, that neither 
fiber optics or digital switchers are really required to transmit voice 
communication. That can be done even with crossbar switches, 
which we have in some of the rural areas. But PacBell is asking for 
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another huge down-payment the customers, the venture 
capitalists of They are asking for 
another huge $640 to $750 million, for modernizing the rest of 
California in order to allow the telco both to connect and to exploit 
present and future information products. 
There is no question that PacBell is on the brink on a 
great information question in the customer's mind 
is, do we need it I now? I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that we 
don't need it all now. We ought to go, as they say in Italy, poco a 
poco, "little by little." Implement whatever it is based on economic 
studies, on studies of services, on the outside field 
of what customers would want to buy. 
In the packet you have an article that is very telling, 
from the WaH Street Journal, indicating the hot prospects of the New 
Jersey Bell Company. I heard the chairman there testify the other 
day, on cable television that they had 20 new products. But then, a 
couple of days later, I read that the saturation level is only 2.4 
percent for the total package of 20 new products. That indicates to 
me that the customers are really not so hot for all of these new 
products. 
I don't want to be a wet blanket. The telcos accuse me of 
being a wart on the wheel of progress or worst things or whatever. 
It tain't true. 
I just want to point out to you that, for example, 
customers in France were given monitors provided by the state 
telcos to access whatever enhanced services the Minitel wanted to 
bring on line. Their saturation level isn't as great as it should be. I 
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think there is a lot in the marketplace right now, coming on line or 
maybe developing, that we ought to look at closely. We ought to look 
at it carefully before we pull even one little string in terms of 
regulation. 
Now, I'm the one who's always yakking. I was going to 
say something else, but I respect this forum. I'm the one who's 
always yakking about regulation and how weak it is in California, 
and believe me, it is getting weaker. In spite of that, I don't think 
this is the time to pull the string on regulation. I think this is the 
time to improve it, and I think we can. The complaints you hear 
about three-year rate cases are not the fault of the participants, 
except the telcos who feel compelled everytime somebody challenges 
a piece of their testimony to offer four or five more witnesses that 
will take another two to three months to hear and examine. That 
kind of nonsense has to stop. I think there are ways of limiting 
fairly any excess that the parties project. I think we have a 
marvelous staff of administrative law judges who can control the 
proceedings. I think they ought to be permitted to do so. 
I think some of the proposals that has been put forth 
miss a lot of other problems that have not been solved and should be 
looked at immediately. One of them is the business about SPF to SLU, 
which is strictly an arbitrary measure based upon arbitration ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's go back to this proceeding. 
MS. SIEGAL: I think we ought to reinvestigate the whole 
SPF to SLU access charge which is adding cost to basic exchange 
customers. 
44 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You're saying that there are still 
some problems 
MS. are a of problems that need 
regulatory 
The a very senous one. But 
you can't get anywhere a basic cost study of stand-
alone local service. Then can start addressing these other 
problems. That to come first That's the absolute predicate. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Don't go away. Let's go to the 
next. Dun and Bradstreet? 
MR. JOHN P. MACDONALD: Thank you, good afternoon. 
I'm John P. MacDonald, vice president and associate general counsel 
for the Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation, a Dun and Bradstreet 
company. [Prepared Attachment H]. 
It understanding focus of this hearing is on 
the adequacy of telecommunications regulation, with a particular 
concern for proceedings currently underway before the California 
Public Utilities Commission. We are participants in both the 
Alternative Regulatory Framework proceeding and the Enhanced 
Services proceedings. We also have formal and informal complaints 
pending before the Public Utilities Commission, and have opposed 
specific telco bills and market test filings before the Federal 
Communication Commission [FCC] 
In each of these proceedings, we have expressed the 
same concerns. The holder of the local exchange monpoly franchise 
has both the ability and the economic incentive to leverage its 
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monopoly power into adjacent competitive markets. Absent 
legislative enactment authorizing an enlargement of the telephone 
company monopoly franchise, such expansion of monopoly power 
should be aggressively denied. 
The divestiture of AT&T addressed the monopoly power 
that AT&T possessed ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I'm not going to let you read. 
Why don't you just give me the things that are of concern to you? I 
think Mr. Hill touched a little bit on it when he got to the Yellow 
Pages. We are trying to get a synoposis of what your concerns are 
the future, and what impact that has on your business in particular. 
MR. MCDONALD: Given the changes that are occuring in 
telecommunications, we see the need for increased regulation, not 
decreased. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why? 
MR. MCDONALD: The ability to cross-subsidize from one 
business to another and the innerconnection of the business 
themselves. We have talked before about the ability of the 
telephone company to deny access or control product development. 
All of those things become more integrated in today's world. To turn 
a regulated monopoly loose, on what otherwise are competitive 
businesses, it just asking for trouble. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. I apologize to you for 
commg up and not getting the full benefit of your testimony, but I do 
want to give everybody a chance to talk. Although you have not had 




encourage you leave it and it will be published m its entirety m the 
transcript. 
I am 
at responding to 
to 
has 
(DRA, PacBell & GTE) a shot 
said, but you only have four 
sentences. There has been an awful 
bit of rebuttal, but not a lot. 
said. I want to hear a little 
MR. JAMISON: In three sentences. First, we aren't 
seeking deregulation. We are seeking a change in regulation. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Isn't it funny that everybody in 
this room believes that you are? 
MR. JAMISON: Well, I would suggest that they read our 
proposal. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You think they haven't? 
MR. JAMISON: I think they have mischaracterized it. 
(These responses don't count as my three sentences.) 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: AH right. Touch'e! 
MR. JAMISON: Secondly, Ms. Siegal talked about the need 
to do it "little by little." I would suggest that replacing switching 
machines that are 40 or 50 years old is doing it very little by little. 
Third, people have recommended "Let's not have any 
flexibility for Pacific before we have entry." I would point out that, 
our proposal said, we want the principle flexibility adopted. Any 
specific flexibility for services, such as toll, would await a separate 
application or would become part of the Supplemental Rate Design or 
Phase II proceeding in this case. I think that is an unfounded 
concern on the part of MCI. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's hear from General 
Telephone. Do you want to make a comment? 
MR. MCCALLION: It will be very short. I also want to 
reiterate and respond to the gentleman from MCI: We not proposing 
a walk way from regulation, but rather to change regulation. I keep 
hearing those remarks over and over again. I know the parties who 
are making them just don't understand our plan or are deliberately 
trying to create a misrepresentation of our plan. 
A couple of the other points were brought up relative to 
targeting our sharing to particular customers. The reason we did 
that was to make sure that our end users benefit from efficiency 
gams. It wasn't to deny a benefit to AT&T, but rather to make sure 
that the end users in fact get the benefit, and also to somewhat 
cushion the impact to our local residential and business customers of 
long-distance rate reductions that are going on today (as Ms. Siegal 
and Mr. Stechert talked about, relative to SPIF to SLU). Its was 
definitely by design to make sure the end users did receive those 
benefits. 
MS. MURRAY: Just a quick word about the chargs of 
"fairness to the ratepayers" and "complexity." We have tried to 
balance those competing needs, giving our priority to the ratepayers' 
interest, but recognizing the need for a streamlined regulatory 
process. We think we have done it correctly. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask the DRA, do you 
consider what PacBeH and General Telephone propose as aspects of 
deregulation? 
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MS. MURRAY: Not deregulation in the sense that they 
would 
more so the 
reduce the 










of DRA's proposaL 
Obviously perhaps 
General plan, they drastically 
believe that is going a 
a further down that path than 
our proposal. 
So, would call it restricted or 
called it, our brief, "trust me" 
Obviously this group at the table 
me two sentences about what you think 
MS. SIEGAL: Not much. I'll 
to say. I think that summarizes 
more when I have more 
t CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You can bank your sentences. 
All right, let's hear from the next groups of witnesses. Don't be 
redundant. If there is something that has already been said, just say 
they speak for you. Hopefully, we will have a chance for a little 
exchange for this group. I will save cable for last since it has been 
attacked. You will have a little more time. 
MS. DIANE MARTINEZ: I'm Diane Martinez with API 
Alarm Systems. [Prepared Statement, see Attachment I]. 
Our view on this subject is fairly simple, believe it or not. 
We believe that the Alternative Regulatory Framework proceedings 
are a solution to something that seems not to be a problem. Right 
49 
now, the phone companies are saying that they need to have this 
new regulatory framework so that they can operate, but their stocks 
are up, their costs are done, their earnings are at a all-time high, and 
it is real difficult to see what the problems are unless you look at 
their a solution to the nonexistent problem. 
In their version of a solution, they go out there and 
compete, but they still want to hold on to those traditional things 
that protect them from evil competition. Things such as limited 
liability. They don't want deregulation, but they want to be 
detariffed. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You've said that the impact on 
the alarm system would make it almost prohibitive for you to 
provide your service. 
MS. MARTINEZ: Absolutely. They have consistently 
asked for 100 percent increases on our services without even 
beginning to prove that are below costs, as they allege. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You would be concerned about a 
system that would not allow some input That 's what this this 
"trust-me" system would do. 
MS. MARTINEZ: Absolutely. API currently has litigation 
against both companies because the companies have told us to trust 
them on their billing systems, and trusting them has just not worked 
out. We have the litigation to prove it. We have brought our briefs 
today. They are very simple, easy to read, and they bring up some 
very relevant points. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We will include them as a part of 
the record. All right. Let's move on to the next witness. 
50 
• 
MR. PETER HOWLEY: Good afternoon. Peter Howley, 
president of Telemanagement, I think I need about five 
sentences, Madam [Prepare Statement, see Attachment J]. 
something different from any other company here. 
We are a management service company serving small businesses, 
5,000 small businesses in California. We are a single point of contact 
for them. We to make their lives easy and telecommunications 
productive . 
We have made four proposals to the PUC that are critical 
if the interest of small businesses -- and we all understand the role 
they play in California and the economy -- if the interest of small 
businesses are to be protected under any scheme that comes out of 
the current regulatory hearing. I'd like to review the four with one 
sentence on each. 
First, The local exchange company services must be 
available on a nondiscriminatory basis, whether they are ordered by 
an individual customer or by a management company like ourselves. 
The services offered by the local exchange company must be offered 
to all interested users whether they are big companies or little 
companies. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you think that is not the case 
now? 
MR. HOWLEY: Yes. that's correct. I'm more concerned 
about what will take place going forward than I am about today. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's just stop right now and let's 
ask them: Is it your attention in the future to discriminate against 
businesses, whether they are big or small? 
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MR. JAMISON: No. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: General Telephone? 
MR. MCCALLION: No. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: They say "no." Why do you think 
they would? 
MR. HOWLEY: Let me hit my other three points and I will 
come back to the original point. 
Second, before flexibility of any nature is put in place, an 
effective, timely, less costly complaint procedure must be put in 
place at the Commission. Centex has proposed that a workshop be 
held to draw up the guidelines for such a procedure. Currently, the 
procedure penalizes small businesses. Under any scheme that it has 
more flexibility, that will be even more the case for small businesses. 
Third, make every element of the local exchange network 
available to the maximum extent technically possible, down to the 
smallest component. In effect, unbundle those services down to the 
smallest degree based on the needs of customers, not on the desire, 
whim, or needs of the utility or of large compames. Unbundleto the 
maximum extent technically possible. 
And lastly, create procedures m the Alternate Regulatory 
Framework hearing for cost-based pricing. 
The reason I have those four points ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If you go to cost-based pricing, 
they are telling us, small business are really going to take it on the 
au. 
MR. HOWLEY: We don't know if that is true or not 
without a procedure. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How about the study that Ms. 
Siegal is advocating? 
MR. HOWLEY: possible. But, without the procedures 
and safeguards that allow a 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But. if you don't know how much 
it costs to begin with, no amount of procedures are going to make a 
difference. Are they? 
MR. HOWLEY: You do need to determine the cost to begin 
with, abso1utely. That is the point of having safeguards in place, so 
there is a means to determine how the cost was arrived at and to 
assure that it was fairly arrived at. 
Let me answer your original question, if I may. All of the 
realities today are driven by competition. When you say 
competition, you are really talking about big companies. It isn't 
purposely discriminatory against the smaller companies as much as 
accidentally discriminatory, in the sense that the telephone 
companies' focus is on protecting their business against bypass and 
similar concerns. Therefore, they tend to ignore smaller businesses. 
We feel those four items are critical as safeguards to protect the 
small businesses' interest in California . 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Fellows and Ms. 
Siegal, I hope you take note of those four, because I would like you 
to comment on them. 
MR. ED PEREZ: Madam Chairwoman, Ed Perez, City 
Attorney for the City of Los Angeles. I'd like the opportunity to 
submit a written statement in the future. 
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I want to address one point that was not addressed 
today. It is a legal issue. Being a lawyer, I feel compelled to raise it. 
That is, as a matter of law, the Commission can not adopt any one of 
these plans. 
The California Legislature, when it created the Public 
Utilities Code, mandated that the Commission set just and reasonable 
rates after hearings. Nothing in that code allows the utilities to set 
them without a hearing. We believe that nothing should be done 
without further study. And, if the Commission does adopt one of 
these plans, we will seek our remedy before the California Supreme 
Court. (Prepared Statement, See Attachment K]. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask, are you going to sue? 
MR. PEREZ: I don't know if "suing" is the right term, but 
we are going to file a petition for review. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Assemblyman Murray looks like 
he might sue. 
MR. PEREZ: Well, we will see him in court. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right, go ahead. 
MR. DENNIS LOVE: Madam Chairwoman, I'm Dennis Love, 
president of the Extension Connection. We have been involved in the 
Oil 84 and related matters at the Public Utilities Commission. 
The Extension Connection filed a complaint back in 
November of '86 alleging that the utility companies were in violation 
of federal and state antitrust laws, and were acting in anti-
competitive fashion towards the competition. We still believe that is 
so. There have been continuing efforts by the utilities to interfere 
with our particular business. We are the guys in the pits. We are 
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the maintenance crew. We are the technicians that go out and do the 
inside I it funny that our 
phone numbers or left out completely m 
Pacific Bell and over last three years since 
deregulation of the telephone took place. 
In Yell ow Pages book that is sitting here, I have a 
little thing I'd like to read real quick, and then I will get to the bigger 
picture. 
"Have a question about your telephone service? Want 
something done? Can your telephone business office and ask your 
service representative. He will be glad to help you." Can I get one of 
those in there that says, "Call your Extension Connection service 
representative, who will be glad to help you"? There are numerous 
ads similiar to this throughout this book and every book in the state 
of California where the utilities are putting free advertisements for 
deregulated services and cross-subsidizing their own services. You 
don't have to look far, open your Yellow Pages. It is all around. The 
time is not ripe for more deregulation. 
We're looking at utilities talking about taking risks. We 
created utilities originally because it was economically unfeasible for 
a number of companies to enter the telephone market and supply 
wire, switches, and everything else throughout the entire state. 
That's what a utility is. It's the company that does that for the 
community. We're talking about utility companies taking risks? 
That is not what we want for the people of this state, our utility 
taking risks. We want the basic nuts and bolts covered by the Public 
Utilities Commission and the legislators of the state, making sure that 
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we get what we're paymg for. All of these special services that are 
being brought up because of our technology. those things are open to 
competition. You can not put competition and regulation in the same 
bedroom. If you do, somebody is going to start messing around. 
That is what we have going on here. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I am not going to let yours go 
unanswered, because I'm sure they are going to respond to your 
comments. They are not going to mess around, I'll tell you. 
MR. ZACHERY PA VLIDES: I am Zachery Pavlides. In 
1978, I founded the Talking Yell ow Pages, which supposedly was the 
first in the nation. 
Pacific Bell refuse dto give me service, and I had to go to 
the court to get it. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: They refused to give you service 
because they felt you were competition. Is that what you're telling 
me? 
MR. PA VLIDES: That's correct. After a settlement, which 
terms I am not in position to disclose due to confidentiality, I had to 
file a new lawsuit m 1988 which is now pending in Superior Court m 
San Francisco. They show conspiracy in the Supreme Court here. 
These people address the financial issue of Pacific Bell 
and deregulation. This is a different issue. Pacific management is 
not to be trusted. They are acting criminally. They have with me. 
The position shown by their president of the Yellow Pages, who said 
Judge Greene allows them to stop the Talking Yellow Pages. With 
this kind of behavior and people, I don't think there is a flat level 




CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's go to the next witness. 
MR. HARRY SCHWEDOCK: My name Harry Schwedock, 
and I'm vice president and chief operating officer of Amvox, 
Incorporated. Amvox is a nationwide voice-mail provider that has 
been in business for about two years. We have 41,000 subscribers, a 
little less than half of them in California. [Prepared Statement, see 
Attachment L]. 
We currently have a complaint pending before the CPUC 
with respect to what we consider to be anti-competitive monopoly 
abuses on the part of Pacific Bell's voice-mail activities. It is 
interesting that they have been the business for just two months 
and, as far as we are concerned, they are already engaging in 
competitive activities. It seems likely to us that Pacific Bell is gomg 
to defend this on the basis of the fact they are buying services from 
Pacific Bell, just like any other voice-mail company has to buy 
services from Pacific Bell. There only one significant difference, 
and the Bay Area Teleport mentioned it a little bit earlier. The 
difference is that when Amvox or any other voice-mail company 
buys services, someone has to sign a check. When Pacific Bell voice-
mail buys services from Pacific Bell, nobody stgns a check. A 
bookkeeping transaction may take place. Now, I say "may," because 
one of the things that led to the breakup of AT&T was the fact, which 
the FCC essentially admitted, that cost accounting really, didn't work 
as a method of regulation. 
I've heard from the chairman, "Well, this is the new 
telephone company. This is not the old Bell system. The Jeopard has 
changed his spots." If we buy that, then we deserve what we get. 
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In the years since deregulation, Pacific has been required 
by the PUC to refund several hundreds of millions of dollars for over 
aggressive marketing practices, unwise investments, and essentially 
overcharging for service. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Since it is something that 
continues to come up: In the current proceeding, if there is some 
question about your marketing, can that be looked at in an off-year, 
during the rate freeze? 
MR. JAMISON: Yes. In fact, that kind of issue that was 
raised in the marketing-practices portion of the ratecase is exactly 
the kind of thing that a normal complaint process or investigatory 
process at the Commission would likely uncover. Appropriate action 
could be taken, of course. 
MS. SIEGAL: However, the burden of proof is on the 
complainant, not on the company. It is pretty darn hard to dig out 
that information. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's the point that I wanted 
made. Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. SCHWEDOCK: The underlying purpose of these 
hearings, I presume, is what is in the public interest. I don't think 
too many people would disagree that deregulation in the airline 
industry has resulted in choice, higher fares, and poor service. 
Deregulation in the banking industry has resulted in bail-out's that 
are going to cost the taxpayers of this country several hundreds of 
billions of dollars. You can calJ it flexible regulation. You can call it 
deregulation. You can call it by whatever euphemisms you want. 
What the telephone companies in California are looking for is less 
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oversight. There are no two ways to slice that. What we're 
concerned about is lack oversight. 
you a competitor to whom you pay over 35 
percent of your revenues (and Amvox indeed pays over 35 percent 
of its revenues to the telephone company) when you have a 
competitor who has no need raise capital, when you have a 
competitor who has more lawyers than we have employees, and 
when you have a competitor that has a long record of anti-
competitive abuses, we worry. We worry about that competitor 
using the multitude of advantages that they gained from their 
monopoly position to dominate an emerging competitive market. 
If the telephone company wants to enter competitive 
markets, if that is what they want to do, then let them do it. They 
should be allowed to do it. But, them do it under the same 
circumstances as everyone does. Let them go out and find money to 
do it, not use ratepayer to it. Let them set up separate 
subsidiaries so we can at least reduce the potential for cross-
subsidization. Give the PUC at least the chance to find it. If they 
dominate a market, if they end up dominating the a new market, let 
it be because they provided better service, not because they had 
more lawyers or more accountants and could out last any other 
competitors in either the courts or the CPUC. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right. 
MR. PA VLIDES: I have one more item. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: One sentence. 
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MR. PAVLIDES: Pacific Bell for 13 years, they were 
selling to the public a service that they didn't have, and they knew 
about it. I have sworn statements with me. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: There is a procedure to address 
that, though. Let's hear from Jim Martin and then to the cable 
industry. 
MR. JIM MARTIN: Madam Chairwoman and Members of 
the Committee. I'm Jim Martin, regional director of the Western 
Region of the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People]. I am here in these hearings today because the 
NAACP clearly perceives a very urgent need for our constituency to 
be heard, represented, and involved in the issues of 
telecommunications. We are very clear that as the technology 
evolves and changes the society we live in, there are significant risks 
and we must contemplate methods to deal with them. Particularly in 
an industry and generally moves rather slowly when it comes to the 
kinds of changes needed to keep all the people in their various 
communities and constituencies current with the changing times. 
Discussion has centered around regulation. Regulation of 
the industry is clearly something that is needed. I, as a former 
utility employee in the telecommunications environment for 
approximately 20 years, know that the corporation doesn't 
necessarily seek to meet the needs of the people and keep the people 
well informed, unless they need to manage an issue or to get 
something for it. 
We will be involved with this issue. We will seek 




greater degree. that, should the telecommunications 
regulation we lifted, we would see a 
greater jeopardy to that I represent. 
I might we represent nine western states and Japan 
in my regiOn. I have approximately 150 branches. We service over 
3 million Black citizens and a broad range of low-income and other 
people of color throughout this region. I have approximately 121 
telecommunications in our region, we are beginning in 
California since over approximately 65 percent our constituency is in 
this state. We will involved. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you very much for your 
comments. Let's hear from Sprint. 
MR. DENNIS LOPER: We have to submit our testimony in 
writing for Sprint due to the fact Pongrancz was not available. 
[See Attachment M]. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. Good enough. The Center 
for Public Interest Law, are they still around? No? Okay, then we 
will hear from Nick, and then to Spencer, and then we will give 
everybody on my side of the table a chance for concluding remarks. 
MR. NICK SELBY: Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, 
my name is Nick Selby appearing for the Information Providers 
Association (IPA). IPA consists of information providers who deliver 
information and entertainment services via the telephone; relying 
primarily upon the billing and collection services of the local 
exchange carriers. 
In brief, our concern is that there are already stgns that 
the local exchange carriers intend to use their bottleneck control over 
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billing and collection services to influence and control the amount of 
content and information that will be available to the marketplace. 
Pacific Bell, this week, filed document with the Public Utilities 
Commission which said that as a private company it was not required 
to provide any due process before it disconnected an information 
provider. There will be a need for continued regulation in the future 
to ensure that this bottleneck monopoly, this control over basic 
billing and collection services, is not used by Pacific and General to 
favor their own information services which we know are coming 
down the road. Thank you. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Let hear from the 
California Cable Television Association. Those are great charts. I am 
sorry they weren't up earlier. 
MR. SPENCER KAITZ: Madam Chair, I will be brief 
because I know you don't want repetition, but I thought these charts 
would be helpful to the Committee because they are in detail. [See 
Attachment N]. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The people can't see them. 
MR. KAITZ: I have copies that I will be glad to make 
available to all parties. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. KAITZ: The charts illustrate what is really at stake 
here,Madam Chair and Members. The rate case is something that we 
understand. It provides for cross-examination of witnesses and 
discovery of evidence. What Pacific has proposed has been 
characterized by one of their executives as "oversight capability." I 
don't think any of us fully understand what oversight capability 
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means, but what we think it means (based on most of what we have 
been able to we on the chart. If I may 
characterize what we have under that proposal IS 
ratemaking and competitors by schmoozing. It has also 
been called "touchy-feely" on. 
We all get together at a workshop, a room, and we talk, 
and there is a little information by Pacific, not very much. They 
now view much, not most, of their information as proprietary 
because they have gone into competitive businesses. Therefore, the 
basic information that Sylvia and others need to evaluate their cases 
is not longer available without the enormous expense of discovery; 
and then often not available either. 
From the standpoint of competitors, I would characterize 
this as the classic 900-pound-goriHa-versus-canary syndrome. What 
I find interesting is that Pacific, under their proposal, wants to make 
sure they only have one canary at a time to stomp on. The only 
remedy that a competitor would have, to deal with subsidy 
problems, would be to file a complaint. This isolates them from the 
other parties that used to be in the rate case as a group, and forces 
them to bear all the costs of going through discovery, perhaps -- or 
perhaps not -- with support from DRA. For any small businesses, 
this eliminates any effective review of whether subsidy exists. 
This leads me to the basic question that we have about 
this. Many questions that have been raised: Is this unfair to small 
business or it fair to small business? Is there subsidy by Pacific of 
its voice-mail services, data services? Are they creating a subsidy 
situation ultimately for going into video transport for cable 
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television? is the $700 million plus proposal for fiber, $400 in the 
four years of the proceeding, cost justified? Those are the questions 
the rate case was designed to find out. The only way you can answer 
those questions is look at their business and their business records. 
Now, all of the elements that allowed anyone to do that under any 
reasonable cost scenario are being stripped away. 
Everybody who is concerned about the Pacific and 
General plans is arguing for doing this carefully. In a worst case 
scenario, if the PUC really trashed Pacific's proposal, all they would 
get to do is sit back and make $2.5 billion a year for the next few 
years, and sulk about how badly they were treated by the Committee 
and the California PUC. This would be a situation where they could 
not do anything other than continue to ride in their limousines. But 
we are asking, why can't the consumer, cross-subsidy, and 
competitive issues be dealt with carefully? For 50 years, the rate 
case has offered all of these protections. All of us are willing to look 
at changes and modifications; speed it up a little bit; or this, that or 
the other. They are proposing to throw it all out. We think that is 
dead wrong. We think that sets up a scenario for destroying a very 
competitive sector of California's telecommunications economy. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The chart raises several 
questions, and maybe it is a good way to end the hearing. Let me 
also recognize that Barry Ross from the California Telephone 
Association is in the audience is going to submit his testimony m 
writing, in the interest of time. So is James Smith from CalTel. He 
indicated that he also would submit their testimony in writing. I'm 
sorry to really have to be so short because I have really been looking 
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forward to this hearing. The budget dispute just kind of got in the 
way of our 
I don't would disagree with what Spencer 
described as rate case protections. 




My rate case expert for 
pretty much with what they 
it is right. I really didn't read 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You're getting to be just like a 
lawyer. Do you know how cautious they are? 
MS. SIEGAL: After 20 years, I begin to think like them. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: She said she didn't read every 
word, but it seems like it was in order. Let me ask both General, DRA 
and Pacific: In exchange for the ratecase protections that we have 
had, what does your program put in their place? There are no public 
hearings, for the most your proposal, the protections that 
come from cross-examination, and on and on? 
Secondly. I have a question to ask and I want the four 
that were up here to comment on it; things that were raised by 
others. This notion of shifting the burden of proof in a complaint 
procedure, to shift the total burden to the consumer, the ratepayer, 
or someone who wants to raise some issue or complaint -- I can 
understand the need for that, because you can have a number of 
frivolous kinds of things. What about some shared responsibility, 
where there is some regulatory framework or regulatory flexibility, 
some kind of shared responsibility in terms of a complaint 
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procedure. Some method that would differ a little bit from the 
current process? 
MR. JAMISON: Let me address that second question first. 
I think two issues have been confused here. Pacific, indeed, is 
looking for an improvement, a change in the way that protests about 
new products or services are handled. Today, competitors complain 
that we use the regulatory process, but I submit they can tie up new 
products and services that Pacific would like to offer today. We are 
asking for some relief from that. 
However, we are not proposing changes in the complaint 
area whatsoever. All of the complaint procedures should still be 
available. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But the point is, under the 
current complaint procedure, if there is not a rate case, then the 
burden of proof is on whomever is bringing the complaint. What I'm 
saying is, if you're not going to have rate cases anymore, then there 
ought to be some step between that allows for shared responsibility. 
I can understand not wanting a bunch of frivolous cases every time 
somebody wanted to make a complaint. But with you having all your 
information and Sylvia Siegal being outnumbered by 50,000 - one 
attorney and everybody else you have, there ought to be some 
balance. Giving you certain flexibility is all bad, given the changing 
environment, but I do think there have to be some safeguards. I 
think that is what everybody here is saying, recognizing that if there 
are some changes, there ought to be some balance. Anybody can 
respond to that question. Sylvia, you grabbed your mike, so why 






or even a 
I don't see how you can share that kind of 
it insufficient. Excuse me 
of having a full-blown 
the PUC is that you 
have the protection the procedures. The parties have rights: The 
right to get from company, the right to cross-
examine witnesses, and so on. some kind of nebulous 
sharing on a procedure, would be wiped out in two 
minutes. You would have no I'm for rights. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What I'm suggesting is some kind 
of complaint procedure on an issue that would similarily situate one 
as does a general rate case proceeding. In other words, if you were 
complaining, you would have the right to get the information. You 
would have the to cross-examine. You would have the right to 
some of the other things 
MS. SIEGAL: 
you don't now. 
they "no," then it's tough crunchies, 
you know. You have no recourse. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I'm saying there ought to be 
something that can be worked out. Some kind of complaint 
procedure that would allow that to occur . 
MS. SIEGAL: We have to have "full-blown" procedures 
with protection of rights for all parties. We have, Madam Chair, some 
really immense issues coming down the pike. In fact, one is here 
right now, and that is the whole issue of privacy. That's wrapped up 
into this whole new telecommunications world. Nobody is dealing 
with it. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Again, if we were going through 
our normal cases ,that issue would be reviewed in the regular 
process. 
MS. SIEGAL: It's a policy issue, Madam Chair. I 
respectfully recommend that the Legislature take this up with 
respect to future services for telcos. Secondly, I respectfully 
recommend this Committee consider legislation to remove limited 
liability provisions from telcos' protective devices. They can put a 
business out of business in two minutes if they leave the Dennis 
Love's out the telephone book or if they do other things to customers. 
There is a very protective limitation on liability. It has to be 
removed. If these guys are going to get into competitive businesses, 
they have to observe the practices of the business community. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's not a bad idea. I see them 
both frowning. All right. Mr. Kaitz? 
MR. KAITZ: Madam Chair, for a small business to lodge a 
complaint, they immediately are up against a group of lawyers and 
experts funded by the ratepayers and employed by a company that 
does $8 to $10 billion of business a year. That is simply not a level 
playing field, when you have subsidy flowing out of the ratepayers' 
pockets to take on the fight in the first place. The ratecase allowed 
parties to at least intervene at a point in time m which the company 
had enough at risk that it took seriously conduct that would be 
offensive to the PUC deciding that case. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. I hear what you're saying. 
DRA, did you want to make a comment? 
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MS. MURRAY: What we have tried to do in the DRA plan, 
recognizing 
ratecase, is to 
of the 
Then, to have in place the 
kind of index, on companies' specific inflation and productivity 
factors, that would, in many respects, simulate the results that 
ratepayers might to expect of a full-blown ratecase proceeding. Only 
when all the savings of productivity have been appropriately 
returned to the ratepayers, we look sharing of unexpected 
revenues due to exceptional management efforts. Let's get the 
incentives right. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you support this notion of a 
cost study? Basically that you have to have the 
numbers right to start with. 
MS. MURRAY: have to have the numbers right to 
start with whether that entails the type of stand-alone cost study 
that Ms. Siegal described is not necessarily the case. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How do you get the right 
numbers without some kind of study? 
MS. MURRAY: There is, for example, the simple fact... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The "trust-me" factor? 
MS. MURRAY: Pacific Bell is on a regular basis earning 
considerably more than its authorized return. Our attrition process 
does not automatically give that back. If we had had a general rate 
case, we would have reexamined the entire revenue requirement. 
We hope to come up with some relatively simple way. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Of course, a "revenue 
requirement" assumes that everything that has gone before ts 
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correct. You still don't have a detailed study that would point out 
whether these assumptions are correct or not. 
MR. JAMISON: Everybody seems to believe we are not 
gomg to be submitting cost studies. Mr. Perez from the City of Los 
Angeles became very upset that there may be rate changes without 
cost studies. There is a Supplemental Rate Design to follow this 
proceeding which will require all the changes we have proposed m 
principle, except the inclusion of the touchtone and expansion of the 
local calling area, to be subject to cost studies and review before 
those flexibility bands are set, and before any increases of business 
rates are linked to those other rate decreases could take effect. 
I cannot let Spencer's signs go without a comment. 
Because he has printed those words on those sign doesn't make them 
right. We have sat here and repeatedly said we are not proposmg 
rate increases except for those business rates which will go through 
that proceeding. Those charts are not a fair reflection of our 
proposal. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Point that out. I didn't see that 
part. Where is that? Which one was it? 
MR. JAMISON: "Significant rate increases by advice letter, 
effective 'conditionally' unless a protest can show 'irreparable harm."' 
MR. KAITZ: Once you establish the bands, then you can 
do significant rate increases within those bands by advice letter. 
What's wrong with that? 
MR. JAMISON: That is a mischaracterization of our 
proposal. The band, itself, is something that would be fully explored 




CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If we strike "significant" and put 








to keep beating up on PacBell. 
" would that be 
sit here and try and correct his 
Oh, that was good. 
can I correct the 
Wait a minute, we are not going 
MS. SIEGAL: Why not? They're big and rich. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right, go ahead. 
MS. SIEGAL: me just make this one point. So, they 
submit cost studies wi all new services. Those don't mean a 
darn thing. 
CHAIRWOMA want independent cost 
studies. 
MS. SIEGAL: They would be as flawed as every other cost 
study they have submitted. I can assure you that until we get a 
stand-alone cost study. this is an poppycock . 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask Pacific and General 
Telephone, if we are talking about getting the numbers right. Do you 
guys have any problems with an independent cost study? 
MR. JAMISON: Our cost studies today undergo great 
scrutiny by this Commission. People are able to ask for information 
and make their own studies. In the foHowup procedure that has to 
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take place, the Supplemental Rate Design or Phase III, all of those 
will happen. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, is the answer "yes" or "no"? 
MR. JAMISON: The answer is that the cost studies that 
we produced will be provided. Other parties can ask for information 
and create their own estimates. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, the answer to the question is 
"no." You are comfortable with what you provide, but if anybody 
wants to add or change, they can build on what you give them. Is 
that correct? 
MR. JAMISON: They can require information to be 
provided to them by us. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Never mind, I got your point. 
MS. SIEGAL: I respectfuJly recommend, Madam Chair, 
that this Committee order the Public Utilities Commission to 
commission an independent stand-alone cost study. I don't want the 
Commission staffto do it. They don't have enough staff to do it. I 
want an independent outside purveyor to do it. An independent 
purveyor selected by the parties involved. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay, you had three shots at the 
apple. We are going to close it out. I am going to give everybody 
one last sentence. I will let General, Pacific, DRA, and Sylvia have the 
final word. Past the mike around and let's go. 
MR. KAITZ: You have in the audience right now a group 
of smaller providers, telephone answering services, who find that 
Pacific is able to use their thousands of service representatives to 




here should be a question to Pacific: Given that the telephone 
answering services 
Alternative Regulatory 
money to be involved in the 
and these are small businesses 
with small margins, now competing with the tens of thousands of 
people on Pacific's forces, how under Pacific Bell's proposal will 
they protect themselves when rate case is gone? 
CHAIRWOMAN Okay. 
MR. SELBY: As you know, Madam Chairwoman, Pacific 
Bell is on the verge of offering a host of new "information age" 
services. Not just voice-maiL Pendi right now before the 
Commission, on a motion for interim approval, is Pacific's voice store 
and forward service. This will put Pacific Bell almost into a direct 
partnership with certain selected information providers, and through 
its control of the biHing and collection mechanism, as well as its 
control of the local exchange bottleneck, the company will have the 
ability, in subtle ways that are very difficult for an individual 
competitor to challenge to control the marketplace. I hope the 
Legislature will continue to fund the Commission. Give the 
Commission the resources to ensure that discrimination is not 
allowed to occur. Thank you . 
MR. SCHWEDOCK: Madam Chairwoman, today we have 
listened to a lot of people argue about a lot of things with respect to 
cross-subsidy. I would suggest that there is a very, very simple 
solution to this, and that is simply to have two companies. There are 
the regulated telephone companies with their monopoly services, and 
there are the unregulated competitive services. If the telephone 
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companies want to be in those businesses, let them do it exactly the 
same way as everyone else does. 
It has to make any person in a business that is competing 
with them feel terribly uncomfortable when the person that he has 
to buy his basic services from is also his competitor. There is no 
amount of "trust-me," no amount of oversight procedures that are 
going to get people past that. If you want to play the game, then 
play it the same way that everybody else does. 
MR. HOWLEY: We don't compete with Pacific Bell. In fact, 
we are one of its most effective sales ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: This is your parting shot. You 
can't gtve me a whole history. You have to do one or two sentences. 
MR. HOWLEY: A quick sentence, is we don't compete. We 
sell and manage their services very effectively. And yet, we have 
the same concerns, m some respects, as the other companies here. I 
think the reason ts obvious: The impact this will have on the 
industry for the next 20 years. Not only the industry, but how 
information products develop in that timeframe. We outlined 
Centex's four points which we thought. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We have those four points and 
we will go back through those. 
MR. HOWLEY: We would like to ask your Committee to 
closely monitor the results of the hearing. If those are not properly 
addressed, to take legislative action to correct that. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me say this to you: Given the 
fact we didn't have the kind of hearing that we really hoped to have, 
with full discussion, we may end up having to do this another time. 
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Once we sort through the testimony and the information we have, 
then may be a to so that we can 
maybe come 
matter how we 
management group 
be in charge, nothing 
president of the company comes 
nothing that you can hope for 
change. 
my belief is that no 
game, if we allow the 
years of monopoly cu1ture to 
As I stated before, when the 
the there is 
changing the rules of the game. 
You just change the players. They have done enough criminal acts so 
far that it's justified . 
MS. MARTINEZ: API has one further comment. From 
what we've heard from the DRA and witnessed in the proceedings, 
with the litany of information that's been provided during these 
proceedings, it's evident that the Commission's resources are 
inadequate. API that create an oversight, a watch 
dog committee. This ts not uncommon. They have been established 
m a number of states that are able to look at these issues and take 
care of the general ratepayers, of which we are one. 
MS. MURRAY: In looking at regulation for the 90's, DRA 
seeks three things: A regulatory framework that is (1) flexible 
enough to induce innovation and efficiency on the part of the local 
exchange carriers; (2) stringent enough to guarantee that those 
benefits flow through to the ultimate ratepayers; and (3) fair enough 
to ensure that both the local exchange carriers and their competitors 
have a reasonable opportunity to compete on equal basis, so that 
California consumers are the ultimate winners. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I think that ought to be the goal 
of everyone. That sounds great. Excellent. That's where I am. I'm 
with Terri. Go ahead. 
MR. MCCALLION: I will make this very brief. In closing 
we feel that our plan is good news both for the ratepayers and the 
telephone compames. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You think it is flexibile enough, 
stringent enough. and fair enough? 
MR. MCCALLION: Yes. It was carefully designed to be 
such. 
I would like to add a comment relative to many of the 
parties who spoke near the end of this session. That is, we at GTE 
California also have some concerns relative to our existing rate 
design. The last time we had a full-blown rate design decision for 
GTE California was in 1984. Certainly, conditions have changed to a 
great extent and we need a new rate design. So, we agree with some 
of the concerns raised by some of those parties. 
As you may be aware, we had a 1988 general rate case, 
and the rate case has been concluded. The rate design portion was 
put on hold and rolled into the Supplemental Rate Design portion of 
this proceeding. So, we are anxious to receive a rate design decision. 
I just want to point out the rate design portion of the Supplemental 
Rate Design is more than supplemental for GTE California. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right. We recognize that. I 





MR. JAMISON: I think Terri said it best as far as what a 
change regulatory 
proposal does that 
half of this 
things. It is fair to our 
I believe Pacific's 
discussion of the latter 
proposal does exactly those 
to Pacific, and provides safeguards 
for competitors as we move to a competitive environment that is 
going to come whether we Hke it or whether they it or whether 
the DRA likes or whether Committee or Legislature likes it. 
MS. SIEGAL: but not least, Sylvia Siegal for the 
residential customers. While customers look 
forbenefits really I the Legislature must 
bear in mind the whole wrath of proposals currently under 
discussion are not necessarily beneficial, prudent, or cost effective as 
far as the larger of Further, we would 
urge this Legislature to continue to 
Commission. Your 
proceedings this year and stopped a 
oversight over the 
helped the regulatory 
of "speed up", ill-considered 
notions, and so forth. I won't go into those details. We need you. 
We need you. And we will be happy to provide whatever 
information we can. 
We look to the future and its benefits. But, I'm not 
entirely convinced that the only thing that our future citizens will be 
concerned with is information. Information is not the be-aU or end-
all of our existence. I think economic issues are a lot more 
important. Thank you. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you very much. Let me 
close by thanking everyone who came, and again, apologizing to 
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those of you who came a long way and perhaps did not get to say as 
much as you would like. Let me assure you that your comments will 
be included their entirety in the recorded publication of this 
hearing. 
Secondly, once we can sort through the great deal of 
information that you have provided to us, there may be a need to 
come back. There are some issues that are unresolved. There are 
safeguards that have been pointed out that perhaps have not been 
adequately addressed, and there are some legislative suggestions 
that may need a response. I hope we can work together to come up 
with a means of addressing the problems. We have had a taskforce 
in the past. There may be a role that such a taskforce could play 
again. Most of you who have come here today would certainly be 
invited to participate in such a task force. 
Again, let me thank you. Let me ask one final question: 
What is the status of Phase HI of the OH? Does anybody know? 
MR. JAMISON: It hasn't been set yet, as far as I know. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. A lot is riding on that, 
including the rates and competition and some of the other things 
have been mulled over. Certainly, we want to be aware. It certainly 
ought to be widely noticed in public so that people can participate. 







Opening Comments of Chairwoman Gwen Moore 
Utilities and Commerce Committee Special Hearing 
June 6, 1989 
Committee Members, Witnesses, and Members of the Public: 
In 191 0, after years of strife between the utilities and 
their customers, the people of California, by initiative, created 
the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC} to create order 
and to protect their common interests. 
Now the PUC is engaged in one of its most important 
assignments ever: Determining how to regulate California's 
telephone companies in the 1990's. In December, the PUC 
significantly lightened regulation of AT&T, the largest long-
distance carrier, as it had done for MCI, US Sprint, and the other 
long-distance carriers. Now the local telephone companies are 
petitioning the PUC for their own lightened regulation. 
But there is a bigger issue. That issue is how telecommuni-
cations services will be provided in California, in the last years 
of the 20th Century and the first years of the 21st. 
Our hearing today is convened to discuss what our state's 
telecommunications policies should be. Ever-changing federal 
policies and new technological possibilities require that we 
reassess our state's policies on a regular basis. 
For that reason, I am asking our witnesses, who represent 
almost every active player in the telecommunications arena, to 
concentrate their testimony on the Big Picture, the policies that 
they recommend for the future. Among these is the appropriate 
role of the PUC. I don't want to reiterate the proceedings now 




As Californians, we all have a big stake in our state's tele-
communications policies. They will determine, more than we can 
imagine today, how we will live our lives tomorrow. Can we 
build a social consensus for the 21st Century -- for the "Infor-




Bell Prepared Testimony 
of Bruce F. Jamison 
Submitted Assembly Committee 
on Utilities and Commerce 
June 6, 1989 
Pacific Bell appreciates this opportunity to participate in 
these proceedings as they explore alternatives to traditional 
telephone regulation. Pacific believes that the modification of 
today's regulatory procedures is essential to the continued 
development of California's telecommunications infrastructure. 
This committee is well aware of the current proceeding before 
the California Public Utilities Commission entitled Order 
Instituting Investigation Into Alternative Regulatory Frameworks 
for Local Exchange Carriers (or OII 87-11-033). Pacific Bell, 
along with numerous other parties, participated in the 
proceeding. Pacific Bell has submitted a complete proposal, 
recommending revisions to the current regulatory system. To 
briefly summarize, Pacific proposes to: 
• Freeze the price of basic residence service through 
1992, at rates already among the lowest in the nation. 
• Include Touch-Tone service for free as part of residence 
basic service. 
• Expand local calling areas for residence and business 
customers from about 8 miles to about 12 miles. 
• Modernize the telecommunications network over three 
years so all Pacific Bell customers can have access to 
same level and variety of services regardless of where 
they live and provide a telecommunications 
infrastructure that will support California's continued 
economic development. 
• Continue regulation by the CPUC, with some streamlining 
of procedures to allow downward pricing on services 
presently priced above cost and to allow for more timely 
introduction of new services. (For example, pricing 
parameters would require review and approval by the 
CPUC.) 
• Share evenly with customers any earnings above a level 
set by the CPUC. 
• Gradually adjust prices for business services so they 
are closer to the cost of providing the service, by the 
amount of reductions ordered by the CPUC for 
interexchange carriers (IECs). (The CPUC has ordered 
that the reduction to the IECs should be offset in the 
remainder of Pacific's business. There will be no 
revenue increase for Pacific Bell.) 
As you can see, Pacific's proposal does not envision 
deregulation, or even a radical departure from traditional 
regulation. Rather, Pacific's proposal is a thoughtfully 
planned evolution of today's approach to regulation to one 
which offers greater benefits to customers and the company 
and is fair to competitors. 
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More specific responses to the Committee's questions follow: 
Key of Interest to the Committee 
l.Q The traditional of ion include: 
a) assuring just and reasonable rates, 
b) preserving the ability of the utility enterprise to 
attract capital on reasonable terms, 
c) preventing abuse of monopoly power and undue 
discrimination among customers, and 
d) assuring high quality service and adequate facilities. 
Are these goals inappropriate for the 1990s? Should 
additional goals be pursued in the 1990s? 
1.A The goals you have stated are goals today and 
for the 1990s and are similar to goals the CPUC has 
articulated: 
1. Universal Service: This goal directly correlates to 
goals (a) and (d) above. 
2. Economic Efficiency: This goal relates to (a) and (b) 
indirectly, for as economic efficiency is approached, 
customers will be further assured of just and 
reasonable rates; capital will continue to be available 
as investors remain confident about the level of return. 
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3. Encouragement of Technological Advances: This is 
related to (d) above, and is a goal that must be 
pursued more vigorously if California is to remain 
competitive in the new, worldwide economy. 
4. Financial and Rate Stability: This goal has a customer 
and a utility component, in that the stability of the 
utility will enhance the stability afforded customers. 
Thus, both (a) and (b) are addressed. 
5. Full utilization of the local network: High quality 
service and adequate facilities are the outgrowth of a 
fully-utilized local network, or (d) above. 
6. Avoidance of Cross-Subsidies and Anticompetitive 
Behavior: This goal is embodied in (c). 
7. Low Cost Efficient Regulation ... an additional goal not 
stated above which should be pursued due to the 
increased competition in this industry. 
Pacific Bell developed its proposal in support of all of 
those goals, and we still believe these goals are 
appropriate to pursue in the 1990s. A brief summary of our 
proposal is attached. 
2.Q Traditional rate-of-return regulation ideally links rates 
to costs (including the cost of capital). It is the 
principal method to achieve the twin goals of (a) capital 
attraction on reasonable terms and (b) just and reasonable 
rates. Is a new form of telephone regulation recommended 
-- or can traditional rate-of-return regulation still serve 
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the public interest? Please restate (briefly) your 
position, if any, before the Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC) in OII 87-11-033 ("Alternative Regulatory Framework") 
and A. 88-08-031 ("Enhanced Services"). 
2.A As used today, rate-of-return regulation may in fact work 
to the detriment of both the customer and the Company. 
Pacific is proposing a modification to correct the 
deficiencies with rate-of-return regulation to make it more 
appropriate for today's increasingly competitive 
environment. 
Pacific's plan enhances the ability of the current 
regulatory process to achieve the goals outlined by the 
Commission and this Committee in its first question. 
The improvements we envision include: 
• more reliance on incentives to encourage greater 
productivity, such as the shared earnings plan. 
• the ability of the company to lower prices so it can 
compete more effectively when current prices are above 
cost. (For example, the Commission would determine 
that a price range is reasonable, taking into account 
the costs of providing the services in question. The 
costs, as determined by the CPUC, could serve as the 
price floor in some cases.) 
• the simplifying of some regulatory processes so new 
products can be introduced more quickly. 
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Pacific is proposing to move toward a regulatory structure 
more appropriate for the current environment and more 
capable of accommodating further change. Under the 
structure proposed by Pacific, the Company will be 
encouraged to perform at its best because there are better 
incentives for excellence, as well as greater risks for 
failure. 
Pacific also has proposed in A. 88-08-031 ("Enhanced 
Services") that enhanced services should be detariffed, but 
still be part of the regulated business. Not only will 
this help ensure the continued evolution of a robust public 
network, but also money earned by these services will help 
keep the price of basic service low. There should be 
flexible pricing for such services, but the Commission 
should retain oversight of the services. This is 
consistent with what Pacific has proposed in response to 
OII 87-11-033. 
3.Q Are current regulatory procedures adequate to identify and 
consider, in a coordinated fashion a full range of issues 
that should be of concern to policymakers? These issues 
include, among others: 
a) Maintaining and enhancing universal service. 
b) Improving the efficiency of the public 
telecommunications network. 
c) Competitive access to telephone company facilities. 
8B 
d) Conditions under which telephone utilities may compete 
in unregulated markets. 
e) Privacy of telephone subscribers' personal information. 
f) Consequences of activity in the telecommunications 
sector for state and local economic development. 
3.A The commission currently has many procedures through which 
it may examine issues. The "Order Institutuing 
Investigation" <OII) in which we now are involved, 
obviously is one such procedure. It formally began more 
than one and one-half years ago, although the issues it 
examines really took shape and were defined over several 
years prior to the issuing of the OII. And the process 
clearly will continue for some time. 
The OII process, rule making procedures, audits, and the 
complaint processes provide other ways to identify 
potential or actual problems and resolve them. 
Pacific believes the current procedures, such as the OII, 
can and do deal with the full range of issues that are of 
concern to policymakers. 
That is not to say they cannot be improved upon. While some 
procedures may be "adequate" to consider issues, they often 
require more resources and time than would be considered 
reasonable. Pacific believes we should not close the door 
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to new ideas on how to make the current procedures more 
efficient. 
4.Q Does the existing regulatory environment encourage the 
presentation of points of view that represent the interests 
of Californians at large? Should greater participation be 
encouraged? If so, how? 
4.A The Commission's investigation into alternative regulatory 
frameworks provides perhaps the best insights into this 
question. 
The Commission began examining these issues even before 
divestiture of the Bell System was completed. In 1983 and 
1984 the Commission conducted investigation concerning 
competition and regulatory structure. In 1986 in response 
to questions asked by then Commission President, Donald 
Vial, Pacific first proposed modifying the regulatory 
process. Commissioner Vial said the proposal " ... merits 
further consideration." Because of the nature of Pacific's 
proposal, Commissioner Vial said a separate proceeding was 
the appropriate way to assess the proposal.* Pacific's 
current proposal, the California Plan for Rate Stability, 
* The paper distributed by the Utilities and Commerce Committee 
entitled '"Don't Hang Up!": The PUC and Telephone Service in 
the 90's -- Regulation, Deregulation, or Reregulation?' signed 
by Robert Jacobson is in error in its characterization of this 




evolved from that earlier proposal is similar to it, but is 
enhanced from that first proposal. 
On August 11, 1987 the Commission formally commenced its 
investigation into alternatives to cost-of-service 
regulation by issuing its Notice of En Bane Hearing to 
publicly announce its intention to hold hearings. The 
Commission invited 23 participants, representing a wide 
cross section of utilities, competitors, consumer 
representatives and academicians to participate by 
responding to specific questions during the September 24 
and 25 hearings. 
After reviewing the written comments filed by the parties, 
and after listening to the discussions and debate during 
these two days of open hearings, the Commission issued 
Order Instituting Investigation 87-11-033, on November 25, 
1987. In this OII, the Commission set forth a procedural 
framework for considering changes in the regulatory 
framework for LECs, and divided the proceeding into three 
phases: Phase I to examine pricing flexibility for 
services subject to competition; Phase II to look at 
alternative approaches to ratemaking for LECs; and Phase 
III to consider lifting the ban on intraLATA competition 
for toll calls and related services. (Note: Considerable 
competition, both authorized and unauthorized, already 
exists in Pacific's service areas.} 
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To date, the Commission has completed Phase I and has had 
61 days of evidentiary hearings with 43 witnesses 
testifying on behalf of 20 parties of Phase II of this 
OII. In addition, 13 public participation hearings were 
held throughout the State to provide an opportunity for 
members of the general public to express their views 
directly to the Commission. 
These comprehensive proceedings have developed an extensive 
record (literally a stack of papers about 10 feet high) 
upon which the Commission can base its Phase II decision. 
The Commission also has the proceeding in progress on 
enhanced services (A. 88-08-031). And Pacific anticipates 
there will be further action by the Commission on billing 
issues and on Open Network Architecture. 
It is clear that the Commission has gone to great lengths 
to encourage californians with many divergent interests to 
present their views in its proceedings. In addition, many 
groups and individuals send letters to the Commission 
explaining their views. Pacific believes that those who 
want to participate in Commission proceedings have ample 
opportunity to do so, and the record shows they do take 
advantage of those opportunities. 
From this discussion one can easily see that the Commission 
has taken and continues to take comprehensive measures to 
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encourage presentation of various points of view from 
Californians with many different interests. Furthermore, 
many special interest groups also communicated their unique 
perspectives direct to the Commission in letters 
ensuring their voices were heard. Pacific does not believe 
that such an extensive process needs to be expanded still 
further. 
5.Q What would you recommend to the Legislative and the PUC of 
the 1990's as an 
policy? 
approach to telecommunications 
5.A Pacific already has offered a comprehensive, balanced 
proposal to the Commission on this , and it 
probably is not necessary to review that here. We believe 
our California Plan for Rate Stabil does provide an 
appropriate approach to regulation through the 1990s. But 
if after some experience, policymakers believe some further 
changes should be made, a review process is appropriate. 
That's why we proposed such a review in 1992. It would be 
an opportunity to evaluate our initial experience under 
whatever regulatory framework the Commission adopts, and 
fix whatever may not be working. 
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Pacific has proposed holding rates for basic residential 
service at their present level through 1992. The review 
process we have proposed at that time would be the logical 
place to consider any changes in rates that may be needed 
beyond 1992. It also may be reasonable to link any such 
changes to some kind of adjustment factor, such as a price 




California Plan for Rate Stability (CPRS) 
• Enhance services; hold residence basic rates constant. 
Guarantee no increases in basic residential rates through 1992; 
no extra charge for Touchtone fo: residence customers; expand 
local calling areas for both residential and business 
customers. (In Zone Usage Measurement (ZUM) areas combine 
Zones 1 and 2; in non-ZUM areas eliminate toll band 2.) 
• Give all customers -- rural and metropolitan -- access to a 
network which meets the needs of the Information Age. 
By 1992, replace older equipment with digital switches and 
transmission facilities. Perform this replacement program with 
no increase in rates. 
• Gradually move business rates priced below cost toward cost. 
Match the increases toward cost with the annual revenue 
reductions, already authorized, for long distance access. This 
results in no net revenue increase for Pacific. 
• Continue regulation, but make it more streamlined and 
responsive to market demands. 
Replace rate case and associated annual attrition filings with 
incentive-based regulation based upon actual performance that 
will allow Pacific to operate as efficiently as possible. 
Establish downward pricing flexibility for all services now 
priced above cost. Review Plan in 1992. 
• Share profits above a benchmark rate of return. 
Divide equally with customers earnings over a proposed 
benchmark of 12.37%. Pacific commits not to ask for higher 
rates if earnings fall below the benchmark. 
• Continue high-quality service to all customers. 
Provide the same standard of service quality as measured by the 
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The Center for Public Interest Law (CPIL) is a private 
nonprofit academic center. The charter of CPIL is the education 
of students in public interest law, focusing on state regulatory 
law issues. CPIL publishes the California Regulatory Law 
Reporter, an academic quarterly journal detailing the actions of 
the sixty business and trade regulatory agencies in California. 
CPIL has participated extensively in Phases 1 and 2 of the 
instant 85-01-034 proceedings. CPIL' s contributions to both 
phases were adopted by the Commission, including proposed 
policies for the application of curvilinear drivers in attrition 
formulae and the development of a defined policy for prudent cost 
calculation of utility advertising. Intervenor compensation was 
awarded for these and other CPIL contributions. 
The major concern of CPIL expert testimony and cross-
examination concerned the lack of a clear conceptual framework 
guiding prudency cost and "used and useful" rate base standards. 
Most important has been the failure of the utility to gather 
adequate information in categories necessary for the regulator to 
make proper decisions. Information concerning the impact of 
proposed rate,changes and investment decisions on the utilization 
of current fixed plant . committed to monopoly power loop 
facilities was an example of basic information lacking outside of 
the outside plant (OSP) matched pair utilitization percentages 
and central office utilization (COU) measures used by ORA to 
measure lack of utilization for penalty purposes. 
CPIL' s continued examination of the rate process increased 
our concern about the lack of relevant information absolutely 
necessary to enable the regulator to make proper decisions. As 
17B 
the proceedings carried over into the Modernization, Utilization 
and Productivity (MUP) phase--which is the predecessor of the 
immediate pr.oceeding, CPIL increased its participation and 
developed an outline proposal of the information appropriate to 
require in the case of major modernization commitments of a 
regulated utility, either in the monopoly power sector or in 
newly deregulated competitive sectors. That information 
requirement was formalized in a proposal for an "Economic Impact 
Statement" (EIS). It was not the purpose of the proposal to 
require a supplemental proceeding as a prerequisite to major 
modernization, but merely to precede those major commitments 
(which are difficult if not impossible to unwind once made) with 
very basic information from which a regulator could accurately 
judge important consequences central to this Commission's 
purpose. 
During the MUP proceedings, CPIL gathered evidence in major 
document discovery efforts, produced expert testimony, and cross-
examined witnesses. The cross-examination of PacBell experts was 
a particularly important part of this proceeding, since they 
admitted that the information to be required in CPIL's EIS 
-
proposal is in fact important to a proper evaluation of the 
appropriateness of investment decisions. CPIL presented 
substantial evidence that the information in its proposal is 
capable of presentation; is not included in any required form by 
the PUC; is not received by the PUC; and that, lacking such 
information, the Commission operates without knowledge about the 
most critical consequences of substantial modernization 
18B 
investments in the complex economic setting of mixed monopoly 
power/deregulated competition. 
Exhibit A Opening Brief of CP IL in 
that proceeding. That sets forth the legal arguments and 
summarizes and cites evidence adduced by CPIL. Exhibit B 
presents CPIL's Reply Brief filed in that proceeding. Both of 
these exhibits are part of the official record of 85-01-034, as 
is the evidence cited therein. 
On December 22, 1987, the Commission issued Decision 87-12-
067 covering the MUP proceeding. The 339-page opinion decided 
most of the issues before the Commission. However, the extensive 
record laid by CPIL on the issue of modernization was temporarily 
deferred by ALJ Lynn Carew. Exhibit C contains the single page 
of the decis n concerning modernization and addressing the 
proposal of CPIL. Although consideration of the A.D. Little 
Report and the SRI was deferred to the instant Phase 3, 
the decision promises a "separate modernization decision" within 
the next several wee on the issue of modernization, and 
acknowledges that " ... an extensive evidentiary record was 
developed during Phase 2, aimed at issuing a policy-related 
decision to assist in framing the issues for the Phase 3 
modernization review. Pacific Bell, DRA, and CPIL presented 
evidence on these Phase 2 modernization issues, and filed opening 
and reply briefs, containing extensive arguments and analysis" 
(D.87-12-067 at 288). 
As Phase III began, CPIL expressed concern. No decision was 
rendered by the PUC, as the D.87-12-067 indicates was intended. 
CPIL was in a quandary. CPIL is a "soft money" public interest 
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law center required to be self-supporting. PUC intervenor 
compensation, instead of enhancing market value fees with 
"multipliers~, divides those fees where any portion of the 
advocacy is not adopted and attributable to the intervenor. CPIL 
had committed over $200,000 in market value time to two years of 
proceedings and had no result, notwithstanding a contribution it 
believed to be meritorious and necessary to the process. If its 
proposal were to be adopted, it would devote its energy in Phase 
3 herein to its refinement. If it were rejected, such efforts 
would be moot and further exhaust its limited and by now depleted 
resources--a depletion which may jeopardize its future. 
Meanwhile, the PUC embarked upon its related "In the Matter 
of Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers" 
(87-11-033). Many of the questions raised in this initial g_n 
bane proceeding and then in its subsequent Phase 2 before the 
Honorable Administrative Law Judge Charlotte Ford raise the 
identical need for the information advocated by CPIL in MUP. 
CPIL decided to participate in order to buy time while the 
MUP decision was forthcoming and to broaden and amplify its 
. 
proposal. Exhibit D attached hereto includes the January 11, 
1988 testimony by CPIL's Professor Fellmeth. Exhibits E and F 
include the Opening and Reply Testimony, respectively, of 
Professor Fellmeth in that Phase 2 proceeding. Exhibit G 
includes a reprint of a feature article outlining in another form 
the CPIL EIS proposal, as published in the C~lifornia Regulatory 
Law Reporter. 




began, we wrote a letter to the Administrative Law Judges 
involved: Carew 1 Geo Amaroli, Charlotte Ford, 
respectively. H attached 
hereto. CPIL this instant 
proceeding. le ALJ Amaroli was kind enough to 
schedule a on the 
the Honorable ALJ 
attached.) 
As a 
that the instant 





additional informat n 
proffered EIS proposal 
not 
16, 1988. (See Exhibit I 
was agreed hearing 
e the consequences 
ALJ Carew scheduled for 
on the 
87-11-033. CPIL has 
the exhibits and 
ce to support its 
provision 
requirements as icates to major rnization investment 
commitments PacBell. a party, we relied upon that 
decision and did not present the extensive body of evidence and 
analysis in the instant proceedings. Nor were we in a position 
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to litigate for a third time the same point. 
Now we are presented with a comprehensive proposed 
"settlement• which violates the instruction of that hearing and 
which would render moot both the prior and current proceedings of 
the Commission on this subject. We object to the terms of the 
proposed settlement, and request a hearing thereon pursuant to 
Rule 51.5 of the Commission's Rules. 
We have reviewed the Little and SRI reports. They fail to 
21B 
address the issues raised by CPIL' s proposal. 
·fail to see the forest for the trees. 
They generally 
The instant proposed settlement scheduled for conference on 
March 22, 1988 appears to provide the final insult to CPIL before 
the Commission. PacBell and ORA propose to stipulate to 
conditions that avoid gathering the basic information absolutely 
necessary for the Commission to do its job competently. Instead, 
PacBell agrees to pay $36 million in an annual revenue reduction 
in each of four years. This amount is not a significant 
percentage of gross revenues. PacBell agrees to negotiate with 
SRI (a private concern) in an "interactive, nonadversarial 
process" (whatever that means) an "evaluation" of appropriate 
modifications of Pacific's investment decisions in these areas: 
"1) Non-guideline driven investment justifications; 
2) Engineering guideline justification; 
3) Documentation standards and their enforcement; 
4) Training/professional development needs; and 
5) Peer reviews including feedback process." 
Leaving aside the substanceless jargon to which professional . 
consulting firms are addic~ed, this proposed procedure avoids the 
gathering or presentation ~ review of the basic information the 
regulator must have to evaluate a major investment: (1) What is 
its impact on the utilization of current fixed plant in the 
existing monopoly loop upon which ratepayers must rely and which 
is the most fundamental concern of the regulator? ( 2) What is 





history and a 
CPIL argues 
esent the nature of these concerns, their 
information which 
by the regulator. 
The cost-benefit modus operandi the consulting firms 
is here badly misplaced. consu firms can easily advise 
private concerns 
benefits and costs 
of such schemata by a publ 
the marketplace how to measure 
But the substitution 
very different duties 
is inappropriate. 
utilization. 
The systems at sue do not measure 
not measure external costs commonly at 
issue. They do not concern themse s with anticompetitive 
impacts. Since these are 





abuses which led to divestiture and 
lation, their omission from PUC 
ible. 
and easily manipulated-away revenue 
reduction, and the privatization modernization review to a 
conulting firm-
utility obtains a 
11 be thereafter financed by PacBell, the 
check. "There will be no audit or 
follow-up audits of modernization investment decisions which are 
implemented 'by Pacific ..•• " It is unclear to CPIL how a 
government agency can constitutionally enter into a binding 
agreement not to regulate so long as the utility follows the 
instructions of a private concern the utility will thenceforth 
pay. 
Exactly whose idea was this? Who is going to blow the 
whistle when the utility decides to cross-subsidize from the 
monopoly sector into a major competitive investment which meets 
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all cost-benefit criteria--except for the fact that it is a 
predatory effort violative of the principles behind the Robinson-
Patman Act and gratuitously destroys more efficient small 
business entities competing in that sector? Who is going to 
measure the higher rates which must be borne because monopoly 
loop modernization investment expands fixed costs and lowers 
utilization of existing plant? Presumably, we'll ask PacBell to 
renegotiate its contract with SRI and lower their commissions. 
If the PUC wishes to consider seriously this proposed 
settlement, CPIL asks that it be approved without prejudice to 
the EIS proposal of CPIL still pending before ALJ Carew and now 
before the Commission in 87-11-033. A failure to allow for the 
modification of this settlement to require that information and 
its evaluation as a predicate to any modernization investment 
approval would create a procedural problem making the settlement 
and ancillary PUC proceedings subject to court reversal. Two 
separate proceedings now affect the subject area of this proposed 
stipulated agreement. Both are s ti 11 pending. This agreement 
would bind the Commission to terminate or limit both not through 
the mechanism of those proceedings, but through a separate 
proceeding which did not have available to it the evidence and 
advocacy before the other tribunals. Such a posture creates a 
regulator at war with itself, with related proceedings binding 








COMPETITION, AND THE 
REGIONAL BELLS 
A "natural 
subject to maximum rate 
Such a monopoly exists when economies 
of scale for a single 
structure exist across range of 
expected demand for that structure. 2 
Such a structure involves 
initial fixed costs, as a railroad or 
power In other words. there is 
room for only one to operate 
efficiently. It is uneconomic to repeat 
rights of way, tracks, or lines where a 
single system accommodates all of the 
anticipated traffic. 
Maximum rate 
by state public 
cessive prices. and also to assure the 
owners of the monopoly a fair rate of 
return on their investment.l The 
pose of regulation is to 
for the absent marketplace. The ideal 
market-which would allocate 
resources according to const;mer prefer-
ence through purchasing decisions, and 
improve competitive performance 
through the natural selection of the most 
efficient-accomplishes neither function 
where a natural monopoly exists. The 
regulator must somehow set fair prices 
and prescribe conditions of operation to 
satisfy consumer preference and stimu-
late efficiency improvement. 
But what happens when the monopo-
ly enterprise wishes to enter into areas 
where there is competition-where there 
is clearl~ room for more than one 
entrepreneur? What happens when the 
structure of the industry begins to 
change so that the fixed cost structure 
The author IS a tenured al 
the Lnnersttl o( San Dter;o School of 
Ll11 and d1~eC1or the. ~ 
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monopoly 1 competitive sector interaction 
in a host of contexts: com-
panies with (non-regu-
lated) suppliers operating in the competi-
tive sector:s and protection of a natural 
monopoly structure from competition.6 
But no area presents these questions 
more starkly than does the continuing 
technological revolution in telecommuni-
cations. Cable television by 
state and local authorities involves local 
companies often given effective mon-
opoly franchises. with extremely crude 
and scandalously deficient arrangements 
for rate regulation.' Here, a new enter-
prise raises and serious 
natural monopoly in the con-
trol of information distribution, not 
merely as to issues of 
free speech access! but in the ignored 
area of rate review.' 
In our more traditional telephone 
and data commumcation 
are somewhat away 
has been an natural man-
structure. Substitutes some 
serv1ces heretofore to be the 
Utility 
Proposal to Require 
tions 
AT&T and its sub-
are technologically feasible 
from the rights of way and lines 
formed their high fixed cost 
. These advances are still largely 
but they do portend possible 
for America's telecommunica-
The interaction of competitive busi-
ness sectors with our telephone monopo-
ly not new, except historically it has 
occurred abuse from the monopoly 
side into competitive sector rather 
than by competitive challenge to the 
monopoly. AT&T has a long history of 
incursion into the competitive sector 
beyond the scope of its monopoly re-
sponsibility. h has used iu monopoly 
power to eliminate competition in areas 
of non-monopoly enterprise in which it 
was involved.IO For example, consumer 
phone equipment may be manufactured 
by any number of entities, and the activi-
ties of then-AT&.T regional phone sub-
sidiaries in prohibiting connection to 
their loops of equipment except that 
manufactured its own subsidiary or 
affiliated companies have been docu-
mented in antitrust litigation over the 
past two decades. And there are other 
abuses one might expect, given the verity 
of Lord Acton's sage dictum that hpower 
corrupts; absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely." 
There proved to be a check on the 
abuses of AT & T: the Antitrust Division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice." In 
ordering the divestiture of AT&. T and 
the break-up of the Bell operating sys-
tems into separate regional companies. 
Judge Greene in United Stares v. AT&. T 
dramatically reshaped the industry. The 
concept was not complex: structural!~ 
inhibit monopoly power abuse: allo,.. 
competition where new technology 
moots the natural monopoly structure: 
and confine the monopoly to its mini-
mum territory. The brunt of the mon-
opoly power was left with the spin-off 
independent regional Bell companies . 
They control the high fixed cost "loop" 
of of and lines upon which 
for our telephone 
name for the pro-
\iders of this local loop (the Regional 
Bells and other small providers which 
exist outside the previous AT & T suuc-
nne) is "local exchan~e carriers.~ or-in 
the of telecommunications-lECs. 
, with the devolution of these 
lECs. we are left with a new version of 
old questions, except the is 
two-sided. New technology may chal-
lenge these local monopolies, injuring 
the monopoly power strucwre upon 
which essential services still 
And the local Bells are anxious not 
to meet any such challenge, but to 
expand imo areas of eomrqerce clearly 
subject to competition and which do not 
necessarily require any natural mon-
opoly connection. 
Some of the parameters of LEC entry 
into competitive sectors will be set by 
Judge Greene as he refines his U.S. v. 
A T&.T order, but in the long run they 
are likely to depend more substantially 
on re~lation by state public utility com-
missions, which now have what is for 
many of them a newly problem: 
what to do about the proclivities of 
these LECs to use their still-existing 
monopoly power structure for advantage 
in the competitive sector? 
This question is a great deal more 
difficult than the traditional maximum 
rate regulation questions, such as the 
definition and calculation of proper rate 
base, prudent expenditures, anticipated 
revenue. and fair rate of return at a 
sensible debt, equity ratio on invested 
capital. Now we have additional vari-
ables: antitrust concepts and concerns; 
issues of cross-subsidy; protection of the 
monopoly fixed from underutiliza-
tion: and others. 
Moreover. we have regiona.l Bells and 
other lECs singing a consistent song: if 
competitors are going to cha.llenge us, 
let us challemze them. The LECs insist 
that a new day is upon us-that 
their monopoly power system is being 
bypassed by new technological challenge; 
and that COMSAT, microwave relays, 
and private fiber·optic networks are 
skimming the cream off their high-profit 
commercial data and other traffic. The\' 
argue that in this era of -;. 
they should by deregulated as well, and 
should further be allowed "rate flexi~ 
bility"-that is, the right to lower rates 
for specific customers to retain and 
efficient traffic levels where those cus-
tomers are presented with competitive 
alternatives. They want to invest heavily 
in modernization to maintain that same 




compeuuve sector sources. The lECs 
seek latitude to compete.n 
An examination of these issues is 
nrl••ru""' in California as applied 
the regional 
Bell lEC subsidiary of Telesis. 
As part of its initial post-divestiture rate 
review, the California Public Utilities 
Commission to its credit, has 
entertained a separate yearlong phase 
on questions of Pac:Bell's modernization, 
utilization and productivity (MUP)." 
Growing from this proceeding (which is 
still ongoing) is a November 25, 1987 
order of the Commission to consider en 
bane Pac:Bell's request for "pricing 
flexibility" for services subject to com-
petition, and certain other related 
questions. 1' 
The Center for Public Interest Law 
(CPlL) has participated in these hearings 
and has had the opportunity to conduct 
regression studies on the cost and traffic 
features of the Pac:Bell physical plant as 
it is evolving. CPIL has also had the 
opportunity to engage in substantial dis-
covery into PacBell operating documents 
and internal memoranda. CPIL has off-
ered its own hearing testimony and ex-
hibits. and has cross-examined at some 
len~h those experts provided PacBeU. 
These proceedings serve as a useful 
forum to examine the basic regulatory 
issues, precedents, and policy alterna· 
tives applicable to the regional Bell 
companies and other LECs. 
Based on that examination. and on 
the information available from 
which 
CPIL has lnn·nn'l.;~d 
Of Ill 'N't:111li1rM .I::.C,OiliC>mJC 
ment 
ment program. 
.would a clear Structure, con~ 
sonant with sound 
the proper evaluation of 
And iu principles are I:V!I:Ilic:able 
only to modernization 
increase but also 
posed "rate flexibility" 
reductions toward 
without overhead 
proposed for a 
tomers to meet 
PACBELL'S MODERNIZATION 
PLANS AND CRITERIA 
During 1986, PacBell spent some $2 
billion for new construction.•~ Expendi-
tures for both growth and moderniution 
will consume many millions of dollan 
in additional rate base funds. upon 
which a rate of return debt interest 
2 
payments will be assessed from rate-
payers. Over the past decade. much of 
this "modernization" has involved the 
replacement or existing switching facili-
ties with more advanced electronic tech-
nologyY Much of this aspect of 
PacBell's modernization program has 
been eompleted,1• and PacBell now pr<'-
poses to enter into a "market need 
concept," with emphasis on profitabili-
ty." The electronic switchin{! modern1· 
:uti on was justified under a WCUCR IT" 
formula (discussed infra) where direct 
cost advantages in comparison with ex-
isting equipment allegedly justified the 
investment made.20 
The utility now proposes, often under 
the misnomer of "revenue factors,'' to 
advance a modernization program with 
implications far beyond switch upgrad-
ing justified by lower maintenance costs. 
The LECs are now advancing fiber-optic 
tecbnolol)'.2 1 The alteration of baste 
transmission equipment has implications 
beyond a simple .. the maintenance cost 1 
savings pay for this improvement~ kind 
of calculation. More important, the 
LECS are now proposing major ventures 
into areas subject to unregulated com-
petition, from alarm services to modular 
phones to data transmission services.~= 
And the lECs are focusing system 
changes in areas where they believe by-
pass threatens loss of businessn Fur-
ther, they are entering directly into the 
offering of products and services avail-
able from competitive sector sources.2• 
PacBell (as with regional Bell LECs 
generally) has confined modernization 
criteria substantially to the use of its 
CUCRIT formula_ This formula calcu-
llues the net present value of alternative 
technoloSY or equipment stratetztes based 
on discounted cash flows.25 h purports 
to calculate whether or not a .. moderni-
zation" investment is more cost-effective 
than present equipment or alternative 
proposals. The value of such a calcula-
tion is undeniable. 
But PacBell is interested in directinf 
its modernization dforts not mere!~ 
where more efficient equipment can de 
the same task more cheaply. but in area5 
where it can offer new services altogeth· 
er, particularly where competition threat-
ens the lou of existing customers.l6 In 
PacBell testimony during current Pl'C 
rate witnesses consistent)\ 
stressed a to return to market con--
cepts to maintain the ntisfact 1on of 
lon~·term extsunJ.! customers.:• Pac:Bell's 
expert wuness Sullivan contended lh 
PacBel! bad ~~ific &rell ~vulnerab~; 
to compcuuon P&~eBell witness B d 
ler testified thai ~modemiz..a. 1· 0 . an · • n ts the 









PacBell's CUCRIT benefit-cost com-
puter modeL 
The 3'""'"''-a ..... ~ 
severe nr~•hl~·m~ 
that costs are 
powth. In Decision 
mission specifically put the on 
notice thai uncritical 
Msizing drivers~ to 
through and allow more revenue 
on a percentage incre!ISe in new traffic 
or NALs added) a of the 
At the urging of CPil, 
for the first time refused 
assume any straight line •"'"'"""'~mp 
tween net access lines and costs, and 
instead demanded a close 
future nne 
Pacific Bell, 
address in their direct 
relation between their various 
drivers and incremental 
changes. ":!l In other words, if the 
calculates that an lEC needs 
$800 million in revenue to operate in 
1987. the LEC 10% more traffic 
(or 10% more in !988, and the 
next rate proceeding is set for 1990, how 
is the revenue requirement for 1988 
be figured? LECs will propose, in an 
abbreviated "attrition"' that 
rates be set 10 
straight-line siring driver. But if there 
are economies of scale. the unit costs 
should decline with additional traffic 
and costs should be at less 
than S880 million. 
The California Commission hilS 1'-
jected the notion that there is a direct 
correlation between "expanding the cus-
tomer base" or "incre!ISing traffic" and 
total costs. Economies of scale must be 
considered. Regulators should be careful 
not to inferentially readopt, in the con-
text of allowing modernization invest-
ment to protect unit costs, what 
have rejected in the context of tradition-
al monopoly ratemaking. 
CPIL has presented to the PUC four 
threshold sub-tests of utilization which 
should be considered in making a mod-
ernization investment decision. These 
factors are quite beyond the CUCRIT 
considerations of PacBe!J.S6 These four 
tests form the "utilization" element of 
CPIL's proposed EIS and 
should provide the for PacBell 
justification and PUC review of a pro-
posed modernization investment. 
First, the PUC must determine thai 
there is in fact a natural struc-
ture appropriate for If 
Tilt Califomill Regulalory Law ihpmur 








to utilization: that of "indivisibilities."' 
To the extent il finds utiliu-
tion or substantial of scale 
whal extent can 
new investment 
must be 
to the cross-subsidies which 
using 
or services pay 
out-ol-l:l>oc~~:et costs. 
on outside entre-
and the competitive market-
be evaluated. These 
concerns form a part 
"'"IP"'"'' of antitrust law 
monopoly I competitive 
sector interaction hilS given rise to a 
series of restraints of trade by 
and others, which have 
resulted in extensive and court-
ordered divestiture. &I 
As in the area of 
ever, the lECs have been de-
fidem in or gathering the 
mosl basic data needed to 




first. the LEC must measure the 
and cost stnu:wre of 
capitlll 
market and will then evaluate the pres-
ent and potential capable of 
most 
mentality. meas-
in makinj! their 
investment decisions: 
their own internal cost factors. and ex-
ternal factors as they affect 
They ignore the competition. 
They simply fail to recognize that the 
environment is not a benign one which 
is static: on the contrarv. 
will react to the LEC's 'entr\' the 
market. and customers will react to both 
the and the LEC. ln the 
simplest terms. the will im· 
mediately begin to drop their prices to 
best the LEC. The LEC must therefore 
also begin to lower its to stay 
competitive. or offer incentives 
that raise the lEC's cost to retain the 
customer. 
In either case. the cost and revenue 
ligures calculated in the vacuum are no 
longer relevant. A vigorous competitive 
marketplace ensures that this kind of 
move and countermove will continue, as 
each side drops its prices toward its 
long-run marginal costs. Neither side 
can long continue in the market once 
the price drops below its marginal cost. 
However. the lECs simply fail to assess 
their competitors' cost structures to 
determine whether thev have an inherent 
cost ad'l.antage that will necessarily re-
sult in the competitor undercutting the 
lEC.6~ This most basic information that 
every shopkeeper needs before he opens 
his doors-how low can I go and how 
low can the fellow next door go-is 
utterly lacking in one of the largest 
companies in the state. 
In addition to basic com-
petitive data. the must be required 
to calculate cross-subsidies. To the 
extent cross-subsidies mav be involved 
within the lEC in order. to carrv the 
competitive enterprise. they shouid be 
revealed. It is possible that this cross-
subsidv m1v take the form of low utiliza-
tion livels ·of new modernized plant, to 
be carried b\' lower levels of utilization 
and his:her ·averas:e cosu by existing 
ratepayers. If so. the analysis urged 
above as to utilization should reveal 








are in a to commit what 
'll.ould otherwise be antitn.1st violations 
in the These violations 
mav include or anv of the •-••-···•-·-
. of behavior ·traditional where 
an entrepreneur possesses substantial 
market in <me market and in-
trudes another: 
(Sherman Act Section 
man Act Section I. 
3); 
Patman Act, "'"'"":n"" 
and' or unfair extension of M(lnCJPO 
power (Sherman Act Section 
The problems of to a utili-
unbridled discretion as it operates in 
competitive sector U.S. ''· 
A T & T. and occupy a of the 
archives of antitrust abuse. of 
law stretches from the 1922 
, .n1rnnm & N. W. R. R. caseM to the cable 
under 
tion.""' of facts 
in these cases. and thousands of 
lower court progeny. should make any 
regulator cautious about countenancing 
monopoly entry into the 
sector without maximum information 
and at least a modicum of nr•rn,;rw• 
safeguard. 
In addition to monopoly power abuse, 
a natural monopolist intruding into the 
competitive sector raises the same 
!ems as those which exist in the 
regulatory law known as 
tween affiliated enterprises." Problems 
commonly arise where a mon-
opolist buys and sells. not to obtain 
maximum service at optimum cost. but 
in a setting of ancillary interests and 
motive~. PacBell's dealings from mon-
opoly to competitive challenge sector 
include the same imprudence and cross-
subsidy dangers as do dealinl!S with 
affiliated enterprises (which may also be 
directly involved as well). These seen· 
arios traditionally demand cost review 
and impact assessment-'s In fact, the 
most pernicious modernization abuses 
involving negative utilization and com-
petitive impact implications are to 
be cloaked thn::Jul!h affiliated '""l, .. n~n!~es. 
making this analysis and ,.. .. ,,.,,.,,.:al 
vant to the examination 
tion projects of affiliated 
critical of r .... nrrm~ a"'""' .. '"'"' 
pany 
As noted above. the 
monopoly 
not m:mers of 
3 B 
and in communications. anal 
eJtisl 1.\ hich suppor 
w'"'""'"t1 review of the 1m 
outlined above. A case 1 
RCA Commumctzllom. Inc.' 
Franlduner rn iewec 
intrusion int r 
areas is to be presumed f. 
then instructed the Commi>-
sion to evaluate in detail lhe interaction 
between and competition m 
t>euing its 
ln American Comrmtrcial Lines. Inc 
Louisville tJnd I'• ashville Railroad." 
Justice Marshall explored in detail the 
kinds of cos1 comparisons which should 
be evaluated the Commission in deter· 
mining regulatory policies. The issue 
there turned on whether the railroad 
should be allowed to compete agaimt 
water carriers. which are not a natural 
mcmo,oo!\·, in the carrial!e of ore. Re-
lated to the issue of the monopolist ·s 
desire to invest in modernization of the 
sector in order to capture 
now carried another. the 
railroad a in rates to 
allow it to compete. The first area of 
detailed consideration was the "inherent 
of the railroad's mon-
structme seeking entry into the 
area of the barges. Justice Mar· 
shall discussed the ICC's computation 
of both modes' distributed and 
costs per ton, 7o and then 
the history and meaning of the term 
"inherent advantage." 
The entire context of the Amtrican 
Commercial Lines decision-and. in-
deed, the entire body of law in this 
aru-is the fundamental examination 
of buic and full\ dis-
nibuted cosu the monopolisi and 
those with whom the monopolist might 
Yet the behavior of the na-
lECs to dale voids this critical 
line of which has been mandated 
the couns on re1.1ulators. Adoption 
the EIS would ensure that 
the repeatedly demanded 








is a dtminished 
to intimately tn· 
management of the 
viewpomt. It 
the investment is 
as the case~ discussed 
above make dear, th~: regulator has an 
affirm111tive to oversee the competi-
the actions are un-
dertaken. Post hoc decisionmak.ing will 
suffice under a [leneral rubric of 
for the LEC. the 
before the 
u"''""'""" by relued 
a required EIS 
three elements. We note 
data and minimal required 
information in each category may be 
further refinement. But the 
for initial in-
• 
resources as oooo:sed 
sector: ( 4) the cost 
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low-cost efficient regul ion. 
a ive an that would meet these 
would automatical benefit financially 
and product vity. 
B 
two categories 




n phones, to 
revenue 
• 
In 1988, the PUC 
price a limited 
GTE's plan would 
other existing 
II services are: 
Pricing flexibility 
marketplace. Under 
percent annually, but 






respond qui to the 
ncreases would imited 10 
ces at any time, so long as 
If the company increases i overall earnings through pricing 
flexibility, basic service cu would benefit through GTE 
sharing earnings. 
Sharing Earnings With Customers 
Under GTE's plan, the telephone company would channel a portion of its 
earnings directly • When company's annual earnings 
exceed the target set by PUC, half of the additional earnings 
would be paid to basic service cu through a credit on their 
monthly bills. 
Shareholders would ve 
company more effi ently. The 
profits from all regulated 
B 
f as an incentive to run the 
earnings would be based on 
GTE s proposal is good news for the customers. When GTE's increased 
efficiency and new technology leads to higher earnings, customers 
gain a share of those earnings. 
Meanwhile, customers are protected by revenue caps on basic services 
and price increase limits. The telephone company bears the risk for 
new services, but ratepayers share the rewards. 
In the long run, customers win with modern, high quality 
telecommunications service, increased choices of products and 





WRITTEN RESPONSES OF THE DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
TO THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND COMMERCE 
"KEY OF INTEREST TO THE COMMITTEE" 








in the 199 
ANSWER .l: 
indeed are 1 
competition some markets 















goals be pursued 
s ut ity regulation 
the 1990s. The emergence of 
not mask the fact that the vast 
to provided a monopoly 
must continue to promote the 
ace. The emerging 




new in the 
QUESTION z: Traditional rate-of-return regulation ideally 
links rates to ( cost of capital). It is the 
principal method to achieve twin goals of (a) capital 
attraction on reasonable and (b) just and reasonable rates. 
Is a new form of recommended -- or can 
traditional regulation still serve the public 
interest? Please restate (briefly) your position (if any) before 
the Public Util Commission (PUC) in OII 87-11-033 
("Alternative Framework") A.BB-OB-031 ("Enhanced 
Services"). 
B 
ANSWER ~: Traditional rate-of-return regulation has served 
us well over the past several decades. Universal, high-quality 
service has been achieved, and the telecommunications system in 
California is among the finest in the world. However, the world 
has changed in the last several years. Decisions by Judge Greene 
(the breakup of AT&T, lifting of some line-of-business 
restrictions), the FCC (competition for CPE, payphones and inside 
wire; ONA) and the CPUC (high-speed data services competition; 
pricing flexibility for competitive centrex services) have 
fundamentally changed the LEC from a pure monopoly to a mixed 
competitive/monopoly firm. 
ORA believes a modification of the existing regulatory 
framework is necessary in qrder to meet the traditional and 
emerging goals of regulation (discussed above). To this end, ORA 
has proposed the following plan, which would continue to align 
rates with (declining) costs and allow the LEC a fair opportunity 
to earn a reasonable return: 
o Move competitive services into a separate profit center 
o Index monopoly rates to automatically capture all 
expected cost decreases for ratepayers without 
regulatory lag 
o Decrease LEC rates upfront to reflect a fair return 
o Allow limited pricing flexibility to respond to 
competitive markets 
o Share any excess profits with the LEC as an incentive, 







identify and cons 
















QUESTION ~: Does 
the presentation of 
of Californians at 













access to all 




represent the interests 
greater participation be 
representation of 
regulatory environment 
of view, as evidenced 
by over a dozen active parties and several dozen interested 
parties in the Alternative Regulatory Framework Investigation 
(I.87-11-033). Undoubtedly, however, the extensive discovery and 
hearing process that characterize any major proceeding can 
discourage some parties from participating in CPUC proceedings. 
Our intervenor funding program is an important step in 
encouraging representation of varying viewpoints, as is the 
availability of the CPUC's Public Advisor office. DRA has no 
recommendations to offer at this time regarding other measures to 
encourage public participation. 
DRA does note that those parties with the greatest resources 
-- predominantly utilities -- have the ability to present their 
case more effectively than most other parties due to their large 
in-house legal and regulat.ory staffs, access to decision-makers, 
and control of vital information. As the advocate for the 
ratepaying public, DRA must continue to have complete access to 
all utility records and information, as well as adequate staffing 
to analyze data fully and to determine the consequences of moving 
into this new era. 
QUESTION 2: What would you recommend to the Legislature and 
the PUC of the 1990s as an appropriate approach to 
telecommunications policy? 
ANSWER 2: Telecommunications pol must focus on effective 
regulatory oversight as protection for captive ratepayers. In 
some respects, the emerging mixed competitive/monopoly firm 
requires more oversight of financial records, costs, pricing 
policies, and competitive interactions than ever before. The 
opportunities for cross-subsidy and unfair competitive actions 
grow by the day. DRA's proposal for modifying the CPUC's 
approach to telecommunications regulation should not be construed 
as an endorsement of a "trust-me" form of reqt1lation which 
438 
I 
allows the LEC to act as it wishes in this rapidly changing 
environment. Some changes are appropriate to the current 
regulatory system, but the focus on regulatory oversight must not 






























to meet customers' needs have 
, necessitating 
manner goals are 
to 
of 
1990s 1 an goal of 
to ete the removal of 
regulatory constraints on AT&T not apply to other 
inter exchange competitive market for 
interexchange regulatory 
intervention. An interexchange market 
will more of a 
telecommunications infrastructure that best meets the needs of 
Californians. 
There are compelling reasons to seek alternatives to rate-
of-return regulation. It is widely recognized that rate-of-
return regulation was instituted to ensure that ratepayers pay 
reasonable rates and receive adequate supply of monopoly 
services offered by a regulated utility, while providing 
utilities with an opportunity to recover their costs of 
operation, including a fair rate-of-return. Although rate-of-
return regulation has always been difficult to implement, it 
has been justified as a substitute for marketplace competition. 
Conversely, where competition is present, as in the 
interexchange telecommunications markets, rate-of·-return 
regulation or any alternative regulatory framework is not 
necessary to ensure j and reasonable and should be 
eliminated. 
Rate-of-return regulation is also 
because it requires complicated 
to implement 
including 
detailed cost studies and extensive hearing processes -- and is 
necessarily a resource-intensive activity for all parties 
involved. Moreover, rate-of-return regulation is inherently 
inefficient because at best it fails to reward regulated 
businesses for providing more or 
46B 
• 
the worst instance it encourages efficiently and 
inefficiencies 
regulators must devote resources 
Presently, 
time to an 
ongoing and 
through 











so 1 reasons to 
s of investment 
of 
if ever 
to ensure the 
alternatives to 
some areas, and 
environment. 
for consumers and 
their provision 
of non-competitive However, as an interexchange 
carrier, AT&T has concerns which must be addressed under any 
alternative regulatory framework that might be adopted for the 
local exchange carriers. 
First, AT&T needs assurance that 1 be able to obtain 
reasonably priced facilities needed to originate and terminate 
long distance services for its customers. These facilities, 
47B 
which are obtained almost exclusively from the local exchange 
carriers, connect AT&T's offices with its customers' homes and 
offices throughout the State. Only the local exchange carriers 
have these ubiquitous and essential facilities, and the prices 
of these facilities significantly influence the rates for 
services provided by AT&T and other interexchange carriers in 
California. For these reasons, any alternative to rate-of-
return regulation must provide mechanisms to assure that local 
exchange carriers cannot reap monopoly profits through 
excessive rates for the provision of these essential facilities 
to interexchange carriers. In 1985 the California Commission 
adopted a seven year transition plan to bring the prices for 
these facilities more in line with their economic cost. That 
program must be continued, and the prices interexchange 
carriers pay for all access facilities should continue to be 
driven towards cost. 
Second, under any alternative regulatory framework, there 
must assurances that local exchange carriers cannot use 
their control over those essential facil to obtain any 
unfair advantages in their provision of competitive services. 
Because the local exchange carriers continue to provide 
essential facilities under tariff to their competitors it is 
imperative that the prices they charge their competitors are 
s reflected the rates they charge the customers 
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And the interexchange 
allowed to realize 
as they are in 
CPUC (OII 87-11-033) 
cap plan for 
Such an 
1 customers to reap the benefits of 
the companies' efficiency gains through sharing of increased 
earnings or through a so-cal "consumer dividend" 
arrangement. AT&T proposed that the CPUC separate Pacific's 
and GTE-C's services into market of services subject to 
individual price indices each market basket; establish 
effective cost allocation mechanisms and other competitive 
B 
safeguards to ensure against cross-subsidization of competitive 
services; develop realistic productivity adjustment factors; 
and monitor results with periodic reviews of the plan. 
However, AT&T also suggested that such a price-cap plan should 
become effective only after the completion of a combined Phase 
III and Supplemental Rate Design proceeding that would resolve 
the issue of intraLATA competition and establish the 
appropriate revenue requirement and cost-based rate design 
which will constitute the starting point for price caps and 
pricing flexibility. 
Regarding the Enhanced Services proceeding (A.88-08-031), 
AT&T strongly believes that the development and deployment of 
enhanced services will be beneficial to consumers, businesses, 
and the California economy. Although AT&T has not actively 
participated in the Enhanced Services proceeding, AT&T has 
advocated to the FCC that competitive safeguards, such as 
unbundling and cost-based pricing monopoly elements 
required by competitors, be adopted with respect to these 
services. More specifically, the monopoly building block 
components for enhanced services, which are available only from 
local exchange carriers, must be made available to all 
customers through exchange and access service tariffs. 
Further, the building blocks must be made available on equal 
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the CPUC. Similarly the present regulatory 
address issue of the privacy of 
telephone subscriber's personal information . 
The CPUC is considering the issues of 
telecommunications infrastructure improvements,· competitive 
access to telephone company facilities, local exchange carrier 
competition in markets, and impacts of 
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telecommunications sector activities on state and local 
economic development in the alternative Regulatory Frameworks 
and Enhanced Services proceedings. A wide range of interested 
parties representing the local exchange carriers, interexchange 
carriers, consumer groups, individuals, large business users, 
and enhanced service providers are making their views known to 
the CPUC through the regulatory process. Most of these 
interested parties, including AT&T, yearn for a prompt 
resolution of the issues, but it is clear that the CPUC is 
considering the issues in a measured and coordinated fashion. 
Once this proceeding is concluded it should produce more 
streamlined regulatory processes that will better meet the 
needs of todays telecommunications marketplace. 
As reflected in the listing of parties participating in the 
Alternative Regulatory Frameworks and Enhanced Services 
proceedings, the existing regulatory environment ensures that 
anyone can provide input to the regulatory process. 
Californians have numerous vehicles of participation in the 
regulatory process, including: complaints or letters to the 
Commission, Open Forums held by the CPUC Commissioners, public 
witness hearings, working with the Commission's own Public 
Advocates Office, participation in consumer groups such as TURN 
or The Consumer Federation of America, and customer advisory 




upon the time and energy any individual is willing to dedicate 
to the issue, but the process enables even those who work 
during the day or who are confined to their homes to contribute 
to the process. 
In sum, the Commission has taken a forward-looking approach 
to telecommunications policy in California. It has 
methodically moved forward to address needed change in the way 
the telecommunications industry is regulated both for local 
exchange and interexchange or long distance companies. It 
should continue on this path to increased flexible regulation 
in the competitive areas of the telecommunications industry and 




STATEMENT OF P. BOWEN ON BEHALF OF MCI 
CORPORATION 
and Commerce 
June 5, 1989 
MADAME CHAIRWOMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, MY NAME IS STEVE 
BOWEN. I AM A SENIOR ATTORNEY WITH MCI'S REGULATORY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SPECIALIZING IN CASES 
INVOLVING REGULATION OF LOCAL PHONE COMPANIES BEFORE STATE 
UTILITY COMMISSIONS HERE IN CALIFORNIA AND AROUND THE COUNTRY. 
I REPRESENTED MCI IN PHASE 2 OF THE CPUC'S HEARINGS ON. 
ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANIES. 
I AM HERE TODAY TO ADDRESS THE POSED IN CHAIRWOMAN 
MOORE'S LETTER OF 25, 1989, AND TO YOU MCI'S VIEWS ON 
THE PROPER MANNER OF FOR LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE, IN HER MAY 25 LETTER 1 DESCRIBED FOUR OF 
THE TRADITIONAL GOALS OF UTILITY REGULATION, AND ASKED WHETHER 
THOSE WERE STILL APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1990S. THE GOALS 
IDENTIFIED IN THAT LETTER INCLUDED: ASSURING JUST AND 
REASONABLE RATES, PRESERVING THE UTILITY'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT 
CAPITAL AT REASONABLE RATES, PREVENTING MONOPOLY ABUSE AND UNDUE 
DISCRIMINATION, AND ASSURING HIGH QUALITY SERVICE AND ADEQUATE 
FACILITIES. MCI BELIEVES THAT THOSE "TRADITIONAL" GOALS ARE 
APPROPRIATE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO IN THE '90S. BUT, AS 
MCI TOLD THE CPUC IN ITS TESTIMONY IN PHASE 2, THE COMMISSION 
WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE MORE OF ITS ATTENTION AND RESOURCES TO ONE 
OF ITS STATED GOALS -- PREVENTION OF MONOPOLY ABUSE AND 
AVOIDANCE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT BY MONOPOLY LECS -- THAN IT 
HAS IN THE PAST, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, IT ASSURES THAT THE 
OTHER GOALS ARE MET. 
THE UNDERLYING PREMISE OF THE CPUC'S INQUIRY IN PHASE 2 IS THAT 
~EC SERVICES ARE NOW, OR SOON WILL BE, SUBJECT TO COMPETITIVE 
PRESSURES, AND THAT, AS A RESULT, THE LECS HAVE TO BE GIVEN 
GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO ADJUST PRICES FOR THOSE SERVICES TO 
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ADJUST TO THE COMPETITIVE MCI HAS NO QUARREL WITH 
THAT NOTION AND HAS TOLD THE COMMISSION SO. INDEED, MCI HA~ 
MARKETS ARE PREFERABLE TO REGULATION. BUT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT 
COROLLARY TO THAT PRINCIPLE, WHICH MCI FEARS MAY GET LOST IN THE 
SHUFFLE IN PHASE 2. WHILE COMPETITIVE MARKETS, IF THEY TRULY 
EXIST, SHOULD BE GIVEN THE CHANCE TO WORK, REGULATORY AGENCIES 
• 
CANNOT FORGET THAT ONE OF THEIR PURPOSES FOR EXISTENCE IS THE 
PREVENTION OF MONOPOLY ABUSES. SO, MCI WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE 
FIRST INQUIRY WHICH MUST BE MADE, DETERMINING WHETHER ANY 
MONOPOLY'S RATES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY, IS 
WHETHER COMPETITION IN FACT EXISTS. NEXT, ONE NEEDS TO 
DETERMINE HOW EFFECTIVE THAT COMPETITION IS OR CAN BE. IT IS 
• 
NOT ENOUGH TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS A COMPETITOR OR A POTENTIAL 
COMPETITOR FOR SOME OR ALL OF A LEC'S SERVICES. ONE NEEDS TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER THOSE COMPETITORS CAN EFFECTIVELY OPERATE SO 
AS TO CONSTRAIN THE 1 S MARKET POWER. A RELATED INQUIRY 
B 
IS WHETHER THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE IN PLACE WILL ALLOW 
COMPETITION TO DEVELOP. STATED OTHERWISE, ARE THERE ANY ASPECTS 
OF THE REGULATORY SCHEME WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE INCUMBENT 
MONOPOLY PROVIDER TO GIVE ITSELF AN ARTIFICIAL ADVANTAGE OVER 
OTHER POTENTIAL COMPETITORS? IF THERE ARE, THOSE MUST BE 
REMOVED. MCI SUBMITTED A PLAN TO THE CPUC WHICH ADDRESSES THOSE 
KEY QUESTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PLANS SUBMITTED BY THE TWO 
LARGEST LECS IN CALIFORNIA -- PACIFIC BELL AND GTE OF CALIFORNIA 
-- DO NOT. FURTHERMORE, THE ORDER IN WHICH THE CPUC IS TAKING 
UP THESE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS CAUSES MCI A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN. 
LET ME FIRST ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE ORDER OF THE CPUC's· 
INVESTIGATION. THE BASIC PROBLEM MCI HAS WITH THE PROCEDURAL 
APPROACH FOLLOWED SO FAR IS THAT THE COMMISSION IS PUTTING THE 
CART BEFORE THE HORSE. MCI RAISED THESE CONCERNS IN A MOTION 
FILED WITH THE COMMISSION LAST SUMMER. THAT MOTION WAS DENIED 
IN SEPTEMBER. SPECIFICALLY, THE COMMISSION IS CONSIDERING 
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GRANTING PRICING FLEXIBILITY TO THE LECS IN PHASE 2 OF ITS 
INVESTIGATION, BUT IS DEFERRING THE OF LIFTING THE BAN 
ON COMPETITION TO PHASE 3 IT NOT APPEARS THAT PHASE 3 HEARINGS 
MAY NOT CONCLUDE BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF 1990, AND THAT A 
COMMISSION DECISION IN PHASE 3 NOT ISSUE UNTIL LATE 1990. 
IF THE LECS ACTUALLY GET WHAT THEY ARE ASKING FOR IN PHASE 2, 
WHILE MCI, AT&T AND OTHERS ARE STILL LEGALLY SHUT OUT OF THE 
INTRALATA MARKET, THE LECS WILL USE "PRICING FLEXIBILITY" 
TO LOCK UP THE MARKET FOR COMPETITIVE SERVICES. 
THAT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT GOOD FROM MCI'S PERSPECTIVE. EFFECTIVE 
COMPETITIVE MAY NEVER DEVELOP UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS. FROM THE 
CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE THE LECS WILL GAIN FREEDOM 
TO CHANGE PRICES FOR MANY OF THEIR SERVICES WITHOUT INQUIRY INTO 
THEIR EARNINGS BY THE CPUC AND WITHOUT THE CONSTRAINT ON THEIR 
MONOPOLY POWER WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED BY COMPETITORS. 
STATED SIMPLY, THE COMMISSION SHOULD FINISH PHASE 3 BEFORE 
B 
UNLEASHING THE LECS ANY MORE THAN IT ALREADY HAS. ONCE THAT IS 
DONE, BUT NOT BEFORE, THE COMMISSION CAN CONSIDER IMPLEMENTING 
THE VARIOUS PLANS SUBMITTED TO IT FOR "ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORKS." THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF MCI'S PLAN FOR 
REGULATION OF MONOPOLY LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANIES IS THAT THE 
COMMISSION SHOULD DETERMINE WHICH OF THE LECS' SERVICES ARE 
SUBJECT TO COMPETITION AND WHICH ARE NOT, AND WHICH COMPONENTS, 
OR "BUILDING BLOCKS," OF THEIR NETWORKS ARE USED TO PROVIDE 
THOSE SERVICES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT .THE LECS' 
PRIVATE LINE OR TOLL SERVICE COULD BE SUBJECT TO COMPETITION, 
ASSUMING THAT THE CURRENT LEGAL BAN ON COMPETITION WERE LIFTED. 
HOWEVER, IT IS EQUALLY TRUE THAT SOME ASPECTS OF AN END TO END 
PRIVATE LINE OR TOLL SERVICE, SPECIFICALLY, THE "LOCAL LOOP" AND 
CARRIER ACCESS PORTIONS OF THE SERVICE, CAN BE PROVIDED ONLY BY 
THE LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANY. SO THAT IF A CUSTOMER CHOSE MCI, 
RATHER THAN PAC BELL, AS ITS PRIVATE LINE OR TOLL CARRIER, MCI 
WOULD HAVE TO SECURE A PORTION OF THE SERVICE FROM PACIFIC. IN 
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IS A MONOPOLY BOTTLENECK BUILDING BLOCK. 11 IF PACIFIC OR ANY 
OTHER LEC IS PERMITTED TO CHARGE MCI MORE FOR THAT LOOP THAN IT 
WOULD "PAY" ITSELF THEN PACIFIC HAS AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE IN 
COMPETING • 
• 
THE CORNERSTONE OF MCI'S IS THOSE MONOPOLY BOTTLENECK 
"BUILDING BLOCKS" SHOULD FIRST BE IDENTIFIED. NEXT, THE LECS 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THOSE COMPONENTS TO EVERYONE, 
INCLUDING THEMSELVES, AT THE PRICE AND WITH THE SAME TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS. ONCE THAT IS DONE -- AND ONLY AFTER THAT IS 
DONE -- SHOULD THE CONSIDER PRICING FLEXIBILITY OR 
LESSENED REGULATION FOR THE LECS. THIS IS NOT MCI'S PLAN • 
ALONE. INDEED, MANY OF THE PARTIES IN PHASE 2 SUPPORT THIS 
CONCEPT, INCLUDING THE COMMISSION'S OWN DIVISION OF RATEPAYER 
ADVOCATES, BAY AREA TELEPORT, AT&T, AND OTHERS. THE LECS STAND 
VIRTUALLY ALONE IN OPPOSING THE NOTION OF "UNBUNDLING" MONOPOLY 
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SERVICES AS A CONDITION FOR PRICING FLEXIBILITY. 
ONE OF THE PLANS NOW BEFORE THE COMMISSION -- PACIFIC BELL'S 
"CALIFORNIA PLAN FOR RATE STABILITY" -- HAS RECEIVED MORE 
PUBLICITY THAN ANY OTHER. I'D LIKE TO SPEND A FEW MINUTES 
DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS THAT MCI SEES WITH CPRS. AS I SAID 
EARLIER, MCI OPPOSES ANY MOVE TO GRANT MORE PRICING FLEXIBILITY 
TO LECS AT THIS POINT. BUT THERE ARE ALSO SOME PARTICULAR 
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN CPRS. FIRST, PACIFIC SAYS THAT CPRS WILL 
REDUCE SUBSIDIES. IN FACT, IT DOES NOT. THE SUPPLIERS OF THE 
LARGEST SUBSIDIES ARE PACIFIC'S INTEREXCHANGE CARRIER 
CUSTOMERS. CPRS CONTAINS NO PROPOSAL TO REDUCE CARRIER ACCESS 
CHARGES, AND DOES NOTHING TO REDUCE THE SUBSIDIES NOW BEING PAID 
BY IXCS. FURTHERMORE, CPRS ACTUALLY INCREASES THE SUBSIDY NOW 
FLOWING TO ONE CLASS OF CUSTOMERS -- RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYERS. 
WHILE MCI SUPPORTS THE MAINTENANCE OF AFFORDABLE LOCAL EXCHANGE 
RATES, AND DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT RESIDENTIAL PRICES BE 
61B 
INCREASED, IT DOES THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF 
PRICES WHICH ARE 
BELOW COST, AS CPRS DOES. CPRS ALSO CONTAINS A 11 SHARING" 
MECHANISM, IN WHICH PACIFIC WOULD SPLIT EARNINGS 50/50 
WITH ITS RATEPAYERS. BUT PACIFIC SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES ONE SET 
OF RATEPAYERS FROM THESE SHARINGS -- ITS INTEREXCHANGE CARRIER 
CUSTOMERS THIS IS BLATANTLY UNFAIR, SINCE ACCESS CUSTOMERS 
NOW PROVIDE THE IDY IT'S ALSO ANTI-COMPETITIVE, 
SINCE PACIFIC WOULD CONTINUE TO COLLECT CARRIER ACCESS 
CHARGES, WHILE REDUCING THE PRICES FOR THE SERVICES FOR WHICH 
INTEREXCHANGE CARRIERS MIGHT SOME DAY COMPETE FINALLY, CPRS 
WOULD EXCUSE PACIFIC FROM ANY COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWS OF ITS 
EARNINGS BETWEEN NOW AND 1992. THERE IS NO REASON TO 
BELIEVE THAT PACIFIC'S WILL NOT CONTINUE TO DECLINE OVER 
THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS, AS THEY HAVE DONE OVER THE RECENT PAST. 
REMOVAL OF THE RATE CASE AND ATTRITION MECHANISMS WOULD DEPRIVE 
ALL OF PACIFIC'S OF THE FULL BENEFITS OF THOSE FUTURE 
B 
COST REDUCTIONS. 
TO RECAP MCI'S VIEWS: 
THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT IMPLEMENT ANY PRICING 
FLEXIBILITY FOR LECS UNTIL IT LIFTS THE CURRENT BAN ON 
COMPETITION. 
UNBUNDLING OF THE MONOPOLY BOTTLENECK "BUILDING BLOCKS" OF 
LEC SERVICES, AND REQUIRING THAT ALL CUSTOMERS, INCLUDING 
LECS, PAY THE SAME CHARGE FOR THOSE "BUILDING BLOCKS" SHOULD 
HAPPEN BEFORE ANY FURTHER PRICING FLEXIBILITY IS PERMITTED 
FOR LECS. 
-- PACIFIC BELL'S CPRS SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
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""'""""""""""""""~"'""""=evidence as the 
Chairwoman Moore and Members of the Committee, I am John 
Ayers, President of Bay Area Teleport (BAT). BAT is a private 
provider of high-speed digital network services to business and 
government. Our network connects eleven counties in Northern 
California, including the cities of San Francisco, Oakland, San 
Jose, Sacramento, Santa Rosa and surrounding communities. BAT is 
headquartered in Alameda. 
Because BAT has, since it began operations in 1986, taken an 
activist role in the shaping of public policy -- both at the 
California Public Utilities Commission and in the Legislature -- I 
appreciated your Committee's invitation to come to Sacramento and 
comment on emerging issues facing policy makers in the area of 
telecommunications regulation. 
My purpose today is neither to criticize the Commission nor 
any other telephone company. Many of the processes that are in 
place -- and the shortcomings and benefits of those processes --
are the result of decades of historical precedent. But the 
Legislature can take affirmative steps to recognize some of these 
structural shortcomings. The Legislature must continue providing 
the leadership for telecommunications pol for the 1990s and 
beyond. 
What I offer the perspective of one entrepreneurial 
company attempting to compete in a highly charged marketplace. 
BAT is but one of several metropolitan-area providers now 
operating throughout the U.S. This trend suggests not only a 
marketplace willing to buy new telecommunications technologies and 
offerings, but a sufficient amount of private capital currently 
being directed into the development of private networks to augment 
and benefit from a high-quality public switched network. This 
investment of private capital flow should be encouraged by policy 
makers -- it will be discouraged if the risks of investment are 
deemed unacceptable due to policies which give undue advantage to 
monopoly providers. 
I am happy to report that the companies providing competitive 
local services are quickly becoming organized: I am a member of 
the board of directors of the Association for Local 
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We ieve the Legislature should immediately to insulate 
Commission decisions from non-record or informal influences by 
requiring that each finding of fact be based upon substantial 
evidence in the record. This will greatly reduce the risk of 
careless or arbitrary decision making, and should do much to 
restore confidence in Commission decisions. 
Conclusion 
The safeguards proposed by BAT are the "alternative 
regulatory frameworks" OII are essential for safeguarding 
competition and consumer welfare. BAT also urges the Legislature 
to enact SB 1125 and AB 338 (with the amendments discussed above). 
The Legislature should continue its monitoring to ensure that the 
Public Utilities Commission enacts the proposed safeguards before 
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EXCHANGE MONOPOLY. WHILE COMPETITION MAY HAVE EMERGED 
IN MANUFACTURING AND IN LONG DISTANCE SERVICES~ NO SUCH 
COMPETITION EMERGED WI RESPECT EXCHANGE 
SERVICES~ THE RATIONALE FOR ION OF REGULATORY 
CONTROLS AND OVERSIGHT THAT APPLIES LONG DISTANCE 
SERVICES AND MANUFACTURING F NDS SUPPORT WITH RESPECT 
TO LOCAL EXCHANGE SERVICES. IN THE EFFORTS OF THE 
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SHOULD INCREASED REGULATORY SCRUTI NOT LESS. 
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AND PRELIMINARY 
This br ef is fil on f API Alarm 
Systems (API) wh ch rt extensively in 
this ng as an in teres party. API provides 
burglar rm services in portions of Southern 
Cali rn is a r customer both Pacific Bell 
(Pacific) GTE California (GTEC); it will be 
substantially affected decision the Commission 
may reach in s proceeding as to alternative 
regulatory frameworks to ch those two telephone 
Because API has examined companies 11 be subject. 
careful the alternat regulatory framework 
proposals of Pacific, the Division of 
Ratepayer tes (ORA) I is brief 11 discuss 
API's views as to each. 
Additionally, API has identified several 
issues, such as these companies' tariff liability 
limitations and complaint and advice letter procedures, 
which may be impacted by the Commission's adoption of 
any particular alternative framework proposal; they are 
discussed separately in this brief. As a preliminary 
observ~tion, API wou note its support for any changes 
in the regulatory process which are necessary and in 
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a general princ e 
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ified in some of 
; API does not, as 
any other 
and in the public 
As a threshold matter, API does submit that 
only one alternative framework plan be adopted and 
applied to the intrastate rat both Pacific 
and GTEC. This conclusion arises because these 
companies are the two rgest telecommunications 
utilities in the state companies have 
I 
Any att to accurate ct costs of such 
serv in a two environment ial 
difficul r ies like API -- and this difficulty 
wou only r serv which are jointly 
provided between Pacific and GTEC. Differences in the 
treatment of basic network connections ("Basic Service 
Elements") as pr by these two companies would 
similar generate tantial customer confusion and 
hamper accurate forecasts of telecommunications costs 
and quantities that shou be ordered to provide 
enhanced services to the publ Although each 
company's plan has problems, including some of the 
areas mentioned and discussed in greater detail, infra, 
the imposition of one for these two companies will 
at least avoid creation of additional 
administrative diff ties companies like API. 
s brief rst discuss problems 
presented by GTEC s plan; it 
Pacific's and DRA' s proposals. 
will then discuss 
Finally, this brief 
will discuss issues which API believes are common to 
both proposals, and concluding recommendations of 
API. References to the transcript of the proceedings 
in this case will made by indicating the appropriate 
Volume ( "V"), followed by the letters "TR 11 and the 
appropriate ination Reference to exhibits 
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introduced into evidence in s proceeding will be 
made by the abbreviation "Ex." followed by the 
appropriate number. Reference to the interested 
parties in the proceeding will be made in the manner in 
which they appeared. 
I. GTEC's Plan 
GTEC's witnesses, McCallion and Williams, 
submitted testimony describing the broad parameters of 
GTEC 's plan for an alternative regulatory framework, 
and the changes in the Commission's tariff process 
which are necessary to implement that framework. 
Broadly speaking, and as set forth in Mr. McCallion's 
direct testimony, (Ex. A-56), GTEC's plan is predicated 
upon the division of its presently regulated service 
into two categories. Se ces ject to price 
constraints and rate "rebalancing" 11 be placed into 
Category 1 and would be subject to price changes based 
upon an index proposed by GTEC. Services allegedly 
subject to competition and/or considered to be 
discretionary would be placed in Category 2, and would 
be subject to upward and downward flexible pricing, 
including annual price increases of up to 10%. (Ex. A-
56, p. 6). Earnings above a pre-determined benchmark 
rate of return would be shared with Category 1 
ratepayers. (Ex. A-56, p. 17). The benchmark rate of 
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return wou revi eve two s (Id.) and the 
current rate case proce wou nated Charges 
for flexibly i Cat 2 services would be 
subject to cha on ten days not If based upon 
Advice Letter fili Id. pp. 12-14). 
GTEC 11 outlined GTEC' s plan 
to reba l' rates on an annual basis (Ex. 
A-73, p. 6) ri GTEC's plan to offer 
"information age" services Id at p. 15). API has 
ex ami ned GTEC' s cross-examined its witnesses 
in this proceeding. API significant concerns that 
the plan as a whole is not cost effective, and that the 
plan would particu r unfair for certain 
"Category 2" users like API be subjected to 
revenue maximiz rat r cost based, pricing. 
These concerns are res in order. 
GTEC Has Not Demonstrated 
That Its Plan Is Cost Effective 
The evidence in the record indicates that 
GTEC's plan assumes an increase in the overall rate of 
return from 11.13% to 12.42% to be used as a benchmark 
return. GTEC has quantified the revenue requirement 
value associated with a change in the rate of return as 
approximately $515, 000 per basis point. (See, V. 35, 
TR 4 0 4 0 ; Ex • A-9 2 ) . Thus, the upward move requested 
B 
for GTEC's overall rate of return alone would represent 
approximately $65 million in increased revenue 
requirement. Accordingly, given the magnitude of the 
requested revenue requirement change and the effect 
that it would have on rates in the traditional rate-
setting process, the Commission should justifiably 
question what ratepayer benefics attend the 129 basis 
point increase requested for GTEC's rate of return. 
The record does not support a conclusion that 
GTEC's proposal passes such a cost/benefit test, 
however. For instance, the evidence produced by GTEC 
as to its financial performance under the plan was 
anecdotal, at best. GTEC' s witness Williams includeC: 
the results of a model detailing expected rates under 
its plan (Ex. A-73, p. 12), which was the only 
prof erred evidence as to GTEC • s performance under the 
plan. (V. 22, TR 2395). The record discloses, 
however, that the results of GTEC's "model" are not 
capable of demonstrating customer benefits under the 
plan. Specifically, on cross-examination Mr. Williams 
admitted that the model assumed expense reductions 
unsupported by any factual basis. Mr. Williams had "no 
facts to confirm that these expense reductions are 
accurate" (V. 34, TR 3964). Indeed, Mr. Williams 
testified that he did not know whether the cost savings 
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he had ass 
an incentive 
in h s l cou 
(V. 34, TR 3962). 
achieved without 
While GTEC's failure to substantiate the 
"benefits" tter in the cost/benefit equation 
presented by its plan is reason for concern, API 
submits that the plan's departure from cost-based 
pricing for GTEC's monopoly services are serious 
defects indeed. In this regard, GTEC's witness 
McCallion admitted that, other than GTEC's proposed 
index, nothing would prevent basic rates from 
increasing beyond costs under its plan (V. 19, TR 1930-
31); and as will be discussed in greater detail, infra, 
GTEC's proposal to engage in upward flexible pricing of 
up to 10% annual , for certain monopoly services such 
as low private line, certainly represents a 
departure from cost-based pricing for services not 
subject to competition in GTEC's territory. 
API discusses the portions of GTEC's proposal 
having more immediate impact upon it below (the 
treatment of Category 2 services); nonetheless, the 
underpinnings to support GTEC's request for an 
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increased rate of return under the plan appear unsound 
in the first instance. As Mr. Williams testified, the 
expected savings to be produced under the plan are not 
based upon fact, but upon Mr. Williams'"best shot" (V. 
34, TR 3964). Indeed, GTEC could point to no specific 
methodologies or practices that it would change under 
incentive regulation. API's concerns about GTEC's 
failure to better quantify the "benefits" of the 
ccst/benefit equation presented by GTEC's plan, is only 
heightened by the numerous defects contained in GTEC's 
proposed implementation of Category 2 services, as 
discussed below. 
GTEC's Improper Treatment 
Of Category 2 Services 
As previously mentioned, GTEC • s plan seeks 
considerable pricing flexibility for so-called Category 
2 services. Of particular concern to API is GTEC' s 
proposal to include analog private line services as a 
Category 2 service, although API is also concerned that 
as the network evolves into a more information oriented 
context, GTEC's plan will financially punish companies 
like API who purchase future, network access services 
from GTEC. 
A threshold observation about GTEC's proposal 
to include services within Catego 2, based upon their 
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characteriza ion as t t or discretiona , is 
the a itra nato manner in which GTEC 
has i these init For example, even 
though GTEC p to i I low speed 
private line service within s category, GTEC's 
witness, lion, stat that he not conduct 
services were ject to titian, nor did he know 
if his company had studies (V. 27, TR 
2977}. s r not conducted studies to 
determine if e same ser ces were considered to be 
discretionary a rm companies or ir patrons. 
Id. Indeed, even Pacific's witness, Dr. Hausman, 
indica ted that services are rized under 
GTEC's pr lema i (V. 14, TR 1290). 
Given th s approach to 
ensuring t GTEC s service classifications are 
consistent with its own standards, (API doubts the 
validity of GTEC' s 11 discretionary" criterion) ,!:..J it is 
!:..J For instance, in the case of alarm grade private 
line services, API's witness, W.K. Edwards testified 
that alarm grade private service is neither competitive 
nor 11 discretionary" within GTEC's territory. He 
demonstrated that such services are not available from 
vendors other than GTEC within GTEC's territory and 
that high grade alarm service, only available through 
private line service, would not be considered 
11 discretionary" by customers either required by law or 
practical circumstances, to purchase this high grade 
alarm protection. (See, Ex. A-96, pp. 7-8). 
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not surprising that GTEC proposes no review mechanism 
for its plan to ensure that its serv sifications 
continue to meet its own est ished criteria. (V. 35, 
TR 4053). GTEC' s apparent intention to engage in the 
discriminatory classification of Category 1/Category 2 
services at the outset, however, is apparent. In this 
regard, Mr. McCallion testified that Centrex (a service 
provided by GTEC which is competitive) loops would be 
classified as a Category 1 service, while the related 
features would be categorized at Category 2. He 
testified, however, that private line loops would be 
classified as Category 2 (V. 27, TR 2988) .. Even GTEC's 
witness, Williams, disagreed with this proposed 
treatment as inconsistent with his own philosophy of 
categorizing these services. (V. 34, TR 3992). Thus, 
GTEC' s own testimony demonstrated that its Category 2 
classification scheme is not arbitra I but is 
slated for an application that is discriminatory. 
The financial impacts of GTEC's proposed 
treatment of Category 2 customers are equally 
disturbing. Generally, customers subject to GTEC's 
Category 2 pricing would be subjected to annual rate 
increases of up to 10% (compounded) without regard to 
cost, without any substantive review by this Commission 
and simply based upon marketing and revenue maximizing 
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consi rations 




API submits that 
rejected by this 
e insi t into GTEC's corporate 
pricing i r these Cat 2 services was 
provided its tness, Mr. McCallion. When he was 
asked if an overall revenue or price cap would be 
appropriate for Cat ry 2 services, he rejected that 
suggestion because "it would limit management's 
discretion to maximize revenues 11 • ( v. 2 7 I TR 2 9 9 4 ) • 
Although Mr. McCallion's explanation of how the 10% 
amount was selected by GTEC as the approp~iate annual 
rate inflator was equally candid, it was decidedly less 
scientific: "Ten 
number for that. 
study, but rat r 
need to put a 
2381). 
percent seemed to be a reasonable 
It is not upon a detailed 
it is based basically just a 
r with the ceiling." (V. 22, TR 
API submits that the Commission should be 
rightfully disturbed about putting such a tool in the 
hands of GTEC against this background. 
Telecommunications intensive companies like API are 
extremely sensitive to price changes in the network 
services upon which they rely. API's ongoing presence 
before this Corri.mission in rate cases and other cases 
related to both Pacific and GTEC is evidence of that 
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fact. That dependence promises to become more critical 
as GTEC's monopoly network evolves to support more 
sophisticated network information age services and as 
GTEC moves into the com~etitive provision of those 
services itself, (see, ~~ V. 26, TR 2956). Given 
the fact that GTEC's 10\ annual increases could 
compound indefinitely into the future under its plan 
(V. 27, TR 2995, 2499), its ability to impose such 
large rate increases over a relatively short period of 
time could easily manipulate the demand for certain 
network services within markets in which GTEC also acts 
as an unregulated competitor. GTEC's indication that 
it may increase private line rates based upon 
"strategic pricing" considerations (V. 35, TR 4049-50) 
underscores that concern. Indeed, as if to erase any 
doubt as to the unfettered discretion that GTEC intends 
to ar raga te to itself for Category 2 service pricing, 
Mr. Williams characterized the Commission's review of 
Category 2 advice letter filings as "clerical" (V. 27, 
TR 3094); he did, however, indicate that GTEC might 
furnish cost support for 'politically' sensitive 
private line increases (V. 35, TR 4049). API wonders 
if the Commission and the regulated process would be 
better off by regulation based upon political contests. 
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As previously ment 
of concern to API centers 
, an additional area 
GTEC' s plan to offer 
enhanced services ring the life of its plan (V. 26, 
TR 2956), and the manner in which network access will 
be offered to r enhanced service providers. The 
record demonstrates t, as Mr. McCallion testified, a 
prime objective of GTEC s network deployment under its 
plan will be its abili to offer enhanced services (V. 
27, TR 2968); he also testified that its offering of 
alarm services is "a possibility" (V. 27, TR 2970). He 
further indicated that GTEC plans to account for 
enhanced services "above the line" (V. 27, ~R 2971-72) 
and that information age network access (Basic Service 
Elements) would be offered by GTEC as a Category 2 
service (V. 23, TR 2518). 
API tness, Mr. O'Brien, pointed out the 
necessity of deploying ONA-type services within GTEC's 
terri tory, and API indeed supports the evolution of 
GTEC' s network to support more "information age" or 
enhanced service offerings. (Ex. A-97, pp. 10-11). 
Unfortunately, GTEC's proposal to include 
enhanced services as "above the line" items for 
ratemaking purposes, and its proposal to include ONA-
type services such as Basic Service Elements in its 
Category 2 services, threatens to scuttle whatever pro-
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competitive benefits GTEC's plan might otherwise offer 
in this regard. As the Commiss is aware, under 
conventional ratemaking methodology costs not borne by 
one service are likely to be borne by another. 
Pacific's witness, Mr. George Schmitt, essentially 
agreed with this proposition when presented with the 
hypothetical example of Pacific's entry into the 
burglar and fire alarm business in a manner which lost 
money. (V. 7, TR 316). 
Since API believes that losses in GTEC's non-
regulated, enhanced service operations are inevitable 
-- at least in the short-term -- GTEC' s proposal to 
include these operations as above the line items will 
unfairly burden GTEC's regulated ratepayers with losses 
in competitive markets. API submits that a more 
appropriate way to deal with these services in the 
competitive information age environment would consist 
of ensuring correct cost allocation between GTEC's 
competitive and monopoly services, and allowing GTEC 
stockholders to enjoy the profits or bear the losses, 
as the case may be. 
GTEC' s proposal to price ONA type services 
such as Basic Service Elements (BSEs) as a Category 2 
service -- subject to almost no meaningful oversight by 
the Commission -- is bad for the same reason. As Mr. 
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O'Brien pointed out, r instance, ONA services 
required to fer Bell constitute a 
As a final note on 's plan, API is 
constrained to point out that this Commission has 
recently found that GTEC has been unable to correctly 
bill API for private line services; in its Decision, 
the Commission noted many problems with GTEC's billing 
for these services and with its application and 
interpretation of its tariffs. See, Decision 88-12-036 
mailed December 12, 1988, pp. 64-75 (API Alarms Systems 
v. General Telephone Company of California). Given 
GTEC • s proposal to flexibly price a large number of 
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services, including new services which have not yet 
even been introduced, API believes that GTEC's advice 
letter filings will occur with greater frequency in a 
new environment -- a development which will undoubtedly 
further complicate GTEC' s billing system. API doubts 
that GTEC' s billing system will be able to cope with 
these added pressures, given its inability to correctly 
bill for private line services now. API thus 
recommends that if the Commission approves any flexible 
pricing for GTEC, it require demonstrable proof that 
GTEC has eliminated the ·problems in its billing system. 
II. Pacific Bell's California 
Plan For Rate Stability (CPRS) 
Pacific's CPRS proposal was generally 
summarized by its witness George F. Schmitt. The CPRS 
plan presented by Mr. Schmitt would freeze residential 
rates at their current levels rough 1992, would 
eliminate Touchtone charges for res customers 
and expand local calling areas; it would raise analog 
private line rates and rates for r business 
services between the plan's inception and 1992; it 
would establish the sharing of earnings between 
ratepayers and the company for earnings above a 
predetermined benchmark; it would introduce pricing 
flexibility for certain services; and it would replace 
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the current rate case and attrition process with 
regulatory monitor nal , CPRS would allegedly 
result in a more i rmat se ces oriented network 
based investments Pacific says that it will make 
under CPRS. ~·.9.·, Ex. A-1, pp. 11-21, and 
Attachment A) 
API submits that CPRS fers from the same 
drawbacks as GTEC 's proposal on the question of 
1 passes muster under a cost/benefit whether the pr 
analysis. And although Pacific's CPRS does not contain 
the same potential for the upwa flexible pricing of 
monopoly (~._g_., low speed private line) customers, it 
nonetheless proposes unjustified rate increases for 
business customers and is vague and/or 
overreaching in its 1 to flexibly price and 
account for enhanced services and network access for 
those services. Pacif c's i re to justify its plan 
from a cost/benefit prospective, and the shortcomings 
of its plan vis a vis business and so-called 
information-age services, will be discussed in order. 
The Absence Of Evidence To Justif The Plan 
From A Cost Benefit Anal s1s 
Since Pacific • s plan is pinioned upon the 
elimination of the rate case and attrition process, 
coupled with an increase in its overall rate of return 
B 
for benchmark measurement purposes, API submits that 
the Company's plan should have demonstrable benefits to 
the ratepayers which justify the related costs of 
implementing the plan. Those benefits are missing in 
this record, and the Commission should not buy into 
Pacific's plan without first seeing those benefits. 
For instance, a key element of Pacific's 
proposal hinges upon a request to raise its rate of 
return for the CPRS environment, above which earnings 
will be shared between the company and its 
ratepayers. This return is approximately 150 
percentage points higher for 
Pacific's currently authorized 















approximately 103 basis points higher than its existing 
return. (Compare V. 10, TR 715-718 and V. 64, TR 
8051). And although Pacific's equity cost witness Dr. 
Vander Weide testified that the incremental equity cost 
of CPRS was 50 basis points (V. 62, TR 7779-81) (as 
opposed to the difference between Pacific's currently 
authorized rate of return and the return level 
requested in this proceeding} it is nonetheless clear 





The Commission should thus ask, what are the 
benefits r is cost, given that Pacific's 
proposed freeze on s c rates is occurring during the 
perio~ in which its costs are declining rapidly. 
~·.9_·' Dr. Harris' responses to cross-examination 
questions on this subject. V. 8 , TR 3 91-9 2 , 411 ) . A 
logical answer to this tion and one would expect 
Pacific to have provided, would be that added 
incentives in pr tivity improvements under CPRS 
would p sa vi s for the 
outstrip those to realized 
The record s not support 
Pacific's behalf, however. 
For instance, 
Pacific's witness Schmitt 
ratepayers that would 
under the status ~· 
such an inference on 
ing cross examined, 
not ink of any cost 
savings programs that would be instituted under 
incentive rate maki that would not otherwise be 
instituted (V. 10, TR 614). Nor was proof supplied 
anywhere by Pacific that ratepayers subject to sharing 
would benefit more, in terms of rates, under the 
plan. When Mr. Schmitt was questioned as to whether 
the plan should be tracked from a business as usual 
perspective so that such a cost/benefit analysis could 
be per formed in 199 2 or 199 3, he replied: "I can't 
think of any reason why you would want to." (V. 10, TR 
682-83). 
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Indeed, Pacific's failure of proof in this 
regard permeated its showing. It failed to examine its 
cost of capital or capital requirements during the CPRS 
environment (V. 64, TR 8049), it failed to produce on 
the record any studies as to the economics of CPRS and 
its effect on the cash flows of the company {V. 64, TR 
8053-55) and it failed to consider the capital cost 
effects of modifications that the Commission might make 
to the plan, such as those proposed by ORA and/or GTEC 
(V. 62, TR 7781-83). (Also see Mr. Schmitt's testimony 
that no studies were made to predict the financial 
performance of the company under the plan; V. 7, TR 
251-252' 618). Against this background, API submits 
that Pacific has failed to demonstrate that CPRS passes 
muster under a cost/benefit analysis. 
CPRS Proposes Unfair Treatment 
For Business Services And Open Network 
Architecture-Related Services 
API believes that CPRS presents a 
particularly one-sided proposition for business service 
users, which include API, by singling them out for 
large, unjustified rate increases. For example, the 
record clearly demonstrates that Pacific has targeted a 
number of business services for rate increases that, 
during the life of the plan, would range from over 100% 




was presented with Pacific's quantification of proposed 
business service increases ri li of plan 
(Ex. A-6) a was ask to late the range of 
increases as a percen Exhibit and Dr. Harris' 
answers show that Pacific's plans are to increase 
business service connect an amount exceeding 
100%; to increase PBX trunks by over 100% to increase 
answering line service approximate 400%; to 
increase TAS service by over 1,000%; to increase 3002-C 
bridged alarm service rates by between 600% to 700%; 
and to increase 3002-C ivate line rcuit mileage by 
approximately 1500% (Ex. A-6; V. 9, TR 520, 548-553; 
556-7). It is noteworthy that Pacific's own witness, 
Dr. Barris, characteriz these increases as "bordering 




r these bus 
more aptly 
customers, Pacific's 
characterized as the 
"California Plan for Rate Shock." Aside from the 
turmoil that such large rate increases will undoubtedly 
cause for network dependent companies such as API, 
CPRS's apparent dependence on these rate increases is 
particularly significant in light of the protracted 
litigation that will be spawned in the supplemental 
rate design phase (SRD) of this case as a result. The 
spectre of such a protracted rate design proceeding was 
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noted by API's witness, Mr. Edwards, who explained 
API's view that 3002-C private line service is already 
priced at its cost, given substantial increases 
recently authorized by the Commission for Pacific in 
Application 85-01-034. (Ex. A-96, p. 5) Mr. Edwards 
further noted that these proposed increases proposed by 
Pacific will likely mire the commission in protracted 
rate design hearings in this case, given the absence of 
a finding for service costs in Pacific's most recent 
rate design decision. (Id.) API believes that these 
large increases are particularly unfair, when the rest 
of Pacific's CPRS proposal pointedly avoids looking at 
costs. Indeed, if the success of CPRS is predicated 
upon these increases, then its plan seems destined for 
failure -- Pacific's existing cost studies will simply 
not support these increases -- at least for the private 
line category. 
Pacific's Proposed Treatment For The Regulatory 
Treatment Of Enhanced Services And Related Access 
Should Be Rejected 
The record in this proceeding is replete with 
references to the fact that the key objective of CPRS 
is to make information age services more widely 
available to Pacific Bell customers. The elimination 
of charges for Touchtone service offered by Pacific, 
together with planned network upgrades, are certainly 
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steps in that direction The recorc also reflects 
Pacific'$ intention offer enhanced services on a 
detarift basis (V • 7, TR 314) and to provide 
unbundl Open Network Ar itecture (ONA) services 
consistent with its plan filed with the Federal 
Communications com..11i s s ion r that purpose. (V. 7, TR 
317-318i Ex A-97, pp. 6-7), API submits that two 
elernent.a of fie's proposal in this area should be 
rejected by the Commission: Detariffed, competitively 
provided enhanced services offer by Pacific should 
not be pl "above t line" for rate making 
purposes, and Pacific shou not be allowed engage 
in the flexible prici of ONA services. 
As API witness Mr. 0 Brien testified, the 
central purpose ONA is to ide a "level playing 
field~* tween Bell Operating Companies' enhanced 
services operations (such as Pacific's) and the Bell 
Operating Companies' competitors, who also also offer 
these unregulated services. (Ex. A-97, pp. 8-9). As 
Mr. O'Brien further testified, since ONA services are 
regulated basic network functions, allowing pricing 
flexibility by Pacific for these services would allow 
it to unfairly influence competition in markets in 
which it competes. (Id., at 9). The FCC has described 
these ONA services as requiring unbundled "basic 
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service building blocks" offered under tariffs, called 
"Basic Service Elements" (BSEs) See, Reoort and Order, 
104 FCC 2d 958 at "214 (1986) ("The Computer III 
Order" j. API submits that since these basic building 
blocks will be used to provide access to Pacific's 
competitors, they should remain within the conventional 
regulatory framework in order to prevent 
anticompetitive manipulation by Pacific. Pacific's 
failure to even know at this point which BSEs it wants 
to flexibly price (V. 7, TR 319}, coupled with the 
FCC's recent finding that Pacific Bell's ONA plan is 
deficient both in terms of the BSE pricing, and the 
terms under which they will be offered, confirms this 
result. See, "Filing And Review of Open Network 
Architecture Plans," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
released December 22, 1988, CC Docket 88-2, Phase 1, at 
,1496. As API witness Mr. 0 1 Brien testified, Pacific's 
ONA plan should be finalized at the federal level 
before this Commission even considers changing the 
regulatory environment for these services (V. 39, TR 
4615-16}. 
Pacific•s proposal to include enhanced 
services, offered on a detariffed basis, pose similar 
problems. In this regard, Mr. Schmitt confirmed 




de tar if fed basis, with above the line accounting for 
rate making purposes (V. 7, TR 314); he also admitted, 
however, that such treatment would require regulated 
ratepayers to cover any losses for those competitive 
products. (V. 7, TR 315-316). Indeed, perhaps based 
upon such concerns, Pacific's witness, Dr. Hausman, 
agreed that enhanced services should be subject to 
below the line accounting treatment (V. 14, TR 1292). 
As API has previously noted, it believes that 
"information-age" service competition will proliferate 
in Pacific Bell's service area, if Pacific's network 
access is offered to others on a "level playing 
field." API believes that such level competition is 
dependent upon treating Pacific's enhanced servict 
offerings as truly deregulated services, and according 
them below the line accounting treatment. Mr. 
Schmitt's testimony that Pacific can "live with" below 
the line treatment (V. 7, TR 248), coupled with the 
fact that above the line accounting treatment is 
apparently the result of Pacific Telesis policy (V. 7, 
TR 250), further supports not including Pacific's 
enhanced services operations within its regulated 
operations. 
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ORA's Regulatory Change Proposal 
As outlined in Ex. A-85, and as specifically 
described in Mr. Ahern's testimony (Ex. A-85, 
Chapter 1), ORA's proposed regulatory framework would 
split monopoly and competitive lines of business, and 
would institute a form of indexing (or price caps) 
which would proceed from rates based upon 1991 and 1992 
test years for Pacific Bell and GTEC, respectively. 
( Id. at 1-12, 13). For operations that are deemed to 
be monopoly in nature, a benchmark rate of return will 
be established, above which returns would be shared 
with ratepayers. Quality of service would be monitored 
under ORA's proposal, and ORA's plan would be in effect 
for a five-year period. (Id. at 1-13,14; 15-16). 
Finally, for new and competitive services, ORA would 
establish a separate organization which would offer 
those services on a detariffed basis; these services 
would be subject to sharing for returns realized above 
a predetermined benchmark, while the stockholders would 
bear the risk of any losses. (Ex.A-85, Chapter 3-4-6). 
API has examined ORA's plan from the "macro" 
effects of applying the plan to Pacific Bell and GTEC, 
and API has also examined ORA's. plan from API' s unique 




it now purchases, and will purchase in the future from 
these companies. API's concerns and recommendations in 
these two areas will be discussed in order. 
First, API questions the factual predicate 
for implementing ORA's proposed regulatory framework 
which would replace traditional, cost of service 
regulation, with a form of "price cap" regulation (Ex. 
A-85, p. 3-9). API has seen no evidence in the record 
that traditional cost of service regulation has been 
such a failure that it should be scrapped and replaced 
with ORA's proposal, nor indeed does the evidence 
suggest that ORA's proposal would succeed. For 
instance, this brief has earlier discussed the failure 
of both Pacific and GTEC to supply proof that incentive 
regulation would produce greater savings (or more 
efficiencies) as proposed by those companies than would 
the current regulatory framework. Similarly, ORA's 
witness Khoury testified that the present system of 
regulation contains incentives to achieve efficiencies, 
and that productivities have been realized over time in 
this environment. (V. 54, TR 6661). 
In addition to the absence of a factual basis 
upon which to conclude that traditional regulation 
applied to Pacific and GTEC has been a failure, API is 
105B 
equally concerned about the downside risk in o~~·s 
plan. For instance, API believes that ORA 1 s 
recommendation to review its proposed alternative 
framework's operation after a five-year period may be 
too long. (Ex. A-85, p. 3-21). Since January 1, 1984, 
(the date of the Bell system divestiture) significant 
changes have occur red in the telecommunications 
industry ranging from the method by which 
jurisdictional cost allocations are performed, the way 
that local exchange carriers are compensated for the 
interstate access use of their facilities, to the way 
that interstate carriers are regulated for their common 
carrier services. While API does not believe that 
these changes have undercut the basis for existing cost 
of service regulation for GTEC and Pacific in 
California, they nonetheless underscore the need to 
retain enough flexibility for this Commission to 
address similar industry changes in the ensuing five-
year period. API thus submits that the five-year 
period recommended by ORA for the initial operation of 
its proposed plan creates too much downside risk. 
API also is concerned about ORA's proposal to 
establish a 500 basis points floor below the benchmark 
return as a threshold for measuring the continued 
propriety of ORA 1 s plan. ( Id. at 3-22). If the 
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benchmark were set too low, this floor might impair the 
ability to finance plant additions and/or to attract 
capital on reasonable terms -- all of which would have 
a ratepayer impact. Indeed, API appreciates ORA's 
candor in describing its aprehension about its proposal 
in this regard and its indication that it would have 
preferred an experiment first. (Ex. A-85, at 1-15-16). 
Against this background, API does not believe 
that a sufficient record exists to justify the 
wholesale change in current regulation that ORA's 
proposal presents -- particularly when the stakes are 
so high. And while API does not doubt that ORA's 
beliefs are sincerely held, ORA's own doubts as to its 
proposal point to the fact that some experience should 
be gained with this type of proposed regulation before 
it should be applied to Pacific and GTEC. API 
recommends that the FCC's price cap proceeding be 
monitored closely by this Commission for that 
purpose. The FCC has recently concluded that price cap 
regulation is appropriate for AT&T and is proposing the 
mandatory application of such regulation to major 
(~-~., Bell Operating Company) local exchange 
carriers. Report and Order And Second Further Notice 
of Proposed Rulemak ing, FCC 89-91, released April 17, 
1989, CC Docket 87-313. This Commission may want to 
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judge the success of the FCC's endeavor first before 
implementing ORA's proposed regulatory scheme here. 
concerned 
As previously indicated, API 
about ORA's proposed treatment of 
is also 
new and 
competitive services. ORA's proposal for this category 
of services, essentially consists of establishing a 
separate entity for the provision of the services, 
coupled with the de tar iff ing of the services and the 
implementation of a sharing system for related 
profits. (See, ~._g_., Ex. A-85, at 34-5). ORA's 
proposal would also seek to establish accounting 
guidelines to prevent the improper transfe.r of costs 
between regulated and nonregulated operations. ( Id., 
at 76-7). As an initial matter, API supports the 
detariffing of enhanced services including the complete 
deregulation of the service offerings to end users. On 
the other hand, API believes that care should be taken 
to ensure that "new" services which are basic network 
functions (~._g_., ONA 
regulatory oversight. 







Service Elements constitute such an exception within 
the "new service" category. (Id., at 3-4, 3-19). 
Indeed, ORA witness Ahern agreed that it would be 
possible for a new service to also be a monopoly 
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service. (V. 36, TR 4286-87). API's comments here are 
merely to add emphasis to ORA's recommendations on this 
point; care should be taken to ensure that basic 
services are not inadvertently deregulated as "new" as 
advances occur in the basic network. 
API is constrained to point out that for the 
sake of consistency, it disagrees with ORA's proposal 
to establish a sharing mechanism for profits associated 
with detariffed services. API is particularly 
concerned about the proposal with regard to enhanced 
services, since API believes that all enhanced services 
should go below the line for ratemaking purposes. 
ORA's proposal would apparently place losses for those 
services below the line, but share related profits with 
ratepayers. If the ORA is concerned that it will be 
unable to detect cross-subsidy between regulated and 
competitive operations within GTEC and Pacific, it 
should address that concern through accounting and cost 
allocation procedures. API believes, however, that 
ORA's proposal is a bad substitute for such accounting 
protections, and one which could unnecessarily blur the 
dividing line between regulated and competitive 
services. 
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The Commission Should Examine Advice 
Letter/Complaint Procedures And Tariff 
Liability Issues That Will Be Implemented 
By Alternative Regulatory Frameworks 
During the hearings in this proceeding, API 
has been concerned that the adoption of any alternative 
regulatory framework proposed herein be examined for 
its impact upon the advice letter and complaint 
procedures under the Commission's Rules, and that the 
Commission examine tariff liability issues as well. 
Thes~ topics will be discussed in order. 
It is evident that GTEC's and Pacific's 
alternative regulatory framework plans would place a 
substantial burden on the advice letter and complaint 
process. For instance, Pacific would use the advice 
letter process to request the flexible pricing of 
certain services (V. 7, TR 257) and GTEC would use the 
advice letter process to both change prices, on an 
annual basis, for its Category 1 services and to change 
prices, on ten days' notice, for its Category 2 
services. (See, Ex. A-56, pp.l2-14). GTEC's witness, 
Mr. Williams, : additionally testified that the 
complaint/advice letter process would be an appropriate 
avenue by which to solve problems in an alternative 
regulatory framework environment. (V. 34, TR 4018-




letters and complaints may not carry the load sought to 
placed upon it in the new environment proposed by 
either GTEC or Pacific. 
For instance, Administrative Law Judge Ford 
specifically designated as a policy matter, whether 
changes should be sought in the Public Utilities Code 
regarding the mechanics of bringing a complaint in the 
new environment. (V. 66, TR 8307-08). Section 1702 of 
the Public Utilities Code requires, in this regard, 
that the reasonableness of any rate may not be 
challenged by a complaint unless it is signed by the 
mayor or other officials of a city or county or by not 
less than 25 actual or prospective customers. If the 
Commission adopts a framework which relies more heavily 
upon the complaint procedure as a substitute for 
regulation, API would support such a change in the 
Code. API believes, however, that the degree to which 
the advice letter and complaint process needs to be 
changed to accommodate any new regulatory framework 
will become more apparent after the Commission's 
adoption of a decision in this proceeding. GTE has 
noted the propriety of changing the advice letter and 
complaint process in a new environment (See, Ex. A-73, 
p. 12; V. 27, TR 3025), as have other parties such as 
ORA (V. 56, TR 7022} and API (V. 39, TR 4614). API 
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accordingly recommends that in the event that 
regulatory changes are implemented which make use of 
the advice letter or complaint process, workshops be 
convened to ensure the consistency of these mechanisms 
with any new regulatory framework. 
In the briefing conference held in this 
proceeding, Administrative Law Judge Ford designated as 
a policy issue whether the Commission should modify 
current tariff liability limitations for which 
regulation is relaxed (V. 66, TR 8306). API believes 
that the issue is more broad. API would state the 
issue as what safeguards should apply for competitive 
activities engaged by Pacific and GTEC under their 
proposals, from a jurisdictional perspective. This 
issue arises because as (and if) regulation is lessened 
or eliminated for these companies' operations in 
certain competitive markets, the degree to which this 
Commission exerts its regulatory oversight will affect 
the stockholders, ratepayers and competitors of these 
companies. 
Witnesses for both . companies and ORA 
testified that the appropriate forums for challenging 
competitive pricing issues should lie in the courts, 
and not in this Commission. For instance, Pacific's 
witnesses, Drs. Hausman and Harris, testified that 
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antitrust laws and the courts should be the forums to 
handle claims of anticompetitive activity under 
Pacific's proposed framework (V. 13, TR 1042; V. 25, 
2806). Dr. Hausman further testified that in the 
context of enhanced service offerings, the elimination 
of tariff liability limitations would be consistent 
with the concept of a level playing field. (V. 14, TR 
1298). GTEC's and ORA's witnesses also agreed. For 
instance, GTEC' s witness McCallion testified that the 
court system was the appropriate legal avenue available 
to competitors to prevent below cost pricing (Ex. A-56, 
pp. 18-19; v. 27, TR 2986). Likewise, ORA's witness 
Ahern testified that predatory pricing claims should be 
heard in the courts (V. 36, TR 4295-6). 
API believes that this Commission should make 
clear the extent to which customers who, like API, may 
look to this Commission's processes for anticompetitive 
claims against Pacific or GTEC in a new environment. 
Potential competitors of these companies in enhanced 
service markets stand in the same shoes. The lack of a 
clear decision on this issue will either leave 
customers and/or competitors without an appropriate 
remedy -- either at the Commission or in the courts --
or may result in disputes as to the appropriate 
ratemaking treatment of antitrust judgments.. See, 
1138 
Southern Motor Carriers' Rate Conference v. U.S., 105 
s.ct. 1721 (1985) (antitrust liability for regulated 
operations will exist in the absence of a clear state 
policy to displace competition and state supervision of 
anticompetitive conduct; 105 S.Ct. at 1727). 
API certainly has no objection to handling 
claims of unfair pricing or anticompetitive conduct in 
the courts, consistent with the testimony of GTEC, 
Pacific and DRA. In order to both avoid leaving 
competitors and cus tamers without an appropriate 
remedy, and to avoid unintended results either before 
this Commission or in the courts, this Commission 
should be clear in any decision granting competitiVE>-
freedom for GTEC and Pacific as to the scope of 
regulation and extent of competition which is thereby 
authorized. 
Conclusion 
API submits that neither Pacific nor GTEC 
have justified the overall framework proposed by these 
companies, from a cost/benefit perspective. An 
examination of the record discloses that both companies 
have failed to demonstrate that ratepayers would be 
better off under either of their plans as they would 
implement them. Additionally, GTEC's proposed 
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treatment of Category 2 services would be manifestly 
unfair to companies, such as API, that buy services 
from GTEC and for which no other alternatives exist. 
Pacific's plans for these customers involves less 
discretionary pricing, but API does not believe that 
Pacific can justify its proposed cost increases for 
business services in supplemental rate design. Thus, 
to the extent that Pacific's plan is dependent upon the 
substantial increases outlined in this brief, it must 
fail. 
API believes that Pacific's flexible pricing 
treatment of ONA services also should be rejected. 
Although competition in the enhanced service 
marketplace should proliferate, the flexible pricing of 
network access for these services by an entity which is 
also a competitor, provides the incentive and ability 
to engage in discriminatory behavior; it should be 
rejected. At the very least, API recommends that 
Pacific Bell's ONA plan become final at the FCC, and 
that discrete ONA services that will be offered by 
Pacific be identified, before flexible pricing is even 
considered for these services. API believes that ORA's 
price cap plan does not demonstrate problems with 
current regulation sufficient to justify its 
elimination. API recommends that experience with the 
115B 
FCC's price cap plan be garnered first, before such a 
substantial change in the regulatory process is 
considered here. 
Finally, API believes that ORA's proposed 
treatment of enhanced services involving below the line 
treatment of losses, but not profits, should be changed 
consistent with API's proposed treatment of all 
enhanced service operations below the line. 
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
API is an interested party who filed an 
opening brief (Brief of API Alarm Systems) in this 
proceeding and who has otherwise participated 
extensively as an interested party. API's opening 
brief discussed the Company's position on the 
alternative framework plans advanced by Pacific Bell 
(Pacific), GTE California (GTEC) and the Division of 
Ratepayer Advocates (ORA). Its basic views have not 
been altered by those parties' Opening Briefs. This 
Closing Brief is accordingly limited to two issues 
which nonetheless require brief discussion in light of 
the opening round of briefs. 
First, API submits that Pacific's Opening 
Brief incorrectly urges the Commission to adopt a 
hybrid form of regulation which would clothe Pacific 
with traditional liability protection, normally 
reserved for regulated operations, for operations that 
will not be regulated under CPRS (i.e., enhanced 
service offerings). While Pacific will be free to 
negotiate such limitations of liability with its 
customers in a deregulated environment, API submits 
that its use through a tariff or other regulatory 
mechanism is improper. 
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Second, API submits that given the heavy 
reliance that both GTEC 1 s and Pacific 1 s alternative 
frameworks plans place upon rate design, the Commission 
should consider holding the implementation of its 
Phase II decision in abeyance (at least as far as it 
relates to rate design factors) until Supplemental Rate 
Design is completed in this proceeding.l/ 
lf References to the transcript of the proceedings in 
this case will be made by identifying the party and 
witness sponsoring the cited testimony, and by 
indicating the appropriate Volume ( "V"), followed by 
the letters "TR" and the appropriate pagination. 
References to exhibits introduced into evidence in this 
proceeding will be made by the abbreviation "Ex." 
followed by the appropriate number. References to the 
interested parties in the proceeding will be made in 
the manner in which they appeared. 
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I. 
Pacific's Argument To Retain Existing 
Tariff Liability Limitations Is Improper 
For Enhanced Services Offered Under CPRS 
A. Current Tariff Liability Limitations 
Pacific Bell and GTEC currently enjoy limited 
liability for errors and omissions in the services and 
facilities that they provide. Pacific's liability 
limitations are delineated in CAL. P.U.C. No. A2.2.1.14 
(Rule 14), as noted in its Opening .Brief (Attachment, 
p. 4) • Rule 14 states that damages arising out of 
mistakes, omissions, interruptions, delays, errors or 
defects in any of its services of facilities shall not 
exceed an amount equal to the pro rata charges to the 
customer for the period during which the services or 
facilities are affected (Rule 14, SA. 3). If an error 
or omission affecting one service causes a diminution 
in the value of another service, Pacific's liability 
would include such diminution, but would not exceed the 
total amount of charges to the customer for all 
services or facilities during the period the customer 
experienced service problems Id. 
This general limit on liability has two 
exceptions. First, if the error or omission causing 
the problem is attributable to gross negligence, then 
1218 
Pacific may be held liable for damages totaling up to 
$10,000. Second, no limit is placed on its liability 
if the error or omission causing the problem is 
attributable to willful misconduct, fraudulent conduct, 
or violation of law (Rule 14, §A.l). 
B. Tariff Liability Limitations Apply To The 
Current Regulatory Environment Which Closely 
Regulates The aperations Of Pacific And GTEC 
Pacific's Opening Brief contains an extensive 
discussion of the legal and regulatory development of 
the limitation of liability doctrine to which it is 
currently subject. An examination of the Commission 
and Court precedent cited in its brief, however, 
discloses that while these rules may have valid 
application to the existing regulatory environment, 
they are out of place in an environment where enhanced 
services will be offered on a detariffed, deregulated 
basis by both Pacific and GTEC. 
For instance, Pacific cites In re 
Investigation Regarding Limitation of Liability for 
Telephone Corporations, 71 Cal. P.U.C. 229 (1970) for 
the proposition that five principal reasons underlie 
the doctrine of limited liability. (See, Pacific's 
Opening Brief, Attachment at 6). Each of those reasons 
cited contemplate the traditional form of rate 
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regulation. An example is provided in item "(1)" which 
states that limited liability allows the provision of 
service at a cost to the public that might be higher 
without the limitation. Id. Such logic obviously 
contemplates the traditional regulatory scheme since 
court judgments are sometimes held to be properly 
includable as an above the line expense which are in 
turn spread to the ratepayers as a whole. See, e.g., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 89-136, released 
May 19, 1989 ("Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend 
Part 31 Uniform System Of Accounts for Class A and 
Class B Telephone Carriers to Account For Judgements 
and Other Costs Associated With Anti trust Lawsuits") 
Cole v. Pacific Tel.~ Tel. Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 
249 P. 2d 686 (1952), also cited by Pacific, (Id. at 
7), confirms that the existing liability limitation 
rule contemplates a scheme of close regulation: 
The theory underlying these decisions is that 
a public utility, being strictly regulated in 
all operations with considerable curtailment 
of its rights and privileges, shall likewise 
be regulated and limited as to its 
liabilities. In consideration of its being 
peculiarly the subject of state control, its 
liability is and should be defined and 
limited. [Correll v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. ) 
There is nothing harsh or inequitable--:ln 
upholding such a limitation of liability when 
it is thus considered that the rates as f1xed 
by the Commission are established with the 
rule of limitation in mind. (emphasis 
added) 
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Thus, the court found liability limitation equitable 
for companies like Pacific and GTEC which are strictly 
regulated in all of their operations and which have 
their rates fixed by the Commission. See also Davidan 
::!._:_ Pacific TeL !_ Tel. Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 750, 94 
Cal. Rpts. 337 (1971); Waters::!._:_ Pacific Telephone Co., 
12 Cal. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753, 523 P.2d 1161 (1974); 
Pacific Bell v. Colich, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 244 Cal. 
Rptr. 714 (1988). 
c. Adoption Of The GTEC Or Pacific Proposal Should 
Incorporate Modified Tariff Liability 
Limitations For Their Detariffed, · Enhanced 
Serv1ce Offerings 
Under CPRS the Commission's traditional 
regulatory oversight roles would be diminished, 
contrary to Pacific 1 s baseless claim that CPRS would 
merely "streamline" existing regulation sufficient to 
retain limited liability precepts. (Pacific's Opening 
Brief, Attachment at 8). While the Commission may 
indeed retain some control over certain of Pacific 1 s 
service offerings, Pacific admits that its enhanced 
service operations will be offered on a detariffed 
basis, Opening Brief, at 98, n.*, -- a conclusion that 
is inescapable given the FCC's preemptive deregulation 
of these services. See generally, Report and Order, 









supra, increased re 
r 
be accompanied by less 
this set of 
ing test established in Cole, 
ion of regulation should also 
strict liability limitations. 
Following the rationale implicit in that case, if an 
area is completely deregulated, then public policy does 
not demand liability 1 tation. 
This same conclusion was voiced by Pacific's, 
GTEC' s and DRA' s witnesses on the record here. As 
pointed out in API's initial brief in this phase, both 
companies' witnesses testified t anticompetitive 
activity claims arisi r their proposed frameworks 
should be heard in the courts, and in this same vein 




testified that tariff 
be eliminated for 
Pacific's enhanced service offerings. See, e.g., Brief 
of API Alarm Systems, pp. 34-36. 
API submits that Pacific simply cannot have 
it both ways if its enhanced service operations are 
deregulated, as they surely will be under existing 
law -- then it must play by the same rules as do its 
competitors. A contrary result is more likely to 
125B 
introduce a playing field tilted in favor of Pacific's 
enhanced service operations, with a consequent impact 
on competition. 
These same concerns permeate Pacific's (and 
GTEC's) plans to price network access for these 
services on a flexible basis, (see, e.g., Brief of API 
Alarm Systems at 13-15; 23-25), while at the same time 
they intend to compete in these markets. Id. If the 
Commission extends limited liability to cover 
anticompetitive activity for regulated operations which 
are designed to influence unregulated markets, it may 
unintentionally invite such activity by Pacific and 
GTEC. API' s initial brief outlined the need for a 
clear delineation of the ambit of the Commission's 
regulatory au thor i ty in this area id. at 35-36) and 
API reincorporates those remarks here. The gist of 
API's position, however, is that Pacific's and GTEC's 
proposed alternative frameworks should not result in a 
playing field for these companies' enhanced service 
competitors that is not level, or that would leave 
those competitors without a meaningful remedy for 
claims of unfair or anticompetitive activi 
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II 
The Implementat Framework For 
fie And GTEC Await A Decision In The 
Supplemental Rate Design Phase Of This Proceeding 
In the Bri of Bay Area Teleport, 
("BAT"), it ar generally that Pacific's CPRS 
proposal is rge a matter of rate design, and that 
the Commission shou not any decision 
reached in Phase II (either r GTEC or Pacific) until 
the Supplemental Rate Design ("SRO"), scheduled for 
this proceeding, is completed. ( BAT B r i e f at 6-12 ) • 
Although API did not raise this point in s opening 
brief, it agrees both simply because it makes sense, 
and because SRD now rs to even more dependent 
upon Phase II than be re. The relevance of these 
observations to each company's proposal will be 
discussed in order. 
First, as BAT noted, Pacific's CPRS proposal 
is largely rate design driven given its proposal to 
freeze residential rates, eliminate TouchTone charges 
and to raise certain business rates, including analog 
private line rates. Id. at 6. As API's initial brief 
pointed out, Pacific's proposal is sadly lacking in the 
most basic cost details as to allow a fundamental 
evaluation of its plan. (Brief of API Alarm Systems, 
1 B 
at 17-20). In Pacific's Opening Brief, it nonetheless 
proceeds upon the basis that certain services are below 
costs (e.g., private line), which the Commission should 
now agree to raise "in principle," as a component of 
CPRS, Id. at 33-34.~ While API does not believe that 
Pacific's private line services are priced below their 
relevant costs (it has examined the subject in several 
Pacific rate proceedings), it does not quarrel with the 
proposition that rates should generally cover their 
related costs. Pacific's CPRS plan appears much more 
dependent upon its rate design factors, however, than 
its plea for an approval of price increases 11 in 
principle" would suggest. For instance, what if the 
Commission were to approve freezing basic residential 
rates, giving away TouchTone and eliminating 
attrition/rate case proceedings, only to discover that 
SRD would not justify further rate increases? If 
Phase II were not yet implemented, consequent damage to 
Pacific's stockholders and ratepayers would be 
minimized from such a miscalculation. Given the 
downside risks of implementing Phase II now, however, 
~ Pacific's Opening Brief on this point characterizes 
API witness Edwards' testimony in a manner (perhaps 
inadvertently) which infers his agreement that private 
line services are below cost. Mr. Edwards' testimony 
was emphatically the opposite, however. (API Ex. A-96, 




API submits that better course is to await Phase II 
implementation until after Commission has a clear 
picture service costs from SRD. 
The need to Phase II implementation for 
GTEC until after SRD is even more compelling. As API's 
opening brief noted, GTEC's proposal to include alarm 
grade private line services as a "category 2" service, 
and to subject them to serial rate increases as a 
result, represents a complete abandonment of cost-based 
pricing for these monopoly ser ces. (Brief of API 
Alarm Systems, at 10-12) Indeed, as API pointed out, 
this particular feature of GTEC' s plan appears solely 
designed to maximize the Company's revenues. Id. at 
11. API submits that SRD will demonstrate the fallacy 
behind GTEC's logic on this score, since analog private 
line costs simply will not tell the story that GTEC's 
carte blanche pricing request promises. 
GTEC's Opening 







flexibility for analog private line pricing, as GTEC 
would implement it, until after SRD. In this regard, 
it should be noted that GTEC' s proposal to flexibly 
price analog private 
initially based upon 
line 
GTEC's 




services were either 'competitive or discretionary' --
129B 
criteria that API submits were thoroughly discredited 
on the record, by inconsistencies in GTEC's 
implementation scheme. (API Brief at 8-9). GTEC's 
Opening Brief now appears to have shifted gears 
entirely, by assuming, ~ priori, that analog private 
line rates are below costs, and by arguing that its 
plan would give users of those services price 
predictability, and would avoid 'policing' difficulties 
for those private lines which GTEC now apparently 
admits do not meet its own criteria for category 2 
services. {GTEC Opening Brief, at 31-33). 
Against this background, API submits that 
GTEC's proposal to engage in the upward flexible 
pricing of analog private line services should be 
rejected out of hand, since GTEC apparently admits that 
its own criteria may not be accurate in this respect. 
And at the very least, API submits that to the extent 
that GTEC is relying upon private line revenue/cost 
relationships to justify its proposal, any decision on 
its flexible pricing request should be delayed until 





that Pacific's request to 
traditional regulation (limited 
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tariff liability) competitive, enhanced service 
operations whi it seeks to enter, is inconsistent 
with notions of ir play and should be rejected. API 
also submits that the Commission should explicitly 
define the scope of its regulatory authority for 
services subject to 'streamlined,' or non-regulation, 
in order to maintain the Courts' ability to discipline 
GTEC's and Pacific 1 s anticompetitive activities, as 
recommended by these companies' witnesses. 
Finally, API submits that ·Phase II decisions 
should not ·be implemented for GTEC or Pacific, (to the 
extent that they are dependent on rate design factors 
as discussed herein), until the completion of SRD. 
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UTILITIES and COMMERCE 
June 6, 1989 
SPECIAL HEARING on "TELEPHONE REGULATION" 
I am here 
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to participate in 
are with entry into the 
are concerned with being treated 
As customers CENTEX' clients may be adverse affected by 
regulatory changes which do not ze the LEC's continuing 
monopoly power. The ion which the California Public 
Utilities Commission must answer is: How can customers be 
assured equal access and pric to the telecommunication 
services contained the LEC's central offices? 
In the past, concerns of customers about these services and other 
telecommunication issues could be any of several 
forums. The most of is the traditional rate 
case. 
If the California ic Utilities Commission decides to reduce 
in any way li of this forum to LEC customers, the 
availabili ficacy of the other forums becomes 
essential. This concern is the CENTEX' participation 
in the Commission's ''Alternative Framework" proceeding 
and our of your tat fore this 
Committee. 
1 B 
CENTEX has suggested four safeguards to the Commission that must be 
made part of any changes in the regulatory process: 
1. LEC services must be made available on a non-
discriminatory basis. Small businesses, whether ordering 
services on an individual basis or utilizing an external 
management company such as CENTEX, must be assured equal 
access to the same services as any other business customer 
at equal rates, terms, and conditions. 
2. The functional elements of the LEC network services must 
be made available on an unbundled basis. By unbundled we mean 
the ability to order the technology of the network in the 
smallest components which are technically feasible. The 
focus here should be meeting the broadest general business 
needs, not the convenience of the LEes. 
3. Any flexibility granted to the LECs should not be 
implemented until a more effective, timely, and less costly 
complaint procedure is created and made available. (CENTEX 
has proposed that a workshop be held, under the auspices of 
the CPUC, to develop such improvements.) 
4. Strict procedures for establishing cost-based 
pricing of LEC service elements should be instituted by the 
Commission and made part of the upcoming rate design hearings 
which are part of this "Alternative Regulatory Framework" 
proceeding. 
CENTEX supports the traditional goals of utility regulation 
listed in the letter of invitation which announced this hearing. 
The Commission is being asked to make changes in the regulatory 
process whose purpose it is to accomplish those goals. Our 
message to the Commission, to this Committee, and to the rest of 
the Legislature is to insure that the interests of smaller 
businesses, which represent the heart of California's economic 
health and growth, are not forgotten if any changes are made. 
The inclusion of the safeguards proposed by CENTEX in any changes 
to the regulatory process will be a good first step in protecting 
the interests of small businesses as well as those of other 







lnYeBfor'lll Industries In The News I Telecoh1munications·Services· Monday,Augusl1, 1988 
Centex Telemanagement Brings Back The Phone Company 
By Jolm A. Jones, Investor's Daily 
For business. people who miss the 
simpler times of the old Bell System, a 
young outfit called Centex Telemanage-
ment Inc. has reinvented the one-stop 
telephone company. For a management 
fee, the San Francisco-based company 
analyzes the communications needs of 
its small and medium-sized business 
clients, picks out the best combination 
or services and equipment from today's 
often conrusing or choices, and 
sets the system the client's 
local telephone con:lpanty. 
Centex doesn't own a~y 
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bill each Centex 
network center u a group. Centex in 
turn breaks down the charges and bills 
its individual clients. 
Analysts said the local telephone 
companies pin from having Centex 
bring their local area networks business 
that might otherwise go to independent 
,..,...n..,r~- as well as ~tetting the clients' 
Since it began 19114, 
Centex has built to 
about 3,500 clients. The now 
serve$ six major California and 
it has expanded to the East Coast 




P e a e r 
As the business bas grown, Centex 
has trimmed its expenses u a percentage 
of sales. General and administrative 
expenses fell to 12°/e or billings in the 
first quarter from 15% a year 
while client acquisition expenses fell to 
1 "l•L ..-..rJ...atift...,., fr.nrn ')AO/..,. 
"There are 
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"said James 
William Blair in \...lllllril•li:U, 
40 or more urban 
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clients generate $1 billion 
lon~E-distance revenues." 
5% of the 
said Centex can contract for 
101'12-<ils!ance services at lUI average of 
of AT&T's direct-dial and 
sell them to Centex clients for of 
the AT&T rate. The clients still make 
substantial 
"Tile risks are that don't have 
investment" in equipment, 
, "Entry barriers are 
so competition could appear. To 
date they've seen three or four compel· 
j itors try this and fail. Execution is a 
I pretty difficult thing." 
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Assemblywoman Gwen Moore 
Chairperson, Assembly 
Utilities and Commence Committee 
Page !5. 
Finally, the approach we recommend the State Legislature 
to take is one of increased oversight of the CPOC and one which 
encourages more public hearings and less stipulations and side 
agreements. More evidentiary hearings should be held in the major 
metropolitan areas to facilitate greater participation by local 
consumer groups. The California Legislature should order the CPOC 
to continue ROR regulation unless it can prove with substantial 
evidence that change is needed. Finally, we believe it would be in 
the public interest for some form of government/private consumer 
advocacy, independent of the CPOC. 
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. 




Very truly yours, 
JAMBS K, HAHN, Ci~torney 
By~~~z~ 









Governmental Relations, Inc. 
JUNE 5, 1989 
TO: MEMBERS, ASSEMBLY UTILITIES AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE 
FR: DENNIS L. LOPER 
RE: US SPRINT TESTIMONY 
Attached is the testimony of our client, US Sprint. Ms. Pongracz 
was unable to testify in person due to a conflicting schedule. 
Thank you for considering her comments. 
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The Honorable Gwen Moore, Chairwoman 
May 31, 1989 
Page Three 
Pacific's plan may cost ratepayers more money that Diablo Canyon, since 
Pacific's own estimate of the cost of upgrading its network to fiber-optics is 
about $25,000,000,000, and such investment produces no additional revenue. It 
could destroy or severely damage many of California's telecommunications 
businesses including cable television, none of which could compete with a 
subsidized telephone assault. 
The need for legislative oversight was never greater! We look forward to 



























LAW OFFICES OF 
JACKSON, TUFTS, COLES BLACK 
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROI'ESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
650 CALIFORNIA STREET 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94108 
(415) 433-1950 
TELEX ll 9103 722166 
FACSIMILE m (415) 392-3494 
June 7, 1989 
Mr. Robert Jacobson 
Principal Consultant 
Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce 
State Capitol 
P.O. Box 942849 
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001 
SAN JOSE OrriCE: 
60 SOUTH MARKE:T STRE:E:T 
10TH F'LOOR 
SAN JOSE, CALIF'ORNIA 95113 
(408) 998-19S2 (415) 494-1950 
Re: California Bankers Clearing House Association 
Special Hearing 
Dear Mr. Jacobson: 
Enclosed please find six copies of the Comments of 
California Bankers Clearing House Association with respect to the 
hearing on telephone regulation. As you know, we had intended to 
provide Mr. Gerard F. Milano, executive director of California 
Bankers Clearing House Association, to testify at your hearing 
scheduled for Monday, June 5, 1989. When the date was changed at 
the last minute, a conflict precluded his attendance. 
If you have any questions in regards to this matter, please 





Very truly yours, _ 
0~.~~ 




HEARINGS ON TELEPHONE REGULATION 
OF THE CALIFORNIA BANKERS CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION 
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concerned that by 
• 
excluding the issue of intraLATA competition from Phase II of the 
investigation, the CPUC may be headed toward a diminished form of 
LEC regulation at a time when the necessary price-constraining 
competition does not exist. If so, the LECs will be able to use 
their market power to drive out competition and reduce, rather 
than expand, the choices faced by California's ratepayers. 
Accordingly, the CBCHA has encouraged the CPUC to reexamine 
the process by which rate of return regulation has been 
implemented in order to determine if procedural corrections 
should be made. It has also strongly argued, however, that the 
policy itself should not be abandoned. California's ratepayers 
are in many ways held captive by the LECs, which completely 
dominate the market for local telephone services and thus the 
market for connection to almost all other type of services. 
Unless the CPUC maintains a process whereby the LECs are 
precluded from using the traditionally predatory practices 
available to a monopolist, these captive ratepayers will face the 
risk of increased, uneconomic prices and reduced alternatives. 
Such a situation can not be in the interest of either residential 
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o ANPA opposes 1egis1 ive efforts low the 1 Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs) to engage 1n electron1c publishing, including H.R. 2140 
introduced April 27, 1989 by Congressmen Swift and Tauke. 
o ANPA believes that the owners of monopoly transmission 11nes (the Regional 
Bell Operating Companies) should not own or control the content that goes over 
those 1ines because of their incentive and ab111ty to engage in 
anti-competitive behavior. The local telephone lines of th1 regional phone 
companies are a bottleneck through which electronically published information 
must pass. The 1982 consent decree prohibits RBOC entry into e1eetronic 
pub11shing for good reason. The prohibition was imposed because of the 
inability of the FCC to prevent anti-competitive behivior by the phone 
compan1es. 
o We urge the Congress to reaffirm its commitment to a pub1ie poli~y that 
encourages a diversity of information sources for the American consumer. 
Under H.R. 2140. the RBOts would be allowed to provide electronic publishing 
in a state•if they offered a gateway within that state. The existence of a 
gateway does not measure the ability of an RBOC to act anti-competitively. !f 
the phone companies are allowed to offer electronic publishing, they w111 na..,e 
the incentive and ability to engage in anti-competitive conduct. This wi11 
mean less • not more • information sources for the American consumer. since 
the monopoly phone companies have a track racord of discrimination against 
other competitors. It will also mean that the ratepayer will bear the brunt 
of phone company entry into these services. as cross-subs;dies from the 
ratebase have bttn virtually 1mposs1blt to prevent. H.R. 2140 actually would 
weaken the FCC's existing ratepayer protection measures. 
ANPA supports the development of a diversity of electronic information 
services, but if this 1s to happen, there must be a level playing field. 
Pub1ic 1ccess to information and international competitiveness will not be 
improved by RBOC involvement in information services content. If allowed, 1t 
would present unacceptable anti-competitive risks in an emerging market that 
would result in less 1nformat1on for the public and 1 reduced ability to 
compete 1n 1nternattona1 markets. 
* The American Newspaper Publishers Association 1s a non-profit trade 
association representing more than 1,400 newspapers throughout North America 
Its membership comprises approximately 90 percent of the daily and Sunday 
c1rcu1at1on 1n the u.s. Many nondatly newspapers a1so are members. 
168B 
At s point, the local tKthange 1s the only viable means of distribution for 
most electronic information services. There is no alternative. Information 
content services remain particularly vulnerable to manipulation and 
d1scr1minat1cn by the .onopoly phone company th&t provides the only ~e•ns of 
transmission. The history of the ATlT case points to the ability of the phone 
.company to discriminate in favor of its own operations and the inadequacy of 
accounting safeguards to prevent cross-subsidization. This later point was 
admi by FCC officials during the AT&T litigation. That is why the 
prohi tion on RBOC entry into content should remain. The so-called 
safeguards in H.R. 2140 are much weaker than those applied to AT&T in the 
past, and would not prevent discrimination and cross·subsidy. 
U S. District Court's March 7. 1988 decision gave the RBOCs a tremendous 
opportunity to offer a wide array of information services including a variety 
of ~gateway• services, voice storage and retr1eva1, voice messaging, 
electronic mail and electronic white pages. AHPA believes that development of 
these infrastructure services by the RBOCs will help spur consumer access and 
use of information content services, and this is their proper role in the 
information marketplace. These services are in add1t1on to the wide range of 
information sector services the RBOCs already provide. including basic 
exchange serv1ce, provision of consumer services and equipment and printed 
white and yellow pages, to name just a few. 
The electronic information services marketplace for both voice and data is 
developing. Numerous newspapers and other entrepreneurs are providing voice 
text information services for consumers. These services art proving 
extreme1y popular. 
The advertising market is just as susteptib1e as any other form of electronic 
1shing to RBOC abuses. Electronic yellow pages fall within the realm of 
nformat1on content and should be off limits for an RBOC to offer for the 
reasons set forth above. There are a number of businesses, large and small. 
wh1 are·enter1ng this market. Entry of the RBOCs would stifle this 
aarkatp1ace evolution. 
u.s. 1s a world leader in tha davelopment of new electronic information 
. U.S. exports three times the amount of information services 
it imports. With respect to the French Minitel system. it is important 
that information content comes from competing service providers 
ndependent of the French te1aphone company. The French PTT has increased 
penetration of home terminals by distributing millions of them as part of tne 
M1n1te1 system. It should be noted that the ATlT Consent Decree today does 
not prevent the RBOCs from distributing terminals. In fact. under current 
1awt one ona1 Bell Operating Company, Southwestern 8111, is already 
ing terminals in connection with its new g1teway in Houston. 
1e oversight eccmmunicat1ons policy has been and remt1ns an important 
fi ..... ion of the Congress, le;1s1at1on to 11ft the restrictions on RBOC 
s1on of content would present anti-compet1t1ve risks in an emerging 
information age will continue to grow on1y if those who control 
i11t1es have no incentive or ability to prefer certain 
above others. 
y you to support information diversity 1nd oppo~ H.R. 2140 or 
1 at1ve attempts to cr1pp1e true competition in the in ormation 
ces marketp1ace. 
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ATTACHMENT Q - ----California Association of Long Distance 
Telephone Companies 
925 L Street. Suite 220 
Sacramento. CA 95814 
Hand 
June 14, 1989 
The Honorable Gwen Moore, Chairwoman 
Assembly Committee on 
Utilities and Commerce 
State Capitol, Room 2117 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Assemblywoman Moore: 
(916) 441-4166 
On f of the i of Distance 
Telephone Companies (CALTEL) I to extend my thanks to 
you for conducting a highly informative (and extremely timely) 
hearing last week on the regulation (or prospective lack 
thereof) of local exchange carriers. You and your staff 
obviously spent a great deal of time preparing for the hearings 
as was evidenced by your questions. 
Your hearing provided an excellent forum for those of us 
who are concerned about the relaxation or abandonment of the 
traditional rate case structure for large local exchange 
carriers such as Pacific Bell and General Telephone. While I 
understand that it was not possible for you to hear from 
everyone, I did want to write to let you know that CALTEL is 
also very concerned over this development and generally shares 
the views expressed by the witnesses from AT&T and MCI. 
While there are problems with the present rate 
structure, to a large degree those problems are fostered 
local exchange carriers themselves. As Ms. Seigel pointed 
it is a bit disingenuious for Pacific Bell to respond to 
intervenor claim with a barrage of discovery requests 
rebuttal witnesses and then argue to the Commission that 
rate case takes· too long. Believe me, those of us 
handsomely funded than Pacific Bell would desire nothing 
than to reduce the time and expense associated 












June 14, 1989 
2 
Gwen Moore 
we cannot endorse a proposal which would 
attentuate the rate case process at the expense of ratepayer 
protections. We all know that the unit cost of providing 
telecommunications services is dropping and it is essential to 
ensure that as many telephone customers as possible (whether 
they be large or small users of local exchange andjor long 
distance services) share in the benefits. The cost 
j fication attendant to the rate case process ensures that 
this will occcur. We have yet to hear any compelling reason for 
abandoning the long-standing requirement that local exchange 
carriers justify their rates on an on-going basis to the Public 
Utilities Commission. 
Again, you are to be congratulated for an excellent 
hearing. Thank you for your continuing oversight of the fashion 
which local exchange carriers are regulated. 
best wishes. 
Very truly yours, 
~~ 
Smith, President 




































Mr. Gregg Cook 
Pacific Telesis Group 
925 L Street, Suite 850 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Gregg: 
CHAIRWOMAN 
MEMBER OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FORTY-NINTH DISTRICT 
June 1989 
In his written testimony submitted to this Cmrunittee yesterday, Mr. 
Bruce Jameson, Pacific's comments in a footnote which 
require further amplication. 
Mr. Jameson states, in to the Background Paper I prepared, 
that "The paper.. .is in error in its characterization of this subject." He is 
referring to my remark in the Background Paper that "the PUC twice 
rejected" Pacific's CPRS plan. My Webster's defines "reject" as "to refuse 
to acknowledge, acquiesce in, or submit to." Mr. Jameson is one-third 
right and two-third's wrong: the PUC certainly acknowledged Pacific's 
proposal, but it did not acquiesce or submit to it. Nor did the PUC use 
Pacific's plan. ("Not to use" is another definition of "rejection.") 
In the same footnote, Jameson that the Background Paper 
"also contains other errors of fact." I would appreciate Mr. Jameson's 
enumeration of these errors, so the readers of the Committee's hearing 
report can be properly informed. I fear that readers may find Pacific's 
written submission tantalizingly incomplete without this elaboration. 
1 B 
Mr. Gregg Cook 2 June 7, 1989 
Can we have this addendum prepared before next Wednesday, when 
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ATTACHMENT S 
June 13, 1989 
Mr. Robert Jacobson 
Principal Consultant 
Assembly Committee 
on Utilities and Commerce 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001 
Dear Mr. Jacobson, 
In your letter of June 7, 1989 to Gregg Cook you asked for 
further amplification of my recent comments to the Utilities 
and Commerce Committee. The following are major comments, but 
are not all inclusive. 
First, page 5 of your paper entitled "'Don't Hang Up!·: The 
PUC and Telephone Service in the 90's -- Regulation, 
Deregulation, or Reregulation?" contains the following: "The 
PUC twice rejected Pacific Bell's "California Plan for Rate 
Stability, ... ". 
As I stated in my filed testimony the PUC has not rejected 
Pacific's proposal. In June 1986, af er the hearing on 
Pacific's Rate Projection filing, the forerunner to the 
California Plan for Rate Stability, Commissioner Donald Vial 
issued a ruling stating that Pacific's Rate Projection filing 
merits further consideration and inviting Pacific to propose a 
proper forum for the PUC to consider the matter. (A copy of 
Commissioner Vial's ruling is attached.) The ruling clearly 
did not reject Pacific's proposal on the merits; it simply 
delayed consiieration of it. The current Commission OII is the 
second occasi n for Pacific's proposal to be considered. Again 
the Commission has not ~ejected Pacific's proposal. Some 
aspects of Pacific's proposal were adopted by the Commission in 
their Phase I decision (D. 88-09-059) of this OII and other 
aspects of the proposal are pending in Phase II and Phase III. 
Second, there are several other errors in your paper which need 
to be corrected. For example, on page 5 of your paper, you 
state: "This year, after extensive investigation of Pacific 
Bell's technology investments revealed that some o: these 
investments were not necessary, the PUC directed Pacific Bell 
to reduce its rates by more than $120 over the next three 
years." You should be aware that the Commission has not 
decided anything. The settlement agreement between Pacific and 
ORA did not find that any "investments were not necessary". 




On page 6 of your paper, you state: "In 1988, the PUC 
completed Phase One of the Investigation, allowing for ... (3) 
less scrutiny for special contracts negotiated getween Pacific 
and GTE and their largest customers." In D. 88-09-059, the 
PUC did not provide for less scrutiny for special contracts. 
Indeed each contract requires PUC preapproval before the 
services for which the contract is written can be installed. 
Thus, Phase I tightened contract scrutiny by now requiring that 
contracts with governmental agencies be preapproved whereas 
previously such contracts did not require preapproval. 
Your letter indicated you wished to include more complete 
information in the Committee's report. I would appreciate this 













In tht Hatter of the Application of 
PAOl1IC JILL. a corporation, for 
autbori~J to tnerea1e ctrta1~ iatra-
lt&tt rates ana char&•• appliea~l• to 
ttltlhoae aetviot furn1ehe4 Within 
the tate of California • 
On Mar 27, 1986, a htarin& vaa ht14 \tfore tht full 
Coaaita1on i~ the rate 4tailn portion of thia procee4in&· !he 
heatin& vaa htl4 purtuant to a lulin& of thi• Coaailtiontr 4ate4 
April 1, 1986 vbioh in relevant part retu1rt4 !acifie Jell (Pacific) 
to prtaeut corporate oftictrl havial tirst-han4 knovlt4&t of 
Jacific'• present lona-r~ 11veetaent etrate17 aa4 overall \ulin••• 
plan to teetif7 un4tr oath an4 eub3tet to oro•a-examination on 
Pacific'• pro~ecte4 ratta over the next five to 10 r•ara. !he Rulinc 
&110 htl4 that !aeifio'• rt~Q1&r rate ca1e 1hcvin' could ao forward 
except that the propolt4 rate lhift troa 1ntraLi!A toll to local 
exchaaat rates voul4 bt liaitt4 to &D aaOUftt not creater 1hAA that 




compromiat propoeal1 unlttl another order or r~lina allove4 a 
creater ehift after the ecamiaaicn b&4 acre inforaation aa to lona-
rMCI ratea. 
laoStio prc4uce4 three extcut1ve vitaeaaee, !. J. 8ae~c•r, 
1t1 prta!ttnt ana chief executive officer, tte o. Camp. 1t1 vice 
prea14eftt-aarktt1n&a an4 Otorc• J. Bohaitt, ita viet pre•14ent of 
operation• north. 
lather than preaent a currtnt projection, Saenaer preaentea 
a cofioeptuallr new pro)oaal fo~ rt,ulat1on of fao1t1o vh1ch conten4a 
that the preaentl7 acht4ul.t rate 4ta1an htartnca lhoul4 co forvar4 
a.M. the Coma1ea1on ahoul4 uopt lao1tto•a propoa&l. !ben Pacific 
voul4 tree&e )&sic rtai4tnoe rate• ~t tht levels propott4 1n ita 
lateat :tiline (110 for ont-pa.rtr unl1a1tt4 local aerv1ot 1 up from the 
preaent 18.25) throu&h 1~89. It &44t4 tha.t Pao1:t1c pre4icte4 that it 
voul4 Dtt4 to reque1t cnl7 ao4tlt baeio rel14enee increaaea.;throuah 
1995· 
Saenser maintaine4 that thie freeze an4 potaiblt ao4eat 
increatt voul4 be ~ceaible it, in a44ition to adoptinc !acific'e 
pen41~1 rate propoaal, thia Coamialion &&r••• to the follovin&: 
1 Jacifio'e Jrcpolal lhifta o••~ 1400 aillion ift revenue froa . 
1•f.r.W!.l L..,ll •• ,-~.S.•• •• 1et&1 •••llaaa• P&too. !fhe JID ooaproai.lf 
propoaal lhifta about 17t aillioa out of ••••&&• toll rates via a Ill 
to SLU tracait~on, rtali,ae certain nort~trD lac Praac1eoo ,_, Area 
oallinl rate1 (4tcreaa.S.~f th.a _, about 112 aillion). ac4 epreade the 
aaouat of rtvtnue rtaovt fraa theae two 10urcea alona with the 
aaouat of tbt current author!ael b1111n& turch&r&t of a\out 1120 





1. Intent (IOI) 
U &)JU"O&Ch 
of rat•• utll 
1989 WBIB the COaBilliOB VOU14 
~o1ntl1 ~4erl11na aeauaptioae 
an4 the new re~latorJ traaework itaelf. 
2. Allowina !aoifio ita rateparere to 
equ&llJ ahare &nJ earn1~11 in exo••• of 
lacific'l a~thorilt4 rate of rttU:B• 
'· !tahapint Jflllnt atruaturt to aovt 
~vulnera~l• r•v•nu• ao~roee~ tovar4 coat, ana 
to iapleaent a bulk rate Jl&n for the 
reeovtrJ of aontraffic ••n•itive (1!1) ocate 
froa intertzch • carriers tor acotll to . 




Maintaininl the Coaaiaeion'e prtltnt policr 
ot a1lowinl a aonopol7 in i~tr&LA!A 
aarketa .. 
Allovinl Pac1 a4juet prices for certain 
strv1ctl within a pre4tteralnt4 priot ranee 
vi th a :tloor "reltv~t costa• an4 a c&p , 
Itt with f1J&r4 aarket tac~ort. · 
le,lao1al ~tiae-oontuain, hearin.-• for the 
authorisation of aew offeriacm or rate chana• 
req,1.uusta ri a re Jrooe£ve. 
Allov1 aove capital reoovet7 to 
the act ratt ot capital aoaa~ptioa an4 to 
eliminate itl R£epreciatioa reserve 
4eticieaor• a. tulcklf &a potli\le. 
Al1ow1aa tacltio the option of uain, 1te 
ahare of earai over the authoriae4 rate of 
return to offlt the 4tJrtoiat1oa reaerve 
4tf1c1eru~tf .. 
Al10Y1BI hot. fie to tspua 1 ta network 
otter!~, or aa the witn••••• 4tlor1)e4 it, 
8)1 1.11 tbt it IU lite 11 
Coatiauial to cYtrltt t~eif1c, )ut vit~ 
•appropriate aontiauiaa IUtYtilluce• aft4 
with a •a11s1oa &D4 aoall• of tao1f1c ana the 





inveatmente vi a 
throuch 1 990 .. 
an4 aaplifitl~ that of Satn&er. Sehmitt•a 
t• &o&la an! objectives tor lena-term 
at level of capital espenditure; taraett! • 
!he moat 1mmt41ate Jfobltm created bf tbie teetimcny 11 the 
concern t%preeaed b7 aanr of the 1nttrtatt4 ~artita in 'the rate case 
an! relate4 :Pae111e procee41DII ;!. J'ormt.l rtapcnaee prottttina 
Jacific'a tilin& vert received from ~aer'a Group, MCI, lf!f. GTE 
Sprint, an4 !SD. So•• parti·e; art ccnctrnt4 a'bcnat whether the 
Comaiaeicn plana to ccnai!tr S&tn&•r'e prcpoell and, it ao, whether 
that will chan&• the oouree of the acetae caat which 11 preatntl7 
~tin& heard. !ht1 art alec concerned about apparent inconaiattnciea · 
between Saen&er'e propcaal &n4 tbt !tt&ilt4 &atn!t4 rate !tei&n 
propoaal Pacific filed with the Commiation on 1_, 19, 1986. !he7 
nee4 to know whi=h one(a) to reepon! to in their prepare! t~stimo~ 
due on J~lf 20. (In tha C&lt 01 tht 1ndepandent telephone companita, 
the filial date 11 June ,0.1 It the Ccmaiaeion plans to eon1ide~ 
~acific'a propoaal, partie• Y&nt an opportunitt to ccn4uct 41acovtr7• 
further crosa-exam1ne tbe thrtt corporate witntlltl, an4 file 
eomaente and brief1. !urther. if tbe Ccmmiation 4ecidea to permit 
additional ahitta trom toll to local exch&a&l an4/or to accept 
'aeific'a propoa&l, the11 partite point out that Pacific voul4 \e 
entitled to amen4 itl ptopoae4 rate 4eaian eo that bear1n11 should be 
held on the nev rate 4eat;n. 
I think acme of thelt concern• can be alleviated • 
iaae4iatt1J. firat, the prCJOIIl and teetiaonr preaente4 on Ka, 27, 
altboU~h indicative of hov 'acitic aeea thl future, 4oee not previae 
2 A letter to ALJ Colfan troa Alan t. !tJptr &ttorneJ for Veattrn 










froa tht atatu. 
i81UII, lOCI Of whiOb 
reaerve), othtra 
(tntere~oh&n&e carr 
not prep&re4, as Pac 
J&eifio•a ao4arniaat 
relate4 aatter1 eti 
re1ponat point• out, sill 
reduction• ~~ under oon1i 
In the area 
1ntorae4, we 414 ltarn 
lonc•ttra invt1tment 
the April 1 Julinl aate4 
nee4e4 to &ivt the 
ion. 
allcw1~1 a revenue 
areater th&n that 
, prcv:::!~v!•,::::;urt ;~ 
r ccna14eration, but it 4oel 
it JfCPOIII rtVitvin& 
~een a44rtllt4 <••I• 4tprte1ation 
of other pr.octt4in&• 
nttvork). Jurther, we are 
on ~r curre~t.revitv of 
il&tion tactora, an4 other 
rate oaat. AI etatt•a 
potential revenue 
ve were •~pectinc to be bttter 
Pacific that it ha. & relat1vtl1 flat 
!hie aort of into~ticft that .. -
thil tort are atill 
f&e1fic •••• itaelf in 
five to 10 Jl&rs, formulate ita own 
concept of Ykat 4ir ific ahoul4 taka •. Va auat 
rtaain cautious aa4 c&Dnot aajor reaulatorr cb&nl• when v• 
have ao little on vtioh to -aae a ~ilion of the future. 
Vhilt it &Jfe~l p011ible for local esohaft&t rata atab1l1t7 
throuab 19~9 to \a attaiat6 \J a aoieat aaen4aent to Jac1f1c 11 
pea41D& rata 4tt11B tt1ttacn1 eve~ within the liaitationa of tbe 
reven~• shift that h&a •••n iapoet4 earlier in thie p~oott41nl• the 
~k of fao1f1o'• propoaal conat1tute; a tar•reaohi~ 4eparturt from 
ptiiiAt rattaakia, Jroot4urtlt It 11 lot appropriate.to tap&A4 the 
1 
ecope of this rate proote4iat oo~iler euoh a ft*W oocotpt ot 
/ recui&tion, espeoill1J 1D view ot tbt propoeal'e coaples 







poeeible.:torua for cons14er1a& aueh an overhaul. Ont 11 u ;,r 
appl:l.ce:Uon p1"oeilt41nl where f&oific veula :tilt a 4etaile4 requeat to · J 
sate .uch chan&••· an! the other voul4 bt an Or!tr Inat:l.tutifta · 
Inveatiaation where, perhape, we vou14 &44r••• the iaJaot or 
applSoa\111 tr of euch eh&nltl on all lccll exch&nlt carrier a. I will ~~I 
lee.vt 1t to J&c:l.f'io to ta.ke the next tttp 1.1 far 1.1 ita J!rcpoaal ccea .. 11! 
!here fore, l'f IS !'O'Ul) that t '· 
1. lxcept tor tht concept of loeal exch&nlt rate atabtlitr 
throuJh 1989, tht overall prop~ell put forth~ !. J. 8aen111" at the 
btarina on Mar 27, 19!6 will not be cona14ere4 in tbt priaent 
proctt4iq. 
2. Jteauae of the proxia1t1 ot their filina 4ate, an! tht 
confuaion encendtre! b7 tht x_, 27 hearin&, in4epen4ent telephone 
coapaniet' :t111n1 !ate 11 exten4t4 troa June ,0, 1986 to Julr 1•, 
1986. . 
;. It Pacific vithtl the Coami111on to further oonai4er ite .'/1 
propce&l tor a new tJJHt of ratemakiftl replation. it eht.ll filt u. · .· 
application or othtrviee tue reapcnai'btlitr for prcpoainc a proper /. 
tcrua tor ccnl14trin& the aatter. 







· A·l5.01.0,., lal5.0,.078 AC/v41 
CllfUtC.lJJ OP IJBVi2J 
·· I otrtit, ~bat % h&vt ' ' aall thl1 4at ••rve4 a tru. oop7 · 
of tbt or1&iaal attaobt4 At•l,ata Coaa1111oatr'• Iulie& oa Corpor&te 
Otfioer teetiaonJ oa Ill J&rtltl of rtoora in tbla Jrocte41ft& or 
their attor~t71 of reoor4. . 










From: Dennis E. 
President 
The Extensl 
12 Glen Ln 
1 2 Ohm Leno 
N!Nett~, CA. 04047 
(415) 098 4400 
T 
NovatoJ CA. 94947 
To: Assemblywoman 
Gwen Moore 
Ref: Ant! t1ve t I 1n deregu1 
Dear Ms. Moore~ 
business, 
Five the justice department made a decfsion that a 
POl 
monopoly telephone system was not 1n the best interest oi the Un1ted States 
Government or the publ1c. lslon was one that bore no teeth. 
Although legally we have a deregulated lephone system 1n this country~ 1n 
rea11ty) the deregulation has created etwfronment g1vlng telephone ut1llty 
companies a license to steal 
My name is Denn1s Love and I run a small Independent telephone 
serv1ce company ln Mar1n County Cal1forn1a. I started the company 1n March 
of 1985 lnsplred by the governments fntentlon to create a competttlve free 
market system through wh1ch the American dream could be rea11zed. 
Unfortunately~ my dream has turned 1nto a n1ghtmare full or both the bad 
aspects of a regulated industry as well as the bad aspects of a deregulated 
tndustry, I find it hard to believe that this was the true lntent1on of the 
federal government when it first took its historlc step in telephone 
deregulation. 
on November 17th 1985 1 rned a complatnt wfth the ca11rorn1a Public 
Utllltles comm1ss!on (CPUC) charging ant1-compet1t1Ve pract1ces 1n 
violation of federal ant1trust law on the part of Pac1ftc Bell and General 
Telephone of Ca11forn1a. I was represented ln th1s filing by Marty Matt1s of 
Graham and James, a well respected law flrm involved in administrative 
law in the San Franc1sco bay area. It has been two years and six months 
s1nce that fi11ng, but because of legal maneuver·ing on the part of the giant 
uti l ftles and the conspfcuous absence of a dec!sfon on the part of the CPUC, 
the orlglnal Intent or deregulation has not yet materfalfzed ln the state or 
Callfornta the Un1t~d States of America~ although on March 22na the FCC 
183B 
some cost a1l 
brought up 1n our 
1 The 
g1na1 f111ng lth 
dld were Issues that 1 
New business's like mine fight to stay afloat In a sea of ant1- • 
competit1Ve giants and the pub11c continues to be milked by those glants 
who have actual d 1n their concerns were not ith what the 
public wanted~ ders prof 
Ms. MooreJ by the at ions/ they are bound to 
pass JUdgement these three final brlefs l)ave been 
filed. Apr11 20th I spoke with ALJ (Administrative Law Judge) c. Ford who 
Informed me that she had cases could not possibly even think 
about a proposed dec1sl untll July or this year. That would mean nearly 
three years before the the j th1s case. 
Other tssues are pending that w111 have 1ast1ng harmful effects and 
cost the rate-payers <the vot1ng publ1c) mnlions of dollars 1n wasted 
revenues. one such lssue 1s a box that utilltles. not just 1n Ca1iforn1a, but 
across the ent1re nat1on are lnstalllng on the outside wall of all new homes, 
Thls box, called an SNI CStandard Network Interface) has a modular jack 1n1t 
~compat1b1e with all lephones so that anyone who 1s des1rous of 
using your phone servi can walk right up, plug right ln and run up your 
phone bill. The longer is dec on takes, the greater the damage and the 
higher the cost of modifications removal or replacement of these boxes. It is 
estimated this cost for li ia alone will be one bi111on one m1111on 
dollars over the years, to be d for by your voters. While we walt 







being taken 184B 
be 
reasonable for three years but been unsuccessful 1n my patience. I ask 
that you at least take the t1me to lnquire as to the reason thls dec1s1on 
making procQSS, on 1ssuos raisQd ln my complaint/ (cas& 6 8611028 and 
related matters, appl icatfon 85-01-0341 !85-030-78, 011 84 before the 
CPUC), is being tucked away In the bowels of the bottomless pit of the. 
legislation, 
I am asking for your ass1stance in th1s matter in whatever form tt 
may take and would like to mclude you 111 our list of supporters during our 
next media campalgn. We simply must speed up this process! I would be 
happy to speaK wlth you In length on the subject and prov1de you w!tt1 
whatever mater1a1s you may request. Please feel free to call me at (415) 
898-4400. 















a procedural problem. that hiS 
of inside wire installation 
a complaint with this commission alleging 
1 B 
Pacific Bell and General 
) 
1dated wlth app11cat1on 
standing 




be directed to draft, as exped1ently 
days since the date of 
1eve that th1s 
a delay on my case. 
unaware of the 
no longer wllltng to 
" 1 understand that the 
comm1eeion may feel that 1t has "b1gger f1sh to fry", but that does not 
change my right to a decision on the matters 1n question. 
Unt11 this case 1s resolved~ any decisions on other cases will be based 
on a foundation of Quick sand, as this case w111 have a permanent efiect on 
utnit1es regulated operat1ons. would 1t not be better to have a strong 
foundat1on 1n place before bu11d1ng your new house? 
cc: All commissioners~ 
Ms. Bonnie Packer Pac1f1c BellJ 
Ms. Blunt Esq G.T.E. 
Dennis E. Love 
President 
The Extens1cn Connect ton, Inc. 
Mr. Marty Mattes~ Grahm & James 
C. Ford, ALJ 








ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND COMMERCE 
June 6, 1989 
Good morning. My name is Barry Ross and I am the Executive Vice 
President of the California Telephone Association, a trade 
association representing all of the local exchange carriers in 
the state. Today my testimony is focused on the impact of 
alternative regulation of the telephone industry and 
specifically how such changes may affect the smaller companies. 
With twenty three local exchange carriers providing service in 
the state, it's noteworthy that only two the largest two, have 
filed proposals before the California Public Utilities Commission 
for alternative regulation. The remaining twenty one companies 
will be significantly affected by the outcome of the proposals 
under consideration and it is for that reason that these other 
companies have been following closely the proceedings of I. 
87-11-033. 
The small and medium sized companies within California have 
individually and collectively provided input into this lengthy 
decision process. Specifically they have sought to have the 
Commission consider that the impacts of the proposals to their 
companies have not been quantified and they believe it is impor-
tant that some further study be done to show what those impacts 
may be. The changes in zone calling rates and the redefinition 
of what is basic service ( ie. free touch-tone service) as 
proposed by Pacific Bell would have an impact on the services 
provided by the small and medium sized companies. Additionally, 
the freezing of local service rates for a period of time 
also has an impact that has yet to be measured. The same 
would be true if the Commission were to adopt all or parts of 
the GTE California plan. 
It is interesting to note that the California High Cost Fund, a 
mechanism with which the Chairwoman is familiar, is the method 
most of the small and medium sized companies have recommended as 
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reform under way. 
.87-11-033, is 




Are the proposals here in California or the myriad of national 
proposals of alternative regulation the final regulatory answers? 
The answer is a definite no. Will there be modifications and 
changes along the way? The answer is yes. Is it possible for 
California to make changes once it decides on some alternative 
form of regulation? The answer is yes. Contrary to what many 
here today may have you think, the process will not be cast in 
stone. The requests made by Pacific Bell, GTE and the DRA are 
each limited in time and come with modifiers that preserve the 
Commission's power to assure consumer's interests are properly 
weighed against the company's interests. 
The small and medium sized companies find significant benefit to 
proceeding forward with the current investigation. We believe 
that an adequate record has been established that these companies 
are all affected by the outcome of the Commission's decision. 
Just as the small and medium sized companies have not filed 
actual proposals for alternative regulation, it would be inappro-
priate to apply the resolutions found in this proceeding in a 
broad brush manner to these companies. Additionally, the small 
and medium sized companies believe they should be permitted at 
some later time to exercise an individual option on whether to 
come under such alternative forms of regulation. 
Depending on who you are and what you want out of this process, 
the Commission investigation may be either very burdensome and 
cumbersome or exceedingly swift and lacking in consumer and 
customer input. But that's the nature of a regulated vs. 
competitive environment. We in the industry trust that we will 
be able to persuade the policy makers that this process, as 
laborious and burdensome as it is, should and must result in a 
better mouse trap, a better way to address the traditional 
goals of regulation for the telephone industry. We believe 
that a very strong argument can be made that we should try. 
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this very 
important issue. 
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